WELCOME TO BERLIN

S E C R E T BERLIN 000122 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL GM SUBJECT: WELCOME TO BERLIN Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION JOHN KOENIG FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) -------------- Electoral Fever Puts Pressure on Coalition -------------- ¶1. (C) NSA Hadley: Mission Germany looks forward to welcoming you to Berlin January 31 to February 1. Germany is currently consumed by the aftermath of bitterly fought state elections that took place on January 27 in Hesse and Lower Saxony. They are being seen as barometers for next year's nationwide vote. Although the conservative Christian Democrats (CDU) won comfortably in Lower Saxony, the CDU suffered a major setback in Hesse, where CDU Minister-President Roland Koch ran a divisive election campaign that took his party from a commanding lead in early polls to a virtual tie with the Social Democratic party (SPD). The country is also digesting the significance of the unexpected political gains by the (neo-Communist) Left Party and its entry into both Hesse and Lower Saxony parliaments. Over the next several weeks, state and national politicians will evaluate coalition options, none of which appear to please any of the major parties. The CDU's poor showing in Hesse could energize its competitors and lead to further domestic partisanship, thereby complicating Chancellor Angela Merkel's goal of solidifying the political center in advance of the 2009 national elections. On the other hand, the success of CDU Minister-President Christian Wulff's relatively low-key, centrist re-election campaign in Lower Saxony has been seen as a vindication of Merkel's domestic political strategy. ¶2. (C) The outcome of these two state elections, and that of the February 24 Hamburg elections, will likely reverberate in the day-to-day functioning of the CDU-SPD coalition. Already, Merkel's conservatives and Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier's Social Democrats resemble the proverbial couple that hated each other but stayed together for the sake of the children: the lack of any other viable coalition options is what sustains the partnership between the CDU/CSU and the SPD at this point. On key priorities like Afghanistan and Kosovo (and on certain aspects of Iran), the gap between Merkel and Steinmeier is not so wide, and cooperation with the U.S. has not been harmed by domestic politics. Differences are becoming more evident on some foreign policy issues however: Steinmeier's January 17 meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister Muallem, over strong opposition from the Chancellery, is just the latest example. Increasingly, Christoph Heusgen and the Chancellery's small staff are being blindsided by the Foreign Ministry on policy matters that are significant but outside the spotlight. Overall, we can expect Merkel's government to be more hamstrung by partisan and interagency rivalries between now and the fall of 2009 than was the case in its first two years in office. -------------- Steinmeier's Evolving Political Role -------------- ¶3. (C) Steinmeier, who came to office with a reputation as a technocrat, is increasingly a political rival to the Chancellor. Like most of his predecessors, he has benefited from the visibility conferred on the Foreign Minister. He has become the most popular SPD politician in Germany and the second most popular overall, trailing only Merkel. He recently was named Vice Chancellor, was elected as one of three national deputy chairmen of the SPD, and announced he will run for a federal parliament seat in 2009. Steinmeier is regarded, both within the SPD and among the general public, as an attractive possible chancellor candidate in 2009, should SPD Chairman Kurt Beck stumble. ¶4. (C) With Steinmeier's evolution from technocrat to political leader, he must cultivate much greater rank-and-file support within the SPD. This is a particular challenge for him, because on domestic issues he is seen as relatively conservative. He was a key architect of Gerhard Schroeder's economic reforms and stood by with a studied detachment as Kurt Beck and the SPD's left wing began to roll them back last fall. This is all the more reason for Steinmeier to seek out foreign policy issues like arms control and disarmament on which he can strike chords that resonate with SPD voters (regardless of the shortcomings we find in these ideas). Similarly, in policy toward Russia, the former Soviet republics, and the Middle East, Steinmeier misses no opportunity to evoke the legacy of Willy Brandt, elevating dialog and economic engagement above open expression of disagreement as tools of diplomacy. ¶5. (C) These internal factors amplify the tendency of Steinmeier and his Foreign Office to pursue initiatives not in harmony with the Chancellor's instincts or policy preferences. Germany has a weak foreign policy coordination process and the German constitution grants broad autonomy to ministers. Therefore, the ability of the Chancellor and her staff to rein in the Foreign Office is limited. A result is that Germany does not always speak with a single, clear voice. -------------- IRAN: Importance of International Cooperation -------------- ¶6. (S) Although Merkel and the Chancellery have more consistently toed our common firm line on Iran, both the Chancellery and the Foreign Office are firmly committed to securing a third UNSCR sanctions resolution as a basis for more biting EU autonomous measures. MFA officials called the January 22 P5 1 Ministerial a success in demonstrating unity among the members, both by producing a new UNSC resolution text and by showing a unified strategic approach in dealing with Iran. MFA officials have told us in private that EU autonomous sanctions would not be discussed at the January 28-29 GAERC. In conversations prior to January 22, German officials have emphasized the importance of the broadest possible international coalition, and thus highly value efforts to keep all members of the P5-plus-1 on board, deploying this argument when approached about either unilateral or EU autonomous measures. However, they point to pressures from their business community (as well as from the Finance and Economics Ministries) as constraints on adopting stronger unilateral action against the Iranian regime. Privately, senior officials in the Chancellery and Foreign Office have expressed frustration that the NIE has complicated international diplomatic efforts. On December 4, FM Steinmeier said the NIE on Iran offered the chance "inject new momentum" into the nuclear negotiations and called on all sides not to squander this opportunity. Merkel said publicly on January 15 that the NIE had slowed the momentum behind further UN sanctions; she simultaneously underscored the seriousness of Iran's nuclear activities and the need for international solidarity. -------------- AFGHANISTAN: Need for Broader Deployment -------------- ¶7. (C) Encouraging greater German involvement in Afghanistan is a key priority of Mission Germany; we have made some progress, but the Germans remain very reluctant about deploying combat forces outside of the North. In advance of the April NATO Summit, Germany will increase its involvement in the training of the Afghan National Army and will probably agree to take over responsibility for the 150-man quick reaction force (QRF) in the north. We should welcome the QRF decision, because it would represent the first German ISAF contingent deployable on short notice (including possibly in exceptional and temporary circumstances outside the north), which would be a qualitatively new and significant step toward greater involvement in kinetic operations. Secretary Gates' recent written request to Defense Minister Jung to deploy German Special Operations Forces (SOF) under ISAF in the south of Afghanistan is likely to be very controversial here, but may prove acceptable in the end if, in return, we were to offer Germany the option of ending its current offer of SOF for OEF. Moving the German SOF commitment from OEF to ISAF would also have the benefit of allowing us to shift the considerable diplomatic resources and attention we devoted last fall to getting the German OEF mandate renewed to activities that may yield more practical benefits, such as pressing Germany to increase its contributions to ISAF. ¶8. (C) We should encourage greater German leadership in the EUPOL effort to train Afghanistan's civilian police force. EUPOL is led by German Juergen Scholz, and Germany contributes more police trainers than any other EU country, but the program has been slow to start and the planned ceiling of 195 EU police trainers is inadequate for the job. Furthermore, activities are