GERMANY/RUSSIA: CHANCELLERY VIEWS ON MAP FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 000749

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON GM RS GG UP
SUBJECT: GERMANY/RUSSIA: CHANCELLERY VIEWS ON MAP FOR
UKRAINE AND GEORGIA

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JEFF RATHKE. REASONS: 1.4 (
B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary David Merkel
discussed Russian political developments and
Ukrainian/Georgian MAP with Deputy National Security Advisor
Rolf Nikel and Chancellery Director for East European and
Central Asian Affairs Norman Walter June 4. Because of DAS
Merkel's long relationship with Nikel, the meeting was warm
and friendly, which facilitated a frank exchange of views.
Nikel agreed that Russia should have "no say" over who was
allowed to join NATO, but emphasized that it was important
that any future NATO enlargement be part of a "broader
vision" of how the Alliance planned to engage Russia. Nikel
noted that every round of NATO enlargement since the end of
the Cold War had been "accompanied by some step in the
direction of Russia." Both Nikel and Walter raised concerns
that if MAP were pushed forward too quickly in Ukraine, where
public opinion is bitterly divided on the issue of NATO
membership, it could prove destabilizing and "split" the
country. They also emphasized that they do not expect a
decision on MAP at the December NATO foreign ministerial.
However, they were open to maintaining a regular dialogue on
these issues in the coming months and were receptive to DAS
Merkel's efforts to spell out some indicators that would help
determine whether Ukraine and Georgia were on the right path
to MAP. END SUMMARY.

Read-out
--------------


2. (C) DAS Merkel began the meeting, at the request of Nikel
and Walter, by giving a short read-out on the highlights of
his just completed visit to Moscow. Merkel noted that he had
emphasized to his Russian interlocutors the importance of
maintaining a good investment climate, especially in regard
to the TNK-BP oil company, which was the single largest
foreign investor in Russia. Merkel noted that if the
Russians prevented operations, it would have a negative
effect on production and the investment climate, suggesting a
return to the 1990's manner of doing business. Merkel also
remarked that the press tended to focus too much on the
supposed differences between Putin and Medvedev, which were
really not that great, given the Medvedev had worked under
Putin for the past 17 years. Merkel thought that Medvedev
might use his June 5 trip to Germany, his first to Europe as
president, as a "coming-out party" in addressing foreign
policy issues, given that these issues were not discussed in
great detail during FM Steinmeier's visit to Russia in May.
Merkel noted that there was a great deal of speculation in
Moscow about the Putin-Medvedev tandem and the possibility of
a forthcoming power struggle, with most interlocutors
believing that Medvedev would win out in the end.

MAP
--------------


3. (C) DAS Merkel said he was curious how Medvedev would
address Ukraine during his visit to Berlin and how the
Chancellor intended to respond. He noted that Putin had been
surprised to see the NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration
language, which flatly states Ukraine and Georgia will become
members of NATO. Nikel joked that Putin was not the only one
to be surprised by the Bucharest language, intimating that it
went a lot farther than many German officials had expected.
Nikel emphasized, however, that notwithstanding the very
forward-leaning declaration, no decision had been taken at
Bucharest on offering Ukraine or Georgia MAP and that Germany
did not expect a decision on MAP to be taken at the December
NATO foreign ministerial. He said that the December
ministerial would be the "first" assessment, indicating that
further assessments would follow.


4. (C) Nikel also emphasized that the geo-strategic context
of a Georgian accession to NATO was quite different from that
of Ukraine. While Georgia was "just a bug on the skin of the
bear," Ukraine was inseparably identified with Russia, going
back to Vladimir of Kiev in 988. While acknowledging that
Russia should have "no say" over who was allowed to join
NATO, it was important that any future NATO enlargement was
part of a "broader vision" of how the Alliance planned to
engage Russia. Nikel noted that every round of NATO
enlargement since the end of the Cold War had been

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"accompanied by some step in the direction of Russia" (i.e.,
creation of the Joint Partnership Council in 1997 and upgrade
of the PJC to the NATO-Russia Council in 2002). Nikel said
Germany thought it was wrong to see MAP as a "tool" to
facilitate democratic and military reforms in countries like
Ukraine and Georgia, when it was really the last step to NATO
membership. NATO was a defense alliance that existed for the
benefit of its members "as a hedge against whatever might
happen." Nikel said it was important to take the Article 5
obligation of the NATO Treaty seriously and be prepared to
explain to parliamentarians why the Alliance should be
willing to defend these countries.

