SUB PRIME CRISIS GETTING COSTLY FOR GERMAN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 000469 SIPDIS SIPDIS TREASURY PASS TO FEDERAL RESERVE USEU FOR B. MATTHEWS, J. NUTTER E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: EFIN PREL PGOV GM SUBJECT: SUB PRIME CRISIS GETTING COSTLY FOR GERMAN BANKS: THE LATEST VIEW FROM BERLIN REF: (A) FRANKFURT 1001 (B) BERLIN 112, (C) BERLIN 161 ¶1. SUMMARY: With all major year-end reports of German banks now in, the impact of the U.S. sub prime crisis on German banking is beginning to reveal its full extent of damage. The story emerging is one of a sector largely intact, but bruised and ripe for consolidation. Set for a record profit year, German banks lost much of their margin in the second half of 2007 due to the deepening sub prime impact. Despite significant write-downs, most German private banks managed to remain in the black for the year. However, several German state banks, as well as SME lender bank IKB, were on the brink of collapse and various rescue packages needed to be constructed. The federal government now supports more consolidation in the industry, which the states (Laender) continue to resist. Banking and financial authorities are also calling for more transparency and Finance Minister Steinbrueck wants more regulation. The banking industry has countered by proposing a voluntary "code of conduct" to better prepare the financial markets for future crises and stave off further regulation. END SUMMARY. 2007 - Not Bad Until... -------------- ¶2. Eight months into the sub prime mortgage crisis, a clearer picture of its impact on the German banking sector is emerging as major banks publish their 2007 reports. According to the Head of the Association of Private Banks, Klaus-Peter Mueller, the 2007 reports show that it would have been an "extraordinary year" if not for the crisis; despite write-downs due to the U.S. sub prime turmoil, almost all major German banks posted profits in 2007. ¶3. This is all the more impressive when the full extent of exposure of German banks to U.S. sub prime loans is known. Standard & Poors calculates that Germany's 16 largest banks face write-downs of more than 18 billion euros in the second half of 2007 alone. As a result, S&P estimates that German banks' profits fell by 80 percent between July and December of 2007 to 3 billion euros. State Banks and IKB - The System's Achilles Heal -------------- --- ¶4. While Germany's private banks weathered the crisis relatively well, a number of state banks (Landesbanken),jointly owned by one of the German states and regional savings banks, were severely hit by the international financial crisis. Three of the seven state banks that invested heavily in U.S. sub prime securities -- Sachsen LB, WestLB and BayernLB -- had to be rescued from insolvency with public money. While SachsenLB escaped bankruptcy by being bought by Germany's largest state bank, LBBW (Baden- Wuertemberg),WestLB and BayernLB are still in limbo with reported losses of 5 billion and 4.3 billion euros respectively. A Bundestag financial expert told the Embassy that in the case of WestLB, the federal government was approached to bail out the bank. Finance Minister Steinbrueck rejected such calls, pointing to the responsibility of the German states to rescue "their" own banks. The Finance Ministry told us that the government would like to force a merger among state banks, but feared that the states would then seek compensation for their attempts to bail the banks out. ¶5. The SME lender IKB (Industrie Kreditbank) was the first bank to be hit by the sub prime crisis in July ¶2007. Since then, IKB's losses have mounted and federal government-owned KfW bank (together with the Association of Private Banks) is now on its third attempt to keep the bank afloat. The rescue operation has depleted the 5 billion euro KfW emergency fund and currently totals eight billion euros, with no end in sight. "In the end, the federal government will have to come in directly with taxpayer money; it can't and won't allow the bank to go under," a representative of the Association of Savings Banks told the Embassy. On April 8, KfW's handling of the crisis led to the BERLIN 00000469 002 OF 003 resignation of KfW Chief Ingrid Matthaeus-Maier, who was criticized for her handling of the IKB operation. Consolidation: Much Speculation - Little Action -------------- -- ¶6. Germany's banking industry has long been regarded as ripe for consolidation. The current crisis is viewed by many analysts here as the trigger to finally set the wheels in motion. There is widespread consensus within the industry and the federal government that state banks lack a sustainable business model. Their embrace of risky U.S. sub prime securities is seen as ample proof that these banks were forced to take on risk they didn't understand in order to generate profits to stay afloat. Analysts favor a merger of all state banks into one institution that could then aid the savings banks in financing overseas investments by German SMEs. So far, however, state governments (mainly those of Bavaria and North Rhine Westphalia) have blocked any meaningful merger. As a prominent Budnestag deputy from Bavaria told Embassy, "the issue is still taboo." ¶7. Most of the merger dynamic appears to be coming instead from the stated intention of Deutsche Post to sell its subsidiary "Post Bank." With more than 10 million customers, Post Bank is one of Germany's biggest retail banks. Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank, with their notoriously weak retail business, have both expressed interest in buying Post Bank. Another potential buyer is Allianz, which has for years been unhappy with the performance of its subsidiary Dresdner Bank. So far though, there is much talk and little action. Both Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank have already failed with earlier take-over attempts and are likely to approach the matter with caution. A contact at the German Savings Bank Association in Berlin told us that a merger of Postbank with a private bank would require a lot of time, money and energy since two distinctly different business cultures would have to be combined. Reactions: Risk Management is Gold, Equity is Key -------------- -------------- ¶8. In recent weeks Steinbrueck, German Banking Supervisory Authority (BaFin) Chief Jochen Sanio, and Bundesbank President Axel Weber have called separately for banks to fully disclose their exposure to U.S. sub prime investments and to list related write-downs. According to all three, such a step is needed to restore confidence in financial markets. Bundesbank President Weber used a Berlin April 7 event of the Association of Private Banks to stress the importance of risk and liquidity management by banks. "In the recent boom years, there was not a great need for either", Weber said, "but the crisis has shown that one cannot neglect them without increasing the risk of being caught off guard when a crisis approaches." ¶9. Steinbrueck and BaFin Chief Sanio emphasize higher equity underwriting of risk-prone investments. They intend to propose changes that would further tighten Basel II banking regulations which came into force on January 1, 2008. Bundesbank's Weber and representatives of private banks reject calls for a so-called Basel III agreement, arguing that current rules have not had time to take full effect. In a possible move to counter mandated government actions, the IIF (International Institute for Finance) at an April 9 meeting in Berlin proposed a voluntary "code of conduct" for banks that incorporates suggestions made by regulators and government representatives. Apart from improved risk management by banks, the IIF also calls for changes in the IFRS accounting system. The IIF and the Bundesbank regard the IFRS requirement for frequent evaluations of bank assets as "pro- cyclical." "Especially in the very volatile environment we currently have, Weber said, repeated reports of write-downs make the markets even more nervous." Comment -------------- ¶10. The emerging dynamic of a push and pull between BERLIN 00000469 003 OF 003 the federal and state governments on consolidation and federal government and the private banks on tighter regulation can be expected to continue over the next several months. Where the state banks and regulators eventually land is a story still in progress. How it ends will no doubt be largely shaped by the ability of German banks to recover from their bruises. More bad news -- always a possibility -- will continue to drive the momentum for fewer German banks and more regulation. TIMKEN, JR