Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BERLIN1665
2008-12-12 15:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Berlin
Cable title:  

GERMANY SUPPORTS CONTACT GROUP, BUT WARY OF ANY

Tags:  MOPS PBTS PHSA PREL PTER GM 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRL #1665/01 3471511
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 121511Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2847
INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0159
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0663
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 0345
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0988
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0847
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0202
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0727
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 0493
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI PRIORITY 0036
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 9424
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 0659
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1993
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY 0077
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0136
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0560
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 9989
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0247
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 1572
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY 0107
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0560
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 1175
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1599
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0949
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB PRIORITY 0157
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0561
RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0663
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 001665 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2018
TAGS: MOPS PBTS PHSA PREL PTER GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY SUPPORTS CONTACT GROUP, BUT WARY OF ANY
DISCUSSION OF PURSUING PIRATES ASHORE

REF: A. STATE 129941

B. BERLIN 1664

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JOHN KOENIG. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 001665 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2018 TAGS: MOPS PBTS PHSA PREL PTER GM SUBJECT: GERMANY SUPPORTS CONTACT GROUP, BUT WARY OF ANY DISCUSSION OF PURSUING PIRATES ASHORE REF: A. STATE 129941 ¶B. BERLIN 1664 Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JOHN KOENIG. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. While welcoming the establishment of the Contact Group as a useful way to improve coordination in counter-piracy efforts, MFA officials voiced concerns about the U.S. desire for the new proposed UNSC resolution to address the need to pursue pirates ashore. They pointed out that the December 16 UN Security Council ministerial meeting will take place just as the Bundestag begins its debate on the proposed parliamentary mandate covering the participation of the Bundeswehr in the EU "Atalanta" counter-piracy mission. They worried that talk about pursuing pirates on land could undermine parliamentary support for the EU mission and raise concerns about Germany being "dragged into" a ground war in Somalia. END SUMMARY. INTERLOCUTORS ¶2. (c) Post delivered ref A demarche to MFA UN Action Officer Dirk Stockhausen December 12. Also participating in the meeting were Deputy Director of the Parliamentary and Cabinet Affairs Office Jasper Wieck, Deputy Director of the Public International Law Office Oliver Fixson and EU Action Officer Stefan Roessel. WELCOME CONTACT GROUP, WARY ON LAND OPERATIONS ¶3. (C) Stockhausen and the other MFA officials welcomed the planned establishment of the Contact Group as a useful way to improve coordination in counter-piracy efforts. Stockhausen said he assumed that Deputy UN Director General Michael Frei von Ungern-Sternberg would represent Germany at the first organizational meeting in January (he attended the December 2 consultations in Paris),but that remained to be confirmed. Stockhausen also underlined a German understanding that the Contact Group would not discuss the issue of land operations against pirates. In this connection, he pointed to language in the U.S. non-paper which noted that the Contract Group will help facilitate additional international coordination and cooperation on counter-piracy issues "off of the east coast of Africa." He asked for confirmation that this, in fact, was still the U.S. position. CONCERN ABOUT EFFECT ON BUNDESTAG VOTE ¶4. (C) Stockhausen and the other MFA officials spent most of the meeting asking for further information regarding the U.S. desire for the new proposed UNSC resolution to address the need to pursue pirates ashore. Wieck and Roessel noted that the December 16 UNSC ministerial meeting will occur just as the Bundestag begins its debate on the proposed parliamentary mandate covering the participation of the Bundeswehr in the EU "Atalanta" counter-piracy mission (ref B). Underscoring that the EU mission is purely sea-based, they worried that talk at the UN about pursuing pirates on land could undermine parliamentary support for the EU mission and raise concerns about Germany being "dragged into" a ground war in Somalia. Wieck and Roessel were curious about how soon the U.S. planned to launch such land operations and how extensive they would be, clearly indicating their hope that nothing would happen before the final Bundestag vote on the parliamentary mandate December 19. Stockhausen said he understood that the December 16 UN ministerial meeting was open to observers, but wondered if non-participants would be allowed a speaking role. He also questioned whether there would be a side event associated with the ministerial meeting. MAINTAIN A CLEAR DIVIDING LINE ¶5. (C) Drawing a comparison to OEF and ISAF in Afghanistan, Wieck argued that it was important to maintain a strict division between counter-piracy operations at sea and those that might be contemplated on land. Otherwise, public support for the sea-based EU mission could be significantly compromised. Acknowledging the need to address the sanctuary issue, he did not rule out the possibility that Germany could eventually support or even participate in some limited land operations against piracy, but said far more details about what exactly the U.S. had in mind would be needed. ¶6. (C) Fixson noted that collateral damage and civilian casualties were much more of an issue once the fight moved to land than they were at sea. He also questioned what the mechanism would be for securing Somalia's acquiescence to such land operations, noting that under UNSCRs 1846 and 1816, every State wishing to conduct counter-piracy operations in Somalian territorial waters must formally notify Somalian authorities and receive advance concurrence. Finally, Roessel wondered if the U.S. had a regional strategy with regard to land operations against pirates that would, for example, take into account the role of Ethiopia. Koenig

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -