GERMAN VIEWS ON MAP, STRASBOURG/KEHL SUMMIT,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BERLIN 001365

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2018
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV NATO EUN OSCE GG GM RS FR
SUBJECT: GERMAN VIEWS ON MAP, STRASBOURG/KEHL SUMMIT,
RUSSIA AND OTHER NATO, OSCE AND EU ISSUES

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Jeff Rathke. REASONS: 1.4
(B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: German officials at the Chancellery and MFA
told visiting EUR/RPM Director Bruce Turner October 2 that
while they saw little chance of extending MAP to Georgia or
Ukraine at the December NATO foreign ministerial, they agreed
it was necessary to agree on a way ahead to fulfill the
strategic commitment on membership made to these countries in
Bucharest. The meetings took place before Chancellor
Merkel's statement in St. Petersburg that the time was not
ripe for Georgia and Ukraine to enter MAP in December. The
Germans are optimistic about France following through on its
plans to re-join NATO's integrated military structure and
thought President Sarkozy could make a formal announcement
about French intentions as early as the February 2009 Munich
Security Conference. Germany regards the April 2009 NATO
Summit in Strasbourg/Kehl as largely an anniversary event, so
it is anticipating that the summit will be limited primarily
to the 26 Allies and the two invitees, with a key being to
launch work on an update of the NATO strategic concept. If
there is a NATO-Russia Council (NRC) meeting, the Germans
agree that it would probably be necessary to have
NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Georgia meetings as well, although
Turner countered it might be more appropriate to think in
terms of the last two rather than a NRC. Chancellery
officials argued that, contrary to popular perceptions,
Germany and the U.S. are "really not that far apart" on their
approach to Russia. While keen to re-start meetings of the
NRC, assuming Russian compliance in withdrawing troops from
the "buffer zones" in Georgia, German officials acknowledged
there has been a "paradigm change" and agreed that it would
be useful for the Allies to pre-coordinate their positions
and to use the forum to press the Russians to implement the
rest of the cease-fire agreement. A meeting with researchers
at the German Institute for International and Security
Studies revealed the high degree to which the German policy
community views the Caucasus conflict as a NATO failure and
NATO membership plans for Georgia and Ukraine as ill-advised.
Also discussed during Turner's meetings with German
officials were Afghanistan/ISAF, NATO Article 5 contingency
planning, the prospective EU counter-piracy mission and OSCE
issues. END SUMMARY.

INTERLOCUTORS


2. (U) During his October 2 visit to Berlin, EUR/RPM Director
Bruce Turner had separate meetings with Chancellery Director
of Security Affairs Geza von Geyr and Deputy Detlef Waechter;
MFA NATO Office Director Bernhard Schlagheck; and MFA OSCE
Office Director Margit Hellwig-Boette. He also met with
researchers Frank Kupferschmidt and Walther Stuetzle at the
German Institute for International and Security Affairs
(SWP).

MAP


3. (C) Von Geyr was blunt in saying that Germany saw "hardly
any chance" for extending the NATO membership action plan
(MAP) to Georgia and Ukraine at the NATO December Foreign
Ministerial. Chancellor Merkel made this even more specific
on October 2, when she told the press that the time was "not
ripe" for MAP in December. Granting Ukraine MAP now had the
very real possibility of fomenting instability and unrest
given how divided the country was over the issue of NATO
membership, and Ukraine needed more time to sort this out.
On Georgia, the question was whether this was really the
right time, so soon after the war with Russia. Extending MAP
to Georgia now would be akin to rewarding Saakashvili for his
irresponsible behavior in starting the conflict. Turner
responded that MAP would not come close to making up for the
high cost that Saakashvili has already paid for his actions,
namely a humiliating military defeat and the long-term, if
not permanent, loss of a considerable part of Georgian
territory. Turner also noted that concerns about a negative
Russian reaction to MAP should no longer play a controlling
part in these deliberations, given that the Russians had
already played this card. The damage was done.


4. (C) Both Von Geyr and Waechter said one of the German
concerns about MAP, notwithstanding U.S. assurances that it

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was not a guarantee of NATO membership, was its clear
"automaticity." Experience showed that once MAP was granted,
the discussion immediately shifted "two days later" to
membership and debates about when the invitation should be
made. Turner wondered if German concerns on this score could
not be met by either an understanding within the Alliance or
a statement by the applicant that the MAP period would last a
set amount of years at a minimum. Waechter questioned the
ability to enforce such promises, especially since MAP, after
all, was supposed to be performance-driven.


5. (C) Turner asked what Germany's proposed alternative plan
was for fulfilling the Bucharest Summit pledge that both
Ukraine and Georgia would become members of NATO. The
Alliance was on the hook to bring these countries in, and it
was not enough to simply say "no" to MAP. The credibility of
NATO was at stake. Von Geyr agreed that the "strategic
decision" to bring these two countries into the Alliance had
already been taken, and it was now a question of coming up
with a "tactical" plan to accomplish this. Von Geyr noted
that Chancellor Merkel has confirmed the Bucharest commitment
publicly several times in the past few months. Germany was
by no means backing away from that promise. Schlagheck
agreed with the need to be creative in devising a joint
strategy on the way ahead. The main thing, he emphasized,
was to avoid another public clash on this issue as occurred
in the run-up to Bucharest.


6. (C) Schlagheck noted that, according to German reports of
Secretary Rice's recent meeting with EU ambassadors in
Washington, the Secretary had strongly emphasized the need to
admit Georgia to MAP in December, but had hardly mentioned
Ukraine at all. He wondered if it would not send a
"disastrous message" to Ukraine if Georgia was granted MAP in
December, but not Ukraine. Turner noted that the uncertain
domestic political situation in Ukraine was an important
factor and suggested that offering MAP to Georgia need not
necessarily damage Ukraine's prospects over the longer term,
since it would send the message to all that enlargement was
proceeding and Georgia was in a more precarious position.

FRENCH REINTEGRATION INTO NATO


7. (C) Von Geyr said the French were still on track to
re-join the NATO integrated military structure and thought
President Sarkozy might formally announce French intentions
as early as the February 2009 Munich Security Conference, if
not at the Strasbourg/Kehl NATO Summit in April. Von Geyr
noted that the French had linked reintegration into NATO with
reform of their military forces and a strengthening of ESDP.
With the recent publication of the French White Paper on
Defense and National Security and the recent or planned
launch of several ESDP missions (including a counter-piracy
mission off the coast of Somalia beginning in November or
December),Von Geyr thought the French preconditions would be
in place to allow NATO reintegration to be launched at the
Summit. He acknowledged, however, that many of the details
of that reintegration remained to be worked out, especially
how the NATO military command structure will be transformed
to accommodate the French and the degree to which the French
will fill many of the lower-ranking positions at SHAPE and in
other NATO commands.

STRASBOURG/KEHL SUMMIT


8. (C) Von Geyr said that Germany viewed Strasbourg/Kehl
largely as an "anniversary summit" to celebrate NATO's 60th
birthday, and therefore favored restricting the meeting to
largely the 26 Allies, plus the invitees Albania and Croatia.
He saw no need for a meeting with ISAF non-NATO troop
contributors like at Bucharest. Whether it made sense to
have a NATO-Russia Council (NRC) remained to be seen and
would depend largely on developments over the next few
months. Turner countered that it might make more sense to
have a meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) and the
NATO-Georgia-Commission (NGC) than the NRC, if one had to
choose. MFA NATO Office Director Bernhard Schlagheck agreed
that an NRC would have to be in addition to an NUC and NGC,
and not the other way around.


9. (C) Von Geyr said one of the most substantive actions to

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be taken at Strasbourg/Kehl would be to "kick-start" work on
updating the Alliance's 1999 Strategic Concept. Von Geyr
agreed that Russian behavior in the Caucasus represented a
"paradigm change," and that this would need to be reflected
in the new strategic concept. He acknowledged that this would
probably have to entail specific references to Russia.

RUSSIA


10. (C) Von Geyr thought Germany and the U.S. were "really
not far apart" on their approach to Russia; the difference
was just a matter a tone. While German leaders were not
inclined to use the kind of tough language in public that
Secretary Rice had used in her September 18 German Marshall
Fund Speech, recent Russian behavior in the Caucasus had
destroyed most of the "illusions" Germans had held in the
1990s about the "new" Russia.


11. (C) Von Geyr thought that Moscow, through its aggressive
and disproportionate actions, had maneuvered itself into a
"strategic dead-end." While the Russians were still
celebrating their "tactical success" in taking control of
both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, it would hopefully dawn on
them in the coming weeks and months that this, in fact, had
worsened their strategic position in the world. To help them
come to this realization, it was important for the
international community to maintain a strict non-recognition
policy in regards to the illegal seizure of these break-away
regions. Chancellor Merkel had gone to St. Petersburg
October 2 for the annual bilateral government consultations
with Russia armed with all the appropriate talking points on
this matter. However, von Geyr thought it was unrealistic to
expect the Russians to draw down their forces in South
Ossetia and Georgia to pre-August 7 levels any time soon.


12. (C) Turner agreed that this might be the case, but
emphasized that it was important that Russia pay a price for
refusing to fully implement the six-point cease-fire
agreement. Von Geyr thought that Russia was already paying a
price through the NATO and EU policy of "no business as
usual." Germany agreed that no further meetings of the
NATO-Russia Council (NRC) or the PrepCom should be held until
it is clear whether Russia has fulfilled its obligations to
pull its forces out of the so-called border zones around
South Ossetia and Abkhazia by October 10, although Germany
did see a need for continued political dialogue. Von Geyr
emphasized that if, in fact, Russia fulfills this obligation,
Germany would favor resuming NRC and PrepCom meetings, but
agreed that the changed situation with Russia, and the fact
that it has not fulfilled its other cease-fire commitments,
justifies pre-coordination of Allied positions in advance of
any NATO-Russia meetings, during which Allies should use the
forum to press the Russians to implement the rest of the
cease-fire agreement. Schlagheck sounded the same theme,
saying that it would be "foolish" to shut down this
communication channel and expressing the hope that there
could be an NRC Ambassadorial meeting by year's end, albeit
perhaps with a reduced agenda.

NATO ARTICLE V PLANNING


13. (C) Schlagheck said that Germany was "comfortable" with
the recent discussion that NATO Defense Ministers had on
Article 5 contingency planning in London. He agreed that the
key was to walk the thin line between reassuring the Balts
and others that the Article 5 commitment on collective
defensive was operative, but without provoking a negative
reaction by the Russians that could actually increase the
threat against these countries. He said this kind of prudent
planning is exactly what we would expect SACEUR to do.
Schlagheck thought, however, that it was important that any
new contingency planning be based on an updated general
threat assessment, as provided in NATO document MC-161.

AFGHANISTAN/ISAF


14. (C) Waechter said the German government had been prepared
to include in the renewal of the ISAF parliamentary mandate
for the Bundeswehr an authorization for German aircrews to
participate in the planned NATO AWACS mission in Afghanistan.
However, because of French opposition to the proposed

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common-funding arrangement, it was clear that no NATO
decision on the mission would be taken before the renewed
ISAF mandate is considered and voted on by the Bundestag in
mid-October. Therefore, AWACS authorization will not be
included in the ISAF mandate. If and when a NATO decision on
AWACS is forthcoming, the German government will re-evaluate
how to obtain the necessary parliamentary mandate to cover
Bundeswehr participation. Waechter indicated that Germany's
preference would be to wait to provide the necessary
authorization until the ISAF mandate comes up for its next
renewal in December 2009.


15. (C) Waechter also said that the renewed ISAF mandate
would not include additional authority for the Bundeswehr to
engage in counter-narcotics in Afghanistan. He said that
SACEUR's proposal on this score remained a matter of debate,
with at least five Allies expressing concerns. He expected
this to a prime topic of conversation at the October 9-10
NATO Defense Ministers meeting in Budapest.


16. (C) Waechter indicated that Germany had no problems with
plans to streamline the U.S. military command structure in
Afghanistan by bringing the Combined Security Transition
Command (CSTC) and the Combined Joint Special Operations Task
Force (CJSOTF) under COMISAF GEN McKiernan, in his capacity
as the senior U.S. military commander in the country. While
expressing concern about the deteriorating security situation
in Afghanistan, Waechter indicated that Germany remained
strongly committed to the ISAF mission. He said that
notwithstanding the Social Democratic Party's historical
record of running on a "peace" platform, it was notable that
the SPD chancellor candidate for the September 2009 Bundestag
elections was FM Steinmeier, and that he had up to now
avoided playing politics on the Afghanistan issue.

EU COUNTER-PIRACY MISSION


17. (C) Waechter confirmed that Germany planned to play an
active role in the planned ESDP counter-piracy mission off
the coast of Somalia. The German government will seek a
Bundestag mandate for Bundeswehr involvement in the mission
based on collective security provisions under Article 24 of
the German Constitution (Grundgesetz). Waechter agreed with
Turner that the mission had to be transparent, fully
coordinated with NATO, provide added value to existing
operations in the area, and not prevent NATO from considering
its own options. He did not dispute Turner's point that the
U.S. would continue to prefer to engage with the EU through
NATO, and not directly. Waechter said that the current
German government would strongly oppose any "Tervuren 2"
initiative in connection to the counter-piracy mission,
referring to previous Franco-German efforts to set up an EU
military headquarters in Brussels. He agreed that there
should be no competition or duplication with SHAPE.

OSCE


18. (C) Von Geyr noted that in the frequent conversations
between Chancellor Merkel and President Bush, the OSCE is
hardly ever mentioned. However, von Geyr thought the OSCE
was potentially a very useful forum, especially in dealing
with Russia, given the OSCE's good image in Europe as an
objective and neutral conflict resolution organization.
Germany was in favor of using the OSCE to bring Russia along
on key issues and, where necessary, to isolate and pressure
it to adhere to international norms.


19. (C) MFA OSCE Office Director Margit Hellwig-Boette noted
that the Russians, despite repeated requests, have never
provided any further details on President Medvedev's proposal
for a pan-European Security Conference. She thought that the
Russians might use the OSCE Ministerial Council in Helsinki
in December to revive this idea. (NOTE: President Medvedev
told the press October 2 that he shared details with the
Chancellor on this topic, but we have not seen them yet. END
NOTE.) Hellwig-Boette said Germany would strongly resist any
effort by the Russians to change or undermine the Helsinki
Accords or the rest of the OSCE "acquis." Whatever the
Russians have in mind would have to go "on top of"
established body of rules and norms. She hoped that the
ministerial discussion at the December meeting could be

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focused on a broad theme, like unresolved conflicts, rather
some OSCE-centric topic, noting that FM Steinmeier had been
very pleased with last year's OSCE ministerial informal lunch
discussion of Kosovo. She suggested that these and other
issues could be worked out in a Quad meeting at deputy
political director level two to three weeks before the OSCE
Ministerial.


20. (C) Hellwig-Boette confirmed that Germany would not
oppose two proposed OSCE border training projects for inside
Afghanistan, although Germany was keen to ensure that any
opposition from other OSCE members to this project not result
in the Central Asian border training projects in the same
package being held hostage. Noting that the draft decision
referred to security being ensured through NATO/ISAF, she
noted the need to coordinate with NATO/ISAF to confirm that
it was truly in a position to provide the necessary security
for the Afghanistan projects. (Note: The proposed training
sites in Afghanistan lie in Germany's area of responsibility
as commander of ISAF Region North.) Looking ahead,
Hellwig-Boette was hopeful the Kazakh 2010 OSCE chairmanship
in office would have positive spill-over effects in
convincing Central Asians about the benefits of engaging
actively in the OSCE. She favored basing the proposed OSCE
Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe as one way of
bringing Tajikistan closer to the OSCE.

MEETING WITH RESEARCHERS


21. (U) Both Kupferschmidt and Stuetzle at the Institute for
International and Security Affairs (SWP) were extremely
critical of NATO's failure to prevent or stop the outbreak of
violence in the Caucasus, wondering whether the EU was in the
process of eclipsing NATO and the U.S. They were also
bitterly disappointed that the NRC was not used as a channel
of political dialogue with Russia "at precisely the moment
when it was most needed," and argued that the absence of NATO
action illustrated why it was so important to proceed to a
new review of the Strategic Concept. They strongly opposed
extending MAP to Georgia and Ukraine, claiming that these
countries were no more democratic than Russia. They put the
blame for the war squarely on Saakashvili and the Georgians,
claiming that they had precipitated it by killing Russian
peace-keeping soldiers. While the think-tankers approved of
previous NATO expansion to central and eastern Europe, they
clearly thought that the Caucasus region was beyond what
should be NATO's final frontier. They wondered why the U.S.
was keen on bringing Georgia into the Alliance in any event,
claiming it would not contribute anything to the Alliance,
and that Georgia would use its membership as a means to
provoke Russia. They also expressed deep skepticism about
admitting Ukraine to NATO, given its close identity to Russia
and the bitterly divided public opinion there on the
membership issue.


22. (U) EUR/RPM Director Turner has cleared this message.
TIMKEN JR