IRAN: GERMAN OFFICIALS SHARE VIEWS ON SANCTIONS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 001555 SIPDIS, P, NEA, EUR/CE, ISN, DRL, EEB FOR COULTER E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2018 TAGS: PREL PHUM KNNP KDEM GM IR IZ SUBJECT: IRAN: GERMAN OFFICIALS SHARE VIEWS ON SANCTIONS, NATIONAL MEASURES, AND IRAN'S REGIONAL ROLE REF: BRUSSELS 1715 BERLIN 00001555 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Minister Counselor for Political Affairs Jeffrey Rathke for reasons 1.4 (b)/(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: NEA/IR Office Director Todd Schwartz discussed a range of Iran-related issues with representatives of the Chancellery, MFA, and Ministry of Economics during November 12 meetings. Emphasizing their belief that sanctions are working, all three agencies repeated Germany's long-standing position that sanctions efforts should be incremental, targeted, and internationally broad-based, noting their hope that future U.S. policy towards Iran complement the international community's current strategy. They called for improving the international community's communication of the incentive package. Interlocutors also highlighted their role in advocating for legally-binding and voluntary national measures with EU countries and Japan and discussed possible avenues to engage Iran on regional issues like Afghanistan and Iraq. Schwartz and MFA interlocutors also reviewed current civil society programming and discussed ways to target a broader Iranian audience during a period of intense crackdown on traditional civil society audiences. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Office Director Schwartz met in separate meetings with Chancellery Director-equivalent for Security Policy Detlef Waechter; MFA Middle East/Maghreb Office Director Sabine Sparwasser and Iran Unit Chief Andreas Krueger; and Economics Ministry Deputy Director for North Africa and the Near and Middle East Rudolf Gridl. ¶3. (C) SANCTIONS WORKING, NEED TO IMPROVE MESSAGING ON INCENTIVES PACKAGE: Interlocutors from Germany's three main Iran policymaking agencies agreed that the sanctions portion of the P5 1's dual track approach is working and that additional targeted pressure is needed. MFA Office Director Sparwasser told Schwartz that Germany believes that sanctions are working and pressure is building on Iran. The most recent sanctions need some time to unfold, she commented, adding that Germany is willing to increase pressure incrementally. Looking at the state of the Iranian economy, Gridl said that sanctions are exacerbating the effects of Iranian President Ahmadinejad's economic mismanagement, adding that Iran's inflation problems and central bank policies are contributing to dissent within Iranian society. ¶4. (C) On the other hand, the P5 1's incentive track has been less successful, said Sparwasser, in part because messaging to the Iranian public about the incentive package has yet to take hold. She expressed hope that the upcoming EU CFSP seminar in Tehran (reftel) will provide an additional venue for informing Iranian elites about the benefits available in the incentive package. She added that reaching the negotiating table on the incentives package is the main challenge and noted the need to find "creative ways" to launch talks. Gridl was also critical of how the incentives package has been communicated, calling it too technical and not sufficiently populist. ¶5. (C) OFFICIALS TOUT GERMANY'S ACTIVISM ON NATIONAL MEASURES: The three agencies also emphasized Germany's active work on national measures. Waechter re-iterated Chancellor Merkel's personal commitment to the Iran issue, noting her public statements and what he described as the Chancellery's continued forward-leaning approach among the German interagency. He added that on additional legally-binding measures, Germany is working within the EU framework, as German officials have concluded that actions limiting trade need to be EU-wide to override the presumptive right to trade enshrined in German national law. Waechter noted that German law had a national-security provision (Article 7 of the foreign trade law) but said that the legal advisers of the three relevant ministries all had concluded separately that this provision was invalidated by subsequent EU authorities. (NOTE: Other German officials have told us that Germany's statutory framework cedes authority on civil goods (non-military or non-dual-use) to the EU process. END NOTE) When asked if France and the UK shared this view, Waechter said he was unsure; however, he concluded that Germany's E3 partners have a similar approach because recent campaigns to pressure Total and LNG-related projects have been moral suasion-based. Waechter added that further efforts on reducing hydrocarbon-related transactions with Iran will depend on voluntary, moral suasion campaigns, BERLIN 00001555 002.2 OF 003 noting that the rest of the European Union, Russia, and China will not support such efforts. When asked whether Germany's national measures would include action on the German-incorporated, wholly Iranian-owned European-Iranian Commercial Bank (EIHB),Waechter said that German authorities have met with EIHB's management and clearly communicated that the bank will be shut down if there is any indication of activities with proliferation-sensitive entities. ¶6. (C) At the MFA, Iran Unit Chief Krueger noted that the EU approved the final regulations to implement UNSCR 1803 on November 10. He added that as part of the EU3's legally-binding national measures efforts, EU members would be asked at the November 14 PSC meeting to extend the list of designated entities. According to Krueger, Germany is also taking a lead on introducing voluntary measures to its fellow EU members, as MFA Political Director Volker Stanzel will introduce the concept to his counterparts in a November 17 meeting. Krueger said that while implementing such voluntary measures does not require EU consensus, Germany hopes to build the largest possible coalition of EU members in order to send a strong message to Iran. Krueger added that Germany will also discuss voluntary measures with Japan, given both Japan's upcoming seat on the UN Security Council and its status as the biggest importer of Iranian oil. ¶7. (C) ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS SHOULD BE TARGETED FOR MAXIMUM EFFECT: Looking ahead to new sanctions, Sparwasser emphasized the importance of "not helping those we don't like"; governments should be thinking about what sanctions could have the most effect, she said, citing as one approach the improved targeting of the IRGC, rather than broad-based sanctions. She commented that sanctions against the importing of gasoline would hurt the people of Iran; Schwartz agreed, noting that this is also current USG policy. ¶8. (C) Maintaining a long-standing Economics Ministry view, Gridl also called for targeted sanctions, repeatedly saying that business relations should not be cut off completely. He stressed looking for small steps that have a large impact, citing targeting of the insurance and re-insurance of airline operations to Iran as one promising example. Gridl called for a move away from a policy of discouraging all business to one where the international community can agree on broad goals and then take individual measures. Such an approach could also address German companies' persistent complaint that Russia, China, and other Asian companies are not on board with sanctions, he said. When asked if such complaints could translate into election difficulties for the Chancellery as political parties gear up for the September 2009 Bundestag elections, Waechter said that the Chancellery does not expect the Iran issue to have an influence on electoral discussions, particularly in comparison to topics like Germany's relations with Russia or Afghanistan. ¶9. (C) CONVINCING IRAN OF BENEFIT OF CONSTRUCTIVE REGIONAL ROLE: Sparwasser said Germany has great hopes that the next U.S. administration will consider Iran within a regional process. "Every regional problem is linked to Iran," said Sparwasser, comparing it to Germany's role in Europe in the late 19th century. When asked by Schwartz about possible areas where Iran could play a constructive role, Sparwasser said that Afghanistan would be a useful starting point; convincing Iran that it has a deep, constructive interest in Iraq is also important. ¶10. (C) Gridl noted that as German business interest in Iraq grows, this budding relationship could serve as an example to Iranian moderates and bazaaris of the benefits of a positive economic relationship. When asked if German companies reluctant to decrease trade with Iran could be convinced to invest in Iraq as an alternative, Gridl said that it was certainly possible, but that such a viewpoint needed to germinate from the bottom up, as top-down (i.e. government to business) advocacy could be counterproductive. ¶11. (C) GERMANY REVIEWING CIVIL SOCIETY PROGRAMMING AS CRACKDOWN CONTINUES: Turning to civil society programming, Schwartz noted that the USG is currently reviewing its civil society-related programming while also considering ways to broaden the program's scope. Sparwasser said that Germany is also reviewing its programming, particularly as the Iranian authorities intensify their crackdown against civil society. She said that for Iranian contacts in Tehran, attending Germany's National Day celebrations has become an act of BERLIN 00001555 003.2 OF 003 courage due to pervasive surveillance by Iranian authorities. She noted that Germany does not want to expose its partners on the ground to danger and is exploring expanding its focus to include less controversial topics like architecture and urban development. She added that counternarcotics and refugee assistance could also be areas of possible cooperation, given Iran's relatively constructive work and vested interest in these fields. Sparwasser asked if Germany could begin laying groundwork in preparation for future discussion. Krueger also noted that Germany, France, and UK are working to collect and report on their experiences on the ground in Tehran; this information could be useful for those not currently present in Tehran, including the European Commission and the U.S. ¶12. (C) FUTURE U.S. APPROACH SHOULD COMPLEMENT INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS: Looking ahead to the next six months, Waechter said it is important that a new U.S. administration does not undermine hard-won international solidarity on Iran: the U.S. could have contact with Iran, but such efforts must complement, not compete with, current efforts by the P5 1, UN, and EU. Sparwasser emphasized the need for P5 1 unity, noting that "Iran thought they had almost broken us apart." In a similar vein, Gridl said it is important to show Iran that nothing has changed and that pressure will remain. ¶13. (U) Office Director Schwartz cleared this message. TIMKEN JR