Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BERLIN1334
2008-09-26 11:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Berlin
Cable title:
GERMAN RESPONSE: PREVENTING IRAN FROM ADVANCING
how-toVZCZCXYZ0000 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHRL #1334 2701117 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 261117Z SEP 08 FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2265 INFO RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 0802 RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0722 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 9284 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 9854 RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1446
C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 001334
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/CE
STATE FOR ISN/CPI (MEYERS)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2033
TAGS: KNNP TRGY PREL PARM IR MNUC AORC IAEA UNSC
UK, FR, BEXP, IT, SZ, GM
SUBJECT: GERMAN RESPONSE: PREVENTING IRAN FROM ADVANCING
ITS IR-2 CENTRIFUGE DESIGN
REF: A. STATE 99666
B. STATE 052030
C. STATE 039585
D. STATE 021770
Classified By: Global Affairs Unit Chief Don L. Brown for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 001334
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/CE
STATE FOR ISN/CPI (MEYERS)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2033
TAGS: KNNP TRGY PREL PARM IR MNUC AORC IAEA UNSC
UK, FR, BEXP, IT, SZ, GM
SUBJECT: GERMAN RESPONSE: PREVENTING IRAN FROM ADVANCING
ITS IR-2 CENTRIFUGE DESIGN
REF: A. STATE 99666
B. STATE 052030
C. STATE 039585
D. STATE 021770
Classified By: Global Affairs Unit Chief Don L. Brown for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Germany shares USG concerns regarding
Iran's nuclear program and welcomes further steps to prevent
Iran from obtaining critical equipment needed for their new
IR-2 centrifuge design. Germany maintains that its primary
mechanisms for safeguarding sensitive centrifuge technology
are its robust export controls of centrifuge-relevant goods
and its practice of concealing sensitive technologies as a
"black box" (copy-resistant, turn-key system) when exporting
centrifuge-related equipment. END SUMMARY.
2. (SBU) On September 22, EconOffs delivered REF A demarche
to German MFA Desk Officer for International Energy and
Nuclear Energy Policy Joerg Polster. Polster expressed
appreciation for the information and agreed to distribute it
to German export control authorities at the Federal Ministry
of Economics and Technology and the Federal Office of
Economics and Export Controls (BAFA).
3. (C) After reviewing the nonpaper, Polster asked if the
USG had derogatory information or information suggesting that
any of the four listed German companies were of particular
proliferation concern. EconOffs explained that the USG only
assesses that these companies produce the types of critical
commodities that Iran would need in connection with their new
gas centrifuge development. Polster emphasized that if the
USG ever suspects German companies of proliferation activity
in connections with Iranian centrifuge development, we should
bring these concerns directly to the MFA for further action.
COMMENT
--------------
4. (C) Polster (please STRICTLY protect),a nuclear
physicist, shared his personal assessment regarding Iran's
enrichment capabilities and international efforts to hinder
Iran's enrichment progress. Polster opined that although
sanctions and export controls are effective in slowing
Iranian centrifuge development, a strategy of merely
restricting Iran's access to critical centrifuge equipment
would not stop it. Polster believes that Iran already
possesses the knowledge and means to enrich uranium and only
needs time to achieve their objectives. Post will report any
substantive German response septel.
KOENIG
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/CE
STATE FOR ISN/CPI (MEYERS)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2033
TAGS: KNNP TRGY PREL PARM IR MNUC AORC IAEA UNSC
UK, FR, BEXP, IT, SZ, GM
SUBJECT: GERMAN RESPONSE: PREVENTING IRAN FROM ADVANCING
ITS IR-2 CENTRIFUGE DESIGN
REF: A. STATE 99666
B. STATE 052030
C. STATE 039585
D. STATE 021770
Classified By: Global Affairs Unit Chief Don L. Brown for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Germany shares USG concerns regarding
Iran's nuclear program and welcomes further steps to prevent
Iran from obtaining critical equipment needed for their new
IR-2 centrifuge design. Germany maintains that its primary
mechanisms for safeguarding sensitive centrifuge technology
are its robust export controls of centrifuge-relevant goods
and its practice of concealing sensitive technologies as a
"black box" (copy-resistant, turn-key system) when exporting
centrifuge-related equipment. END SUMMARY.
2. (SBU) On September 22, EconOffs delivered REF A demarche
to German MFA Desk Officer for International Energy and
Nuclear Energy Policy Joerg Polster. Polster expressed
appreciation for the information and agreed to distribute it
to German export control authorities at the Federal Ministry
of Economics and Technology and the Federal Office of
Economics and Export Controls (BAFA).
3. (C) After reviewing the nonpaper, Polster asked if the
USG had derogatory information or information suggesting that
any of the four listed German companies were of particular
proliferation concern. EconOffs explained that the USG only
assesses that these companies produce the types of critical
commodities that Iran would need in connection with their new
gas centrifuge development. Polster emphasized that if the
USG ever suspects German companies of proliferation activity
in connections with Iranian centrifuge development, we should
bring these concerns directly to the MFA for further action.
COMMENT
--------------
4. (C) Polster (please STRICTLY protect),a nuclear
physicist, shared his personal assessment regarding Iran's
enrichment capabilities and international efforts to hinder
Iran's enrichment progress. Polster opined that although
sanctions and export controls are effective in slowing
Iranian centrifuge development, a strategy of merely
restricting Iran's access to critical centrifuge equipment
would not stop it. Polster believes that Iran already
possesses the knowledge and means to enrich uranium and only
needs time to achieve their objectives. Post will report any
substantive German response septel.
KOENIG