GERMANS REMAIN WARY ABOUT EXPANDING ISAF AUTHORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 001255 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2018 TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS MARR GM AF SUBJECT: GERMANS REMAIN WARY ABOUT EXPANDING ISAF AUTHORITY ON COUNTERNARCOTICS REF: STATE 96741 Classified By: DCM JOHN KOENIG. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Post delivered reftel demarche points to office directors and action officers in the MFA, MOD and Chancellery September 11, emphasizing that giving ISAF the ability to undertake counternarcotics interdiction missions is critical to achieving success against the insurgency in Afghanistan. German officials uniformly agreed on the need for strong action against the narcotics trade, but argued that it was critical that the Afghans lead the effort and that ISAF continue to play only a supporting role. With only a month before the Bundestag votes on extending the parliamentary mandate for Bundeswehr participation in ISAF, officials are loath to contemplate any changes to the CN provisions in the ISAF OPLAN that would require modifications of the parliamentary mandate. Structuring ISAF's expanded CN authority as an "opt in" would be promising if this allowed the Bundeswehr to stay on the sidelines without requiring Germany to file a formal national caveat. Germany's final position on this issue will be decided at the highest levels, making SACEUR's September 15 meeting with Chancellor Merkel in Berlin very timely. END SUMMARY. MOD ¶2. (C) MOD Political Military Affairs Office Director Col. Bernd Schuett, who served previously as commander of the German PRT in Feyzabad, emphasized the importance of maintaining "Afghan ownership" of CN operations. While it may be attractive from a "tactical perspective" to allow ISAF forces on their own to destroy drug labs and interdict traffickers, it would run counter to ISAF's "strategic vision," which is to work with the Afghans and to build up their capabilities so that they can assume responsibility for their own security as soon as possible. He thought ISAF's current CN role, as outlined in the existing OPLAN, was ideal because it made the Afghans responsible for CN, but called on ISAF to provide critical support, like logistical assistance, intelligence information, training, in extremis force protection, etc. He noted that as a PRT commander, he had played an active role in supporting Afghan eradication forces in this way. ¶3. (C) Schuett also stressed the domestic political problem of adding CN to the public debate only a month before the Bundestag votes on extending the ISAF mandate. Now that the Social Democrats had officially settled on their chancellor candidate (Foreign Minister Steinmeier),the electoral campaign for the September 2009 Bundestag election had already begun, severely reducing the political appetite for introducing new and controversial foreign policy issues to the agenda. ¶4. (C) Schuett, however, was intrigued by the suggestion in the penultimate point of reftel that ISAF's expanded CN authority be structured to allow nations to opt in, rather than requiring nations to opt out if they chose not to participate. Depending on how this was worded, he thought an "opt in" might be a useful way to bridge the gap between nations, like the U.S., which felt the need to undertake CN interdiction missions alone, without Afghan participation, in their areas of operation, and those, like Germany, which did not. He wondered, however, whether the ISAF Rules of Engagement would need to be changed to accommodate the new CN mission, thereby still requiring national caveats from non-participating countries. MFA ¶5. (C) NATO Office Director Bernhard Schlagheck said Germany agreed that there was a direct link between the drug trade and the insurgency and that NATO should "do what it can" against it. However, Schlagheck said Germany felt strongly that CN operations should not be done by ISAF or any other international forces without the participation of the Afghans. The CN effort had to have an "Afghan face" or the international community would find itself scapegoated by the Afghan government when drug lords retaliated, the public protested or things went wrong. Schlagheck noted that COMISAF, in his recent tactical directive, had already acknowledged the importance of having Afghan national security forces present whenever an Afghan compound or house was searched. The same logic applied for CN operations. ¶6. (C) Schlagheck pleaded for interpreting the current OPLAN "as broadly as we can" and avoiding any changes to it, especially changes that would necessitate modifications of the Bundeswehr's ISAF parliamentary mandate. He said he remained unconvinced that the authority and flexibility under the existing OPLAN and CN annex had been fully exploited. He complained that SHAPE had failed, despite repeated requests, to provide a detailed stocktaking of what had been accomplished under the existing OPLAN and what more could be done if the OPLAN were expanded. Schlagheck noted that with ISAF mandate coming up for renewal next month, the government was already struggling to win parliamentary approval of a number of new Afghanistan provisions, including 1) increasing the troop ceiling by 1,000 (from 3,500 to 4,500),2) participating in a possible NATO AWACS mission, and 3) supporting a streamlined U.S. command structure. Trying at this late date to add CN to the debate would be "a bit too much to swallow." ¶7. (C) Schlagheck noted that he had already talked to Schuett (who called Schlagheck right after our visit to the MOD) about whether structuring the expanded CN mission as an "opt in" might make it more palatable for Germany. Schlagheck agreed this was a possible way forward, but that they would need more time to think through all the implications. He welcomed any further information on what we had in mind. Chancellery ¶8. (C) Deputy Security Affairs Division Chief Detlef Waechter, accompanied by Afghanistan Action Officer Dominik Mutter and Military Affairs Action Officer Heidi Reisinger, expressed appreciation for receiving the U.S. points, especially given that SACEUR is scheduled to meet the Chancellor in Berlin on September 15, and indicated an openness to thinking creatively about how to meet COMISAF's concerns. He noted that this issue had been under discussion for a while within NATO and he had the impression that Germany was becoming "isolated" in resisting the effort to broaden ISAF's CN operations. Like Schlagheck and Schuett, he thought the "opt-in" idea was interesting and might offer a way forward. He said he would discuss this matter further with MOD and MFA. Comment ¶9. (C) With only a month to go before the Bundestag votes on extending the parliamentary mandate for Bundeswehr participation in ISAF, the German government will strongly resist any changes to the ISAF OPLAN regarding counternarcotics that require modification of the mandate. Given the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan and an already skeptical German public, government officials see little room for convincing parliamentarians that Germany should undertake CN operations that could lead to greater German casualties, turn the local populace against their troops, or worsen (at least in the short run) the security situation. Having ISAF engage directly in CN interdiction operations, without Afghan participation, also runs directly counter to the German approach in northern Afghanistan, which disavows offensive action except in self-defense, refuses to acknowledge that ISAF is a counterinsurgency operation, and stresses that everything the Bundeswehr does be given an "Afghan face." Structuring ISAF's expanded CN authority as an "opt in" would be promising if this allowed the Bundeswehr to stay on the sidelines without requiring Germany to file a formal national caveat. The final German position on this issue will be decided at the highest levels, making SACEUR's September 15 meeting with Chancellor Merkel very timely. TIMKEN JR