GERMAN RESPONSE: PREVENTING IRAN FROM ADVANCING

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 001334 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/CE STATE FOR ISN/CPI (MEYERS) E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2033 TAGS: KNNP TRGY PREL PARM IR MNUC AORC IAEA UNSC UK, FR, BEXP, IT, SZ, GM SUBJECT: GERMAN RESPONSE: PREVENTING IRAN FROM ADVANCING ITS IR-2 CENTRIFUGE DESIGN REF: A. STATE 99666 ¶B. STATE 052030 ¶C. STATE 039585 ¶D. STATE 021770 Classified By: Global Affairs Unit Chief Don L. Brown for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Germany shares USG concerns regarding Iran's nuclear program and welcomes further steps to prevent Iran from obtaining critical equipment needed for their new IR-2 centrifuge design. Germany maintains that its primary mechanisms for safeguarding sensitive centrifuge technology are its robust export controls of centrifuge-relevant goods and its practice of concealing sensitive technologies as a "black box" (copy-resistant, turn-key system) when exporting centrifuge-related equipment. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) On September 22, EconOffs delivered REF A demarche to German MFA Desk Officer for International Energy and Nuclear Energy Policy Joerg Polster. Polster expressed appreciation for the information and agreed to distribute it to German export control authorities at the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology and the Federal Office of Economics and Export Controls (BAFA). ¶3. (C) After reviewing the nonpaper, Polster asked if the USG had derogatory information or information suggesting that any of the four listed German companies were of particular proliferation concern. EconOffs explained that the USG only assesses that these companies produce the types of critical commodities that Iran would need in connection with their new gas centrifuge development. Polster emphasized that if the USG ever suspects German companies of proliferation activity in connections with Iranian centrifuge development, we should bring these concerns directly to the MFA for further action. COMMENT -------------- ¶4. (C) Polster (please STRICTLY protect),a nuclear physicist, shared his personal assessment regarding Iran's enrichment capabilities and international efforts to hinder Iran's enrichment progress. Polster opined that although sanctions and export controls are effective in slowing Iranian centrifuge development, a strategy of merely restricting Iran's access to critical centrifuge equipment would not stop it. Polster believes that Iran already possesses the knowledge and means to enrich uranium and only needs time to achieve their objectives. Post will report any substantive German response septel. KOENIG