GERMAN VIEWS ON SEPTEMBER 15-16 EU GAERC FOREIGN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 001259 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2018 TAGS: EUN PREL PHUM PGOV GM ZL ZI SO SR BO SUBJECT: GERMAN VIEWS ON SEPTEMBER 15-16 EU GAERC FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING REF: A. STATE 96598 ¶B. STATE 97574 Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JEFF RATHKE. REASONS: 1.4 ( B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Germany expects the EU Council on September 15 to agree on creating a small "coordination cell" in Brussels to help coordinate the existing anti-piracy contributions of EU members and prepare the way for a possible future ESDP mission off the coast of Somalia. The Council is also expected to add names to the Zimbabwe visa ban list. While Germany supports moving forward with implementation of the EU's interim agreement with Serbia, it expects the Dutch and other will continue to oppose that idea pending full ICTY cooperation. The Council will welcome the release of political prisoners in Belarus and signal a willingness to improve relations, but will also highlight continuing democratic shortfalls and express expectations that upcoming parliamentary elections be free and fair. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Post provided Ref A talking points to MFA Deputy EU Correspondent Thomas Schieb September 10. We followed up with him September 12 to get his reaction and to provide the additional points on Georgia in ref B. The read-out on the German reaction to the Georgia points will be provided septel. Zimbabwe and Somalia ¶3. (C) Schieb said that the Council will issue conclusions on both Zimbabwe and Somalia. On Zimbabwe, the EU will add additional names to the visa ban list of those responsible for perpetrating or inciting violence in advance and during the run-off election held this past summer. On Somalia, the EU will take the "political decision" to create a small "coordination cell" in Brussels to help coordinate the existing anti-piracy contributions of EU members and prepare the way for a possible ESDP mission down the road. Schieb said technical problems with the translation of some documents will prevent the Council from taking the formal decision, which will follow "a few days later." Serbia ¶4. (C) Schieb said the Council will discuss whether the EU should go forward in implementing the interim agreement with Serbia based on recent positive developments (i.e., the turn-over of Karadzic). While Germany favors such a move, Schieb said the Dutch and others would likely continue to block, arguing that neither the interim agreement nor the Stability and Association Agreement (SAA) should be implemented or ratified until Serbia has fully cooperated with the ICTY, per the Council decision in April. Schieb said it was not clear whether ICTY Chief Prosecutor Brammertz would attend the Council meeting to report on his September 10-11 visit to Belgrade, but noted that in any case, indications were that Brammertz was not ready to certify full cooperation by Serbia. Belarus ¶5. (C) Schieb said the Council will issue conclusions that acknowledge Belarus for its recent release of all remaining political prisoners, but which also express concerns about its continuing shortfalls on human rights and democratic reforms. The EU will signal that it is prepared to improve relations and relax the existing sanctions regime, provided that parliamentary elections at the end of the month are conducted in a "free and democratic way." ¶6. (C) Post followed-up with MFA Belarus Desk Officer Stephen Iro September 12, who confirmed that, contrary to press reports, Belarus FM Martynov would not be invited to take part in the September 15 GAERC. Iro thought the Council would hold out the prospect of easing sanctions and visa restrictions, provided that the September parliamentary elections showed an improvement over the previous round, even if they were not completely "free and fair." Iro opined that if Belarus were to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the EU would likely still offer some improvement in relations, but at a much "lower" level than if Belarus continues to stand firm against Russian pressure. Iro also thought that Poland and Lithuania may take a stronger stance against Belarus and maintain some bilateral sanctions, even if EU sanctions are ultimately lifted. BERLIN 00001259 002 OF 002 TIMKEN JR