Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BERLIN1354
2008-10-01 16:50:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Berlin
Cable title:
GERMANY/ANA EXPANSION: MORE INFORMATION NEEDED
how-toVZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHRL #1354 2751650 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 011650Z OCT 08 FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2291 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0563 RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 001354
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/A - TOM REOTT AND EUR/RPM - RAPHAEL CARLAND
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2018
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS NATO GM AF
SUBJECT: GERMANY/ANA EXPANSION: MORE INFORMATION NEEDED
BEFORE U.S. REQUEST CAN BE FULLY CONSIDERED
REF: A. STATE 97991
B. BERLIN 1223
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JEFF RATHKE. REASONS: 1.4 (
B) AND (D).
C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 001354
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/A - TOM REOTT AND EUR/RPM - RAPHAEL CARLAND
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2018
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS NATO GM AF
SUBJECT: GERMANY/ANA EXPANSION: MORE INFORMATION NEEDED
BEFORE U.S. REQUEST CAN BE FULLY CONSIDERED
REF: A. STATE 97991
B. BERLIN 1223
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JEFF RATHKE. REASONS: 1.4 (
B) AND (D).
1. (C) As instructed ref A, post approached officials in both
the MFA and MOD to ask that Germany consider providing $100
million per year from 2010 to 2014 in additional funding for
sustainment of the expanded Afghan National Army (ANA).
2. (C) While open to making an additional contribution and
agreeing that standing up the expanded ANA is in NATO's own
self interest, German officials are reluctant to make any
commitments until more information is available on the total
cost of the program and the plan for achieving it. MOD
Office Director for Political Military Affairs Colonel Bernd
Schuett said Germany was looking forward to a concept paper
that would present, in a transparent way, all the information
regarding the stand-up and training of the expanded Afghan
force. That would make it much easier to consider the U.S.
request. (German officials made this same point when we
first broached the idea of increasing the end strength of the
ANA -- see ref B.)
3. (C) Noting that an additional $100 million per year would
represent a significant increase (about 15 percent) in what
the MOD already spends for the Bundeswehr's deployment in
Afghanistan, Schuett thought such a large contribution would
be a hard sell to the Bundestag, especially among
parliamentarians who believe that the ISAF approach is
already too military-focused. He argued that the MOD budget
is very tight, so there was no way the MOD could make such a
contribution out of hide. It would need support from other
ministries. He noted that MOD was already having trouble
financing new ANA infrastructure in the north (barracks in
Feyzabad and a training center in Mazar-e-Sharif) from its
current budget.
4. (C) Schuett and MFA ISAF Action Officer Lukas Wasielewski
also put down a marker that the Bundestag would probably
raise objections to making a lump-sum contribution to a trust
fund, preferring to have more control over how the money is
spent. While this was probably not insurmountable, it would
not be easy. Schuett wondered if NATO common funding might
be appropriate to cover some the ANA costs, and said Germany
might find it easier to contribute equipment in-kind (old
weapons, vehicles, uniforms, etc.) to the ANA than making a
big lump-sum financial contribution. He noted that Germany
had followed this approach in supporting the stand-up of the
Kosovo Security Force (KSF).
TIMKEN JR
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/A - TOM REOTT AND EUR/RPM - RAPHAEL CARLAND
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2018
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS NATO GM AF
SUBJECT: GERMANY/ANA EXPANSION: MORE INFORMATION NEEDED
BEFORE U.S. REQUEST CAN BE FULLY CONSIDERED
REF: A. STATE 97991
B. BERLIN 1223
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JEFF RATHKE. REASONS: 1.4 (
B) AND (D).
1. (C) As instructed ref A, post approached officials in both
the MFA and MOD to ask that Germany consider providing $100
million per year from 2010 to 2014 in additional funding for
sustainment of the expanded Afghan National Army (ANA).
2. (C) While open to making an additional contribution and
agreeing that standing up the expanded ANA is in NATO's own
self interest, German officials are reluctant to make any
commitments until more information is available on the total
cost of the program and the plan for achieving it. MOD
Office Director for Political Military Affairs Colonel Bernd
Schuett said Germany was looking forward to a concept paper
that would present, in a transparent way, all the information
regarding the stand-up and training of the expanded Afghan
force. That would make it much easier to consider the U.S.
request. (German officials made this same point when we
first broached the idea of increasing the end strength of the
ANA -- see ref B.)
3. (C) Noting that an additional $100 million per year would
represent a significant increase (about 15 percent) in what
the MOD already spends for the Bundeswehr's deployment in
Afghanistan, Schuett thought such a large contribution would
be a hard sell to the Bundestag, especially among
parliamentarians who believe that the ISAF approach is
already too military-focused. He argued that the MOD budget
is very tight, so there was no way the MOD could make such a
contribution out of hide. It would need support from other
ministries. He noted that MOD was already having trouble
financing new ANA infrastructure in the north (barracks in
Feyzabad and a training center in Mazar-e-Sharif) from its
current budget.
4. (C) Schuett and MFA ISAF Action Officer Lukas Wasielewski
also put down a marker that the Bundestag would probably
raise objections to making a lump-sum contribution to a trust
fund, preferring to have more control over how the money is
spent. While this was probably not insurmountable, it would
not be easy. Schuett wondered if NATO common funding might
be appropriate to cover some the ANA costs, and said Germany
might find it easier to contribute equipment in-kind (old
weapons, vehicles, uniforms, etc.) to the ANA than making a
big lump-sum financial contribution. He noted that Germany
had followed this approach in supporting the stand-up of the
Kosovo Security Force (KSF).
TIMKEN JR