A/S WELCH DISCUSSES IRAN, ANNAPOLIS, SYRIA, AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BERLIN 000188 SIPDIS SIPDIS, P, T, NEA, IO, ISN, EUR/AGS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL KPAL SY IS GM IR SUBJECT: A/S WELCH DISCUSSES IRAN, ANNAPOLIS, SYRIA, AND LEBANON WITH SENIOR GERMAN OFFICIALS Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JEFFREY RATHKE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B/D). ¶1. (C) Summary: MFA State Secretary Reinhard Silberberg told A/S Welch in a February 11 meeting that the MFA does not agree that it is necessary to push for an immediate UNSC Iran sanctions resolution before the next IAEA report is issued, although Germany is not against such a push. A/S Welch underlined that the P5 plus one had agreed to push for an immediate resolution. A/S Welch also pressed Silberberg, as well as Chancellor Merkel's National Security Advisor Christoph Heusgen in a subsequent meeting, to take a tougher approach on Syria and to support Lebanon including by ensuring the quick transfer of its financial commitment to the Hariri Tribunal. On Syria, the MFA argued for the need to engage Syria to prevent it from moving toward Iran, while the Chancellery responded by highlighting the divergent views on a Syria approach within the EU. A/S Welch discussed the Annapolis process and the way forward on Gaza in both meetings as well. End Summary. -------------- MFA Ready to Wait for IAEA Report -------------- ¶2. (C) A/S Welch inquired about Germany's position on the timing of the UNSCR vote on the Iran sanctions resolution, noting that it is the U.S. view that the P5 plus one had agreed on the need to proceed immediately. Silberberg said that if a consensus on the UNSCR exists before the IAEA issues its report on the Iranian Work Plan, Germany is willing to follow; however, Germany will not press for UNSCR passage before the report is issued. Silberberg continued that it would be worth securing as many votes on the UNSC as possible, underscoring his concern about Libya and Vietnam, as well as the chance for two or three negative votes. A/S Welch noted that these possible negative votes are in fact, soluble, and could be abstentions, adding that the United States will be engaging with Libya. Silberberg then switched tracks, saying that if the Baradei report comes out on February 22, Russia and China will almost certainly delay. He added that it is important that the UNSCR text not be put into question again, regardless of the Baradei report's contents. ¶3. (C) Silberberg noted that the EU's autonomous sanctions list had been approved February 8 and included Bank Melli, "for which the EU-3 pressed hard." He added that the formal decision would be post-UNSCR and said "we can deliver on that side." -------------- Annapolis in Light of Gaza -------------- ¶4. (C) Silberberg commented that Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's February 10-12 visit to Berlin comes at an interesting time: events such as the Gaza border incident and the first suicide bombing in Israel in over a year have captured public attention while less-visible negotiations between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Israel have focused on tough issues. A/S Welch said that the parties are unlikely to expose the negotiations to outside scrutiny due to public reaction and political sensitivities. While the negotiations are sealed, the public observes negative and controversial activities on the ground, ranging from rocket attacks, suicide bombings, settlement building, the Gaza border incident, and construction in East Jerusalem. Negotiators face the challenge of preventing any compromise of the negotiations by these ongoing events. One idea to address these problems has been to have each side examine what it could do on the ground to build confidence and address the need for public reassurance. For example, the PA could do more to address security problems while Israel could take positive action in such areas as illegal outposts, the control regime in the West Bank, or prisoner releases. Silberberg asked if a readiness exists on the Israel side, noting that he perceives Prime Minister Olmert and Defense Minister Ehud Barack as the most important players. Welch added that Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni is increasingly important and Olmert has put her firmly in charge of the negotiations track. She has developed a good rapport with PA chief negotiator Abu Ala'a. Meetings are being held with two teams on each side and appear to work; the teams will be expanded to include experts. A/S Welch underlined that each side should pick up the pace of negotiations, noting that Chancellor Merkel should discuss this with Olmert. -------------- BERLIN 00000188 002 OF 004 Discussion on Crossing Re-Openings -------------- ¶5. (C) Raising the Karni crossing, Silberberg inquired as to whether the United States had taken any action. He noted that for the Europeans, a crisis exists in addressing the Rafah border crossing. Europeans do not see the appropriate conditions for a re-opening of the crossing, since police officers in Gaza would need protection. A/S Welch agreed that this is an issue and added that differences exist both among the parties and within the parties as to how to proceed. He noted that the closure policy has been unsuccessful, but it is not clear how Olmert sees the best way forward. Israel is concerned about maintaining security, reducing its responsibility for the situation in Gaza, maintaining Israeli-Egyptian relations, and assisting Abbas, but is not sure about how to meet these goals. ¶6. (C) Silberberg asked if the Rafah border crossing could function on Egyptian soil. A/S Welch said it could work, but that questions would still remain about the Gaza side. Egypt is disposed to cooperate, but is concerned about how the control regime on the Palestinian side would function: "No one wants Hamas to operate the only Palestinian Authority-run border crossing," Welch underlined. ¶7. (C) Silberberg then asked about possible options for Israel in reacting to rocket attacks from Gaza; he noted that targeted killings carried out by Israeli forces produce "more solidarity" in the Palestinian Authority. Welch responded that Israel faces a selection of bad choices and must decide which is the worst. Israel could squeeze Gaza as a whole, including limiting water and electricity, but this could lead to a repeat of the Rafah border breakdown. The second option, military operations, is not appealing, a point Olmert underscored in his February 10 comments. A third option would be to reach a balance with Hamas such as what existed before, an approach that Egypt would promote. We have to find a way to protect the negotiations from this sort of external pressure, A/S Welch added. ¶8. (C) Silberberg asked if pressure can be brought to bear on Egypt to close the smuggling tunnels into Gaza, calling it a real chance to buttress Olmert. Welch agreed that more effort should be made in applying such pressure and that now is the time to do so. More development efforts from our side, such as the U.S. providing special equipment, will help but will not solve the problem, A/S Welch said, adding that Egypt instead needs to focus more on its intelligence effort against smuggling, particularly within Egypt. Egyptian national pride was offended by the Palestinian border incident; thus, now is the moment to press for Egyptian action. Welch continued that Israel may also be willing to change its rhetoric, as public scolding about Egyptian smuggling brings nothing. ¶9. (C) Inquiring about the timeline for negotiations, Silberberg questioned the likelihood of the parties reaching an agreement by the end of 2008. Welch said it is possible, depending on the type of agreement, its content, and how it would be implemented. The new facet is that negotiations are able to take place in a poor security environment, Welch noted, but he added that implementation of any agreement cannot take place in such an environment. Both sides want to succeed and feel success is attainable if the other side makes the necessary compromises; failure would present the risk that radicals on both sides could torpedo efforts. We do not see any political impediment in Israel, said Welch. -------------- Germany Doesn't Get It on Syria -------------- ¶10. (C) A/S Welch raised U.S. concerns about Syrian negative involvement in Lebanon with both Silberberg and in a subsequent meeting that day with NSA Heusgen in the Chancellery, who was joined by Ludger Siemes, Chief, Foreign Policy Desk, (Asia, Middle East, Africa, Latin America) Chancellery, and his deputy, Karl Klause. A/S Welch noted in the Chancellery meeting that the European position on Syria is actually weaker than that of the Arab League, which would like to see Syria isolated. He questioned why the EU approach is not as tough-minded. Welch added that purposeful engagement could be defended, but only insofar as benchmarks are set. Siemes said that Germany supports benchmarks and acknowledged that the EU does not speak with one voice on Syria, but is working toward this. Siemes argued that the Arab League should be in the lead in advocating a tough approach and should convince other countries to follow suit. Welch questioned whether Germany's expectations of the Arab BERLIN 00000188 003 OF 004 League are unrealistic. Welch said that the Arab League may, at some point, initiate sanctions on Syria. He noted that the EU has no such sanctions and advocated that the EU should consider what tougher actions it could take, including issuing tough public statements, regulating diplomatic relations, taking symbolic actions, including to mark the anniversary of Hariri's death, and could also consider travel restrictions. Siemes repeated that the EU is split on this issue but alluded to some type of effort by the EU in the coming weeks. ¶11. (C) Silberberg asked for Welch's thoughts on Russian plans for an Annapolis follow-up meeting, during which Syria would want to pursue the Golan issue. A/S Welch noted that there is no formal proposal on the table for such a meeting and added that feedback from Israel would be necessary. Welch underlined the need to sustain the Annapolis momentum. Palestinian officials are not interested in the Syrian track; conservative Arabs, when pressed, are also disinterested, said Welch. Nonetheless, he added, while no one wants to dismiss opening a door, the question remains whether Syria is the right door. Unlike the PA's approach, he said, the Syrian position has always been passive or negative, but never constructive. In the Chancellery meeting, Siemes asked about what he characterized as a "German think tank" view that the United States must consent to Israel opening negotiations with Syria. Welch responded that this is a misconception, that if Israel decided to proceed with Syria, the United States would not stand in its way. ¶12. (C) Silberberg noted that Germany and the United States have different views on Syria. If Syria were to develop a constructive approach in Lebanon, more conservative Arabs would support such a move. That would be a good point to activate the Syria track, he added. He asserted that it is difficult to estimate how strong the Syrian influence in Lebanon really is; it has taken on a spoiler role, he said, but added that we do not know enough about Syria's role in convincing Lebanese politicians on the ground. A/S Welch replied that no review of the situation in Lebanon is possible without coming to the conclusion that Syria has the preponderance of influence in Lebanon. Syria could be making positive steps like summoning Hezbollah's leadership to Damascus, making constructive public statements, and promoting quiet in the Palestinian camps in Lebanon. Instead, A/S Welch said, the Syrians have decided that they do not care. Syria has also made clear, Welch continued, that it is apathetic about the Arab League Summit, with Vice-President Farouk al-Sharaa saying that Lebanon is more important than the Arab League summit. The Arab League will have to decide at a later point how to best deal with the question of the summit's delegations and location. ¶13. (C) Silberberg asked if there is any possibility of influencing Damascus to recalculate their costs and benefits. Welch answered that Damascus feels it is in fine shape. Silberberg replied that "if we press too hard, then the Syrians will turn to Iran"; Germany is seeking to decouple the two. Welch inquired, "why does Germany feel more strongly about the threat of a Syrian-Iranian axis than the Saudis?" Silberberg answered that they seek to convince Assad to change directions. Welch then asked if Germany had any evidence that this policy is working and if Germany had set benchmarks to evaluate Syrian progress. Silberberg answered that Lebanon and Hamas each serve as benchmarks. -------------- -------------- Lebanon: Germans Promise to Follow-Up on Tribunal Funding -------------- -------------- ¶14. (C) Turning to Lebanon, Welch stressed the need to support the current government. Silberberg asked if Lebanon is managing well without a President, to which Welch answered that the political crisis has not turned into a popular crisis. Concerns do exist in the Christian community, however, including among Christians within the March 14th movement. ¶15. (C) Welch noted that the appearance and fact of European unity towards Damascus could impact Syria's calculations and behavior. He encouraged the EU to continue to make strong statements on Syrian wrongdoings; he also noted that the level of reception is very important to the Syrians and noted USG disagreement with FM Muallem's January visit to Germany. Silberberg defended the meeting, saying that this was a deal struck with the Syrians in order to ensure their participation in Annapolis. Welch replied that the Syrians would have attended Annapolis anyway, given the placement of an agenda item that the Syrians could not have refused to join. Our perception is that European policy is confused, BERLIN 00000188 004 OF 004 Welch said. ¶16. (C) Welch added that on Lebanon, some things could be done, including countries delivering on pledges of financial support for the Tribunal, particularly given the upcoming third anniversary of the assassination of Rafik al-Hariri. Silberberg promised to look into the status of the funding. Welch also raised this issue in his Chancellery meeting, and asked if the transfer of the funding could be accelerated to meet the UN Secretary General's goal of obtaining the necessary commitment to mark the anniversary of Hariri's death. Heusgen said he would look into the matter and asked how the MFA had responded to Welch's inquiry. To Silberberg, Welch encouraged Germany to explore how it can support the Siniora government; he underscored the border projects, calling Germany "hugely helpful" in UNIFIL. Silberberg pledged continued German participation in UNIFIL and maritime activities. ¶17. (U) This cable has been cleared with NEA A/S Welch. TIMKEN JR