Ukraine
--------------


5. (C) Nikel raised three specific concerns about Ukraine
that he felt made it risky at this stage to offer it the
membership action plan (MAP): 1) overall low public support
for NATO membership, 2) a deep divide between the eastern and
western parts of the country on this question, and 3) a weak
government with a small majority in the Rada. Walter agreed
and thought that MAP and the issue of NATO membership could
"break up the country" if pushed forward too quickly. He
noted that the three leadQg political leaders were "all in
opposition to each other," creating a great deal of political
instability. Each took foreign policy positions based on
domestic political considerations, with little regard to the
long-term effects on the country. In this environment, it
was difficult to gauge whether there was a genuine commitment
to pursuing NATO membership or whether it was just a
convenient position to take in the current power struggle.
Walter said greater political "maturity" was necessary in
order for Ukraine to be in a position to be taken seriously
for MAP and eventual NATO membership.


6. (C) Nikel also raised concerns about whether Ukrainian
officials, given their long historical ties to Russia, could
be trusted not share classified NATO documents and
information with Moscow. DAS Merkel suggested that the U.S.
and Germany work together in the coming months to define some
steps that Ukraine could take to demonstrate that it is ready
forQAP. These could include: having a functioning and
stable government, demonstrating government support for NATO
that goes beyond President Yushchenko, maintaining support
for a NATO bid even if the government were to change before
December, and carrying out a public education program. Nikel
and Walter agreed that this would be a useful exercise and
encouraged a regular dialogue on these issues in the coming
months.

Georgia
--------------


7. (C) Nikel noted that President Saakashvili would be coming
to Berlin June 25 to meet with Chancellor Merkel, which the
Germans saw as a good opportunity to reaffirm the importance
of Georgia making further progress on democratic and rule of
law reforms and not letting itself be provoked into doing
"stupid things" by the Russians. Nikel claimed that Germany
was just as brutally frank with the Russians, "telling them
square in the face" that the more they provoked the
Georgians, the sooner Georgia would get MAP. Nikel said the
Germans hope to use the June 12 Friends of Georgia Quad
meeting in Berlin to coordinate ways of positively
influencing Russian and Georgian behavior. He noted that it
was still not clear whether there would be a full Friends of
Georgia meeting on June 13 -- the Russians had not indicated
whether they were coming. (Note: We understand that in his
meeting with Merkel June 5, Medvedev confirmed that the
Russians would indeed attend.)


8. (C) Nikel also noted that German National Security Advisor
Heusgen planned to call Georgian Foreign Minister
Tkeshelashvili right after Russian President Medvedev's June
5-6 visit to Berlin. Heusgen wanted to give her a read-out
on the visit in order to help prepare President Saakashvili
for his meeting with Medvedev on the margins of the June 6-8
St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. DAS Merkel
welcomed the German initiative, noting that the outreach
would be much appreciated by the Georgians and make them feel
like they are part of the "team." He noted that the goal was
to get all sides involved in Abkhazia to calm down and

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de-escalate tensions. He said in terms of managing Georgia,
it was important to acknowledge to them that we view Russian
actions as provocative.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) This meeting confirmed that the Germans remain very
reluctant about extending MAP to Ukraine and Georgia,
especially in the short term. We have our work cut out for
us in convincing them to agree to MAP at the December NATO
foreign ministerial. However, it is positive that the
Germans are open to a regular dialogue with us on this issue
and are willing to discuss the kinds of progress in Ukraine
and Georgia that might make MAP more acceptable to them.


10. (U) This cable was cleared by DAS Merkel.
TIMKEN JR