IRAN: GERMAN OFFICIALS SHARE THOUGHTS ON NIE, P5+1

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BERLIN 000180 SIPDIS SIPDIS, P, T, NEA/IR, ISN, EUR/AGS, SCA E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2018 TAGS: PREL ENRG PARM KNNP IR GM IN CH SUBJECT: IRAN: GERMAN OFFICIALS SHARE THOUGHTS ON NIE, P5+1 INCENTIVE PACKAGE, AND AUTONOMOUS MEASURES WITH AMBASSADOR SCHULTE BERLIN 00000180 001.2 OF 005 Classified By: Minister Counselor for Political Affairs Jeffrey Rathke for reasons 1.4(b)/(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador Greg Schulte's January 31-February 1 discussions with key German officials covered a range of proliferation issues, including Iran, U.S.-India Civil Nuclear cooperation, and international nuclear fuel bank proposals. On Iran, German officials repeated their strong preference for multilateral sanctions to include the largest number of countries possible, their continued hope for cooperation by the Iranians on the IAEA Work Plan, and their desire for improved communication concerning both the P5 1 incentive package and U.S. intentions towards Iran. Discussions revealed continued concerns at the Chancellery and MFA as to how far Germany is willing or able to go on unilateral measures against Iran and the likelihood of these measures' success. MFA officials were especially anxious about Chinese firms taking over Germany's former position in the Iranian market, as well as the continuing expansion of Chinese-Iranian trade relations. Further high-level USG engagement with the Germans a common approach to China may help to reinvigorate German policymakers. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: Foreshadowing their upcoming chairing of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG),German officials laid out the criteria which they will use to assess civil nuclear cooperation with India, underlining their concerns about the effect such an AGREEMENT will have on the NPT. Ambassador Schulte praised FM Steinmeier's international fuel bank proposal -- the "Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary Project" -- but stressed the need to simultaneously pursue nearer-term options, such as the Russian proposal, given that many countries are currently making decisions about civilian nuclear energy. We should encourage Germany that its role as NSG Chair would give it the domestic political cover it needs to be active in international nuclear energy initiatives. END SUMMARY. ¶3. (C) During his January 31- February 1 visit to Berlin, Ambassador Greg Schulte, U.S. Prmanent Representative to International Organizaions in Vienna, met with key German officials todiscuss the Iranian nuclear issue, U.S.-India Ciil Nuclear cooperation, and international fuel ban models. Interlocutors included Deputy National ecurity Advisor-equivalent Rolf Nikel, Federal Cmmissioner for Arms Control Friedrich Groenig, MA Director General for International Economic Afairs Ruediger von Fritsch, and MFA Commissioner or Middle East Affairs Andreas Michaelis. -------------- NO CHANGES IN GERMAN STRATEGY POST-NIE -------------- ¶4. (C) Deputy National Security Advisor Rolf Nikel gave a frank assessment of the NIE's effect, claiming the NIE had complicated efforts to convince Germans of the merits of our joint approach, a task which was already hard enough. The "only positive aspect" is that the international community now may have a little more time before Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, Nikel said, referring to the NIE's projected 2010 to 2015 timeline. This does not mean a change of tactics or strategy, he said. "We base our policy not only on intelligence but other things and German policy has not been influenced by the NIE," said Nikel. MFA DG for Economic Affairs Ruediger von Fritch noted that President Ahmadi-Nejad's "threats" are what impact the German position the most. Nikel added that Germany's Federal Intelligence Service (BND) still has many open questions on U.S. assessments and methodology, despite having received access to an expanded version of the NIE. -------------- -------------- GERMANY OBSERVING MULTILATERAL ACTIONS ON IRAN CLOSELY -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) SATISFACTION WITH UNSCR ELEMENTS: Nikel expressed German satisfaction with the UNSCR draft. While more could have been included, "we had to see the reality and importance of maintaining unity, especially after the NIE," he said. Nikel emphasized the need to adopt the UNSCR as soon as possible, predicting the end of February. Similarly, von BERLIN 00000180 002.2 OF 005 Fritsch praised the text as an important step, saying that a cohesive, multilateral approach is key. ¶6. (C) MFA STILL OPTIMISTIC ON IAEA WORK PLAN: Federal Commissioner Groening expressed hope that the Work Plan will deliver on its aspirations. Later, he also emphasized that the Germans want to see what results the Work Plan process will bring. He criticized ElBaradei's call for a "public confession," as it did not offer the Iranians a face-saving measure. ¶7. (C) Economic