IRAN: BUNDESTAG MEMBERS DISCUSS LEVERAGING IRANIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 001675

SIPDIS, NEA/IR, EUR/CE, ISN, EEB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2018
TAGS: PGOV KNNP GM IR
SUBJECT: IRAN: BUNDESTAG MEMBERS DISCUSS LEVERAGING IRANIAN
ELECTIONS, IRAN'S REGIONAL ROLE

REF: 07 BERLIN 254

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Jeffrey Rathke for reasons
1.4(b)/(d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Two of the Bundestag's leading Iran
experts discussed Iran-related issues with visiting NEA/IR
Office Director Todd Schwartz November 11 and 12. In
separate meetings, Rolf Muetzenich (SPD),a leading member of
the Bundestag's Disarmament Subcommittee, and Iranian-German
Green MP Omid Nouripour, discussed (1) the Bundestag and the
German public's support for pressuring Iran, (2) the window
of opportunity for sending signals to Iran between the U.S.
and Iranian presidential elections, as well as (3) the need
to engage Iran in particular on its relations with
Afghanistan and the Gulf countries. Muetzenich, in his role
as Chair of the German-Iranian Parliamentary Friendship
Group, repeated his previous offer to facilitate informal
dialogues between Congress and the Iranian Majles and noted
the Parliamentary Friendship Group's planned January visit to
Iran. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) BUNDESTAG, GERMAN POPULATION LARGELY SUPPORTIVE OF
TOUGH LINE IF IRAN DOESN'T COOPERATE: Muetzenich underscored
Germany's special relationship to Israel and its commitment
to nonproliferation as major factors in German support for
confronting Iran. Germany wants the international community
to maintain sanctions, but sanctions require a common
strategy, he said. While admitting that competing interests
exist, particularly from German industry, Muetzenich
believed that a majority of the Bundestag is for more
sanctions if Iran does not cooperate with the international
community, a position about which German industry is fully
aware. According to Muetzenich, there is a common
understanding among four of the five German political parties
(excluding the Left Party) that joint diplomatic initiatives
are necessary, as well as the need for solidarity with other
countries when Iran threatens. This unity extends to their
dislike of any form of military intervention in Iran, he
added. While German companies and Germany's Iranian
immigrant community have strong objections to additional
sanctions, Muetzenich believes the German public would
support it; he dismissed oft-cited concerns about job losses
as more a political than a genuine economic issue.


3. (C) NEED FOR CAREFULLY CALIBRATED MESSAGES DURING
TRANSITION AND BEYOND: Both MPs agreed that the time frame
between the U.S. and Iranian presidential elections provides
an opportunity to send effective signals to the Iranian
leadership and population about the international community's
intentions. Iranians are interested in direct talks with the
U.S., said Muetzenich: "Germany's not so important." The
U.S. is in a special position, he said, given the U.S.'s soft
power advantage in Iran; he joked that U.S. culture has more
influence over Iranian youth than German youth. Nouripour
noted that expectations in Iran have greatly increased due to
the Obama election victory; expectations would double, he
predicted, if ex-President Mohammed Khatami also wins the
June 2009 Iranian election. Should Khatami win, a dynamic
period of a few weeks would exist in which a window of
opportunity would be opened: "how do we prevent it from being
shut?" posited Nouripour.


4. (C) Muetzenich called for a transatlantic approach to
Iran that demonstrates international unity and a willingness
to reach a solution, while at the same time not revealing
differences to the Iranians. Muetzenich emphasized that
during the upcoming period of U.S. transition and in the
run-up to the Iranian presidential election, the
international community needs to carefully craft both its
public and private messages, in particular to the Supreme
Leader. Showing Iran that the opportunity exists for
progress and decreased isolation is particularly important,
he said.


5. (C) Muetzenich, revealing his party's strong commitment
to disarmament, noted that if the incoming U.S.
administration returns the agenda to disarmament, this would
help the German internal discussion on Iran. He also called
for the USG to more clearly formulate its policies towards
external opposition groups, including, "but not limited to",
the MEK. (COMMENT: Muetzenich was likely alluding to the
PKK-affiliated PJAK, whose leadership has repeatedly claimed
in the German media that they receive USG material support.
END COMMENT)


6. (C) IRAN'S ROLE IN REGION SHOULD BE ADDRESSED: Both
Muetzenich and Nouripour agreed with Schwartz's assertion
that Iran's regional role must also be addressed. Muetzenich
said a common strategy on Afghanistan must be developed; he
advocated for sending messages that could develop a common

BERLIN 00001675 002 OF 002


understanding of what interests we share. Nouripour pushed
even harder on Afghanistan, asking why the U.S. would not
acknowledge Iran's role in Afghanistan: "it is impossible to
overestimate the Iranian role in Afghanistan," he asserted,
citing Iranian support for infrastructure and school
construction.


7. (C) Both Muetzenich and Nouripour also cited the need
for increased discussion of Iran's relationship with its Gulf
neighbors. Nouripour related a comment by a former IRGC
commander that, if Iran were to be attacked, Iran would
respond not in Iraq or Afghanistan, but in other neighboring
countries. Calling Gulf countries even more important in the
Iran discussion than Germany, Muetzenich said that the
creation of a regional security body, or even a Gulf-wide
Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, could serve as possible models for
such dialogue. Similarly, Nouripour noted that Bahraini
interlocutors say they are less concerned about Iran
developing a nuclear weapon and more concerned about Iran's
ability to safely manage the Bushehr nuclear power plant.


8. (C) When asked by Schwartz to name possible areas for
increased international cooperation with Iran, Muetzenich
pointed to counternarcotics policy, border security, and
environmental issues, including nuclear waste storage.
Nouripour also noted a growing Iranian interest in renewable
energy.


9. (C) WILLINGNESS TO ASSIST IN INFORMAL PARLIAMENTARY
EXCHANGE: Muetzenich noted that the Bundestag's
German-Iranian Friendship Group will visit Iran January 10-14
as part of their regular exchange. Repeating a previous
offer (reftel),he expressed his willingness, as the Group's
chair, to facilitate an informal, private discussion between
members of the new U.S. Congress and the Iranian Majles
following Iranian elections or even earlier.


10. (U) This message was cleared by Mr. Schwartz.


Koenig