Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BERLIN540
2008-04-25 16:39:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Berlin
Cable title:  

GERMANY: OPEN TO CUSTOMS TRAINING ROLE FOR OSCE IN

Tags:  PREL OSCE AF GM 
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VZCZCXRO8343
OO RUEHBW RUEHIK RUEHPOD RUEHYG
DE RUEHRL #0540/01 1161639
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 251639Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1051
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000540 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/RPM - RICHARD PROSEN
USOSCE FOR DIANA BROWN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL OSCE AF GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY: OPEN TO CUSTOMS TRAINING ROLE FOR OSCE IN
AFGHANISTAN, BUT REMAIN TO BE CONVINCED

REF: STATE 39820

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000540 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/RPM - RICHARD PROSEN USOSCE FOR DIANA BROWN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL OSCE AF GM SUBJECT: GERMANY: OPEN TO CUSTOMS TRAINING ROLE FOR OSCE IN AFGHANISTAN, BUT REMAIN TO BE CONVINCED REF: STATE 39820 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Pol-mil/external chief delivered reftel points to MFA Afghanistan desk officer Clemens Hach and OSCE desk officer Eric Tosatti April 24, emphasizing that the U.S. felt it was important to go forward as soon as possible in implementing the December 2007 decision on providing OSCE technical assistance to Afghanistan and that this assistance should include OSCE projects within Afghanistan itself. Drawing on reftel, pol-mil/external chief also explained in detail the U.S. proposal for a three-phased OSCE customs training program for Afghanistan. While not willing to commit themselves, both Hach and Tosatti agreed that the U.S. proposal was intriguing and deserved further consideration. END SUMMARY. Looking for Added Value -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Hach noted that one of Germany's main concerns had been that the OSCE provide real added value and not duplicate assistance already being provided by another international organization. He was relieved to hear that the U.S. was not proposing that the OSCE get involved in police training, which Germany felt was already being adequately covered by the U.S.-led Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and the European Union Police Mission (EUPOL). He noted that Ambassador Salber's assessment report had been "full" of ideas about OSCE support for police training, which Germany thought would be redundant with current assistance. Clemens agreed that customs training sounded like a fruitful area for the OSCE to provide added value. Pol-mil/external chief pointed out that since the OSCE was already providing this kind of training/assistance to customs officials from Afghanistan's northern neighbors, it only made sense to provide the same kind of training/assistance to their Afghan counterparts. Concern about an OSCE "Permanent Presence" in Afghanistan -------------- -------------- ¶3. (SBU) On the issue of carrying out OSCE training within Afghanistan itself, Tosatti noted that the OSCE has never had a permanent presence in any non-OSCE member country and that Germany supported a continuation of this policy. He argued that establishing a permanent OSCE presence in Afghanistan would constitute "a huge cha
nge in the gravitational center" of the OSCE and could have serious budgetary consequences. ¶4. (SBU) Pol-mil/external chief pointed out that the U.S. was proposing that the program be funded through extra-budgetary means and that several countries had already expressed an interest in donating the necessary funds. This program would not divert funds from other worthwhile OSCE programs. Hach agreed that the relatively small of money contemplated for the four-year customs training program (less than 30 million Euros) should not be considered a major impediment to going forward with this program. ¶5. (SBU) Pol-mil/external chief also noted that by definition, the OSCE presence would not be "permanent," since the proposal was for a four-year program and was based on a train-the-trainer concept. The idea was that the Afghans would eventually assume responsibility for running the customs training themselves. In addition, the idea was for the training and mentoring to be conducted near border points along Afghanistan's northern border. If necessary to meet concerns about security and not having a "permanent" OSCE presence in Afghanistan, OSCE trainers and mentors involved in the program could perhaps reside in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, but travel daily to their duty stations in Afghanistan. Worthy of Further Consideration -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Both Hach and Tosatti indicated that while they were still not ready to "jump in" and support the U.S. proposal, they found it intriguing and worth further consideration during the upcoming stock-taking exercise (phase I of the U.S. proposal). To ensure good coordination with other international actors providing similar training (to the border police, for example),Hach floated the idea of having an OSCE liaison officer based at the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) in Kabul. Comment -------------- BERLIN 00000540 002 OF 002 ¶7. (SBU) The Germans are basically judging the U.S. proposal by two criteria: 1) Is the identified area for assistance a real gap that no other organization is currently filling? and 2) Is the OSCE the right organization to fill that gap, i.e., does it bring real expertise and value added to the table? If we can make a convincing case on these two key points, then the issue of conducting this training in Afghanistan itself, near the northern border, should be easier to manage. The Germans acknowledge that trying to run an effective Afghan customs training program outside the country would not make much sense. END COMMENT. TIMKEN JR

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