DG von Fritsch expanded on German interest in the Work Plan, stating that the P5 1 Ministers had agreed on January 22 that, assuming the Work Plan is delivered on time, the new UNSCR needed to "coincide" with the release of IAEA DG ElBaradei's report on the status of the Work Plan. He added that this would aid the overarching goal of helping the IAEA to maintain access in Iran. Ambassador Schulte noted that he was not aware any AGREEMENT to delay a UNSCR for the IAEA report. (NOTE: Subsequent discussions, including between A/S Welch and MFA State Secretary Silberberg (reported septel) indicate that Germany would welcome, but will not push for UNSCR passage before the Work Plan report. END NOTE) ¶8. (C) GERMANS CALL FOR MORE DETAIL, BETTER DISSEMINATION OF INCENTIVES PACKAGE: Nikel agreed with Ambassador Schulte that the P5 1 incentive package must be better communicated to Iran so that the Iranian population is aware of the costs of pursuing the nuclear program. Commissioner Groening suggested spelling out what the incentives mean in order to "win (Iranian) hearts and minds." Revamping the incentives and putting them on paper prior to a negotiation would "give a scent" to Iran of what we would offer, said Groening. -------------- EU AND AUTONOMOUS MEASURES -------------- ¶9. (C) GERMANS EXPECT EU AUTONOMOUS MEASURES POST-UNSCR: Interlocutors at both the Chancellery and MFA predicted that the EU Council will implement autonomous measures soon after the passage of the UNSCR, given the GAERC AGREEMENT to wait until after a decision in NY. Nikel noted that working group meetings on listings will be held soon and said that the issue would be discussed in detail at the March GAERC. Nikel underscored that the EU had already passed stronger sanctions following UNSCRs 1737 and 1747, going beyond what was required at the international level; he anticipated that the EU would continue on this path. ¶10. (C) Both the Chancellery and the MFA pled for continued international unity on sanctions while expressing some doubts about the actual effectiveness of such measures. Nikel noted that sanctions must be targeted and enforced by all relevant countries. Sanctions are symbolic, but not efficient, he added, especially if implemented by only a select group of countries. They should have bite and must be clear in showing that the regime is responsible but without punishing the ordinary people. Similarly, von Fritsch said that the German argument is not one of economics, but more the political question of whether sanctions are effective. It is hard to assess which effects are a result of sanctions and which result from Ahmadi-Nejad's disastrous economic policies, he added. ¶11. (C) ...BUT LESS FORTHCOMING ON UNILATERAL MEASURES: On unilateral measures against Iran, both the Chancellery and MFA raised concerns about other countries taking advantage of Germany's absence from the Iranian market. While the Chancellery is looking for legal cover to continue its efforts, MFA contacts gave the impression that Germany may have reached the end of the line on increasing pressure on its business community. Nikel drew attention to Germany's forward-leaning position on "moral suasion", saying that the Chancellery is making business aware of what is on the international horizon, forcing business to think twice about commitments not yet covered by international or EU pressure. Nikel noted that the German moral suasion campaign and closer scrutiny of the Hermes export credit program has had BERLIN 00000180 003.4 OF 005 "consequences", including a decrease in trade, a reduction in export credit guarantees, and an increase in export credit insurance premiums. "Unfortunately, other countries have taken over this trade," he added, naming China, South Korea, and "Middle East countries." NSC Director-equivalent Detlef Waechter added that the Chancellery needs a legal basis to continue its moral suasion with German business. Without it, such discussions can only take place in the form of "dialogue." Waechter said that the Chancellery looks for common European action to be as concrete and strong as possible. (NOTE: Subsequent conversations with other senior chancellery officials indicate that the Chancellery has let up pressure on German business. END NOTE.) ¶12. (C) The Chancellery and MFA were divided about the effectiveness of targeting technologically advanced goods that are less easy for other countries' exporters to replace. At the Chancellery, Nikel said that authorities are zeroing in on sectors that can make a difference, i.e. high-tech exports that have an impact on Iran's economy but cannot be substituted by exports from China and India. Waechter added that European thinking is going in this direction. MFA contacts were more skeptical about such a policy: DG von Fritsch said that that there are few areas where German products cannot be replaced, adding that German industry is already citing examples of Italian companies taking over their earlier business. International Economic Policy Division Director Ingo Karsten noted that the bulk of refinery business can be done by anyone, including the Chinese. ¶13. (C) MFA EXPRESSES ACUTE FRUSTRATION WITH CHINA: Von Fritsch bluntly expressed his frustration that Chinese companies are filling the void left by German companies that have withdrawn from Iran. He mentioned a January 31 discussion with the Chinese ambassador concerning German company complaints about China's business involvement in Iran; the Chinese ambassador replied that "we strictly apply the international sanctions in effect." Von Fritsch believes this reply shows that unilateral measures will not work, something he commonly hears from German industry. Unilateral measures show a strong political signal, but von Fritsch admitted that he is not convinced of this signal's effectiveness. Karsten added that Germany cannot go further, especially in trade and finance, if China is taking over Germany's business since there is no net positive effect. ¶14. (C) Continuing his line of argument, von Fritsch stated that Chinese trade with Iran increased by 43%, while Russian trade doubled in 2006. We can argue with China about the political goal, but the Chinese will always refer to decisions by the international community, he said. Chinese interlocutors have told him that their trade would have increased even more had it not been for the international community's measures against Iran. Von Fritsch added that the Iranian suspension of weaponization has given us a window of opportunity for a diplomatic and negotiating approach; Ambassador Schulte replied that international scrutiny and pressure have made the difference. ¶15. (C) Von Fritsch asked whether the U.S. has approached Russia and China on their trade relations with Iran. He added that he had heard of U.S. discussions with the UAE regarding its economic relationships with Iran; Ambassador Schulte replied that all of us need to encourage the UAE to implement export control laws. -------------- QUESTIONS ON U.S. INTENTIONS TOWARDS IRAN -------------- ¶16. (C) Both the Chancellery and MFA questioned U.S. intentions towards Iran and offered advice on possible steps the U.S. could take to bring Iran to the table. Nikel stated that he was not sure if the U.S. is looking to change regime behavior or for Iran to undergo regime change. Ambassador Schulte countered by underlining Secretary Rice's offer, repeated most recently at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January, to meet with the Iranian side if they suspend enrichment as the strongest sign of the U.S. commitment to a policy of behavior change. Nikel encouraged the U.S. to BERLIN 00000180 004.2 OF 005 strengthen this message. Ministers want to see how the dialogue track can be developed; suspension is the precondition, but it is important to prepare for the moment that the precondition is met, he added. Nikel reiterated German policy, noting that sanctions are a means to an objective and reiterated that "the military option is not an option for us." ¶17. (C) In a similar vein, Commissioner Groening asked if the U.S. had considered offering Iran a security guarantee, claiming that this is what Iran desires from the U.S.: "they look to North Korea and perceive such an offer. Iran wants something special." He noted that in the 2005 EU-3 discussions with Iran, a security guarantee from France and the U.K. had been drafted, and he recommended that we think about doing the same. Ambassador Schulte questioned whether a security guarantee could be credible and replied, "How can we offer security guarantees to a country that is killing our soldiers, supports terrorism, and threatens Israel?" -------------- NEW IAEA BOG RESOLUTION? -------------- ¶18. (C) Ambassador Schulte raised the idea of a new IAEA BOG resolution reiterating its earlier resolutions in the event Iran does not cooperate with the Work Plan. He added that such a resolution would do no harm to the UNSCR draft. Nikel seemed wary of a BOG resolution but examined the pros and cons, saying that this could give the impression that the IAEA is "taking back" the Iran file from the UNSC. He said it might promote the idea that we are unable to move forward with a UNSCR, presumably because of divisions between the P5 1. In some quarters, the perception exists that the Security Council has arrived at the natural end of its activities, as these UNSCRs were so difficult to get passed and the new one would not be very strong. He added that a Board resolution would also give ElBaradei an opportunity to comment on the Iran file, and much depends on what he would say. Nikel said that the track must be continued in Vienna, but not everything is taking place there. When Schulte said that Germany's Ambassador to the IAEA would report on further developments, Nikel retorted "that depends if we (the Chancellery) get the reporting... it is a Grand Coalition, after all." -------------- German Perspectives on U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative -------------- ¶19. (C) Von Fritsch noted that U.S-Indian civil nuclear cooperation is an issue of real interest, including in the Bundestag (and particularly among the SPD). He also noted that Germans discount the U.S. argument that civil nuclear cooperation with India could help reduce greenhouse gas emissions, as Germans believe that the world can do without both nuclear energy and fossil fuels. The overall German decision-making process on the Indian case, in light of its upcoming chairmanship of the NSG, would be based on various considerations, including the strategic importance of India as well as what effect such an AGREEMENT would have on the future of the NPT. ¶20. (C) Von Fritsch said that Germans consider international regimes like the NPT of great value, adding that the credibility of the international community's argument with Iran depends on how we apply the NPT globally and whether we apply a double standard. Germany will look carefully as to whether India complies with the standards of others, including on test bans, CTBT standards, the amount of enriched uranium India will insist on having, and what triggers would be in place for the interruption of cooperation (e.g., if India conducts a test, will cooperation be terminated). Germany has received many "wrong signals", including PM Singh's speech to the Indian parliament regarding tests. -------------- INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL BANK PROPOSALS -------------- BERLIN 00000180 005.2 OF 005 ¶21. (C) On the issue of international nuclear fuel supply, Nikel said "we must move forward on something concrete" in light of how many countries are considering nuclear energy. Steinmeier's Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary Proposal (MESP) is on the table, and the Russian suggestion is compatible with it, he said. Ambassador Schulte noted that the Russian proposal is the most likely to be completed near term, and would also serve as one area of cooperation with Russia in a time where joint efforts are otherwise limited. ¶22. (C) During his discussion with von Fritsch, Ambassador Schulte stressed the positives of the MESP for the long-term, but it is important to influence the decision-making taking place among countries now. Von Fritsch stated that the MESP shows that Germany does not close its eyes to the reality of the need for a supply of enriched uranium for civil nuclear purposes. He added that we should bear in mind suspicions of countries interested in nuclear energy -- particularly the NAM -- and thus emphasize the MESP's extraterritorial nature and the notion that the fuel bank should be managed by the international community. (NOTE: German interest in promoting the MESP has prompted them to participate as an informal observer in a Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) working group on reliable access to nuclear fuel despite widespread German misgivings about promoting the use of nuclear energy. END NOTE.) ¶23. (C) DG Groening commented that recent Iranian statements expressing a desire to supply enriched uranium to an international fuel bank makes clear the regime's lack of understanding of the principles of a fuel bank. Groening agreed with Ambassador Schulte's comment that black box technology would be necessary for any fuel bank host country, adding that this is important for safety and security should the host country experience a change in regime. He noted that URENCO -- the British/German/Dutch enrichment consortium -- follows a similar system, under which enrichment technology is delivered as a black box, while a separate company operates the facility. ¶24. (C) Using the examples of Argentina and Brazil, Groening noted that it would be important for the U.S. to be more vocal in its support of moving away from the Group of Six: "if we set the bar too high, no one will follow". ¶25. (C) COMMENT: Germany maintains its preference for the broadest multilateral approach possible towards Iran, to include, at least in some quarters, a generous amount of patience with the IAEA Work Plan process. While differing in the degree, both the MFA and Chancellery are showing possible symptoms of "sanction fatigue," most clearly demonstrated by their philosophical musings on the effectiveness of sanctions. German concerns about China gaining a foothold in the Iranian market also continue to figure largely in their argumentation on increasing economic pressure on Iran. We feel a U.S.-German high-level dialogue about how to engage China (and possibly the Gulf countries) on Iran would help to re-energize and re-focus German policy makers. ¶26. (C) As for U.S.-Indian civil nuclear cooperation, While the MFA remains skeptical of the nonproliferation benefits of civil nuclear cooperation with India, they are firmly convinced of the need to build a strategic partnership with India. Depending upon the outcome of India's SAFEGUARDS negotiations with the IAEA, we should encourage Germany to use its position as NSG Chair -- and the mantle of an "honest broker" working to build consensus -- to provide domestic political cover in a climate of German public opposition to nuclear energy. END COMMENT. TIMKEN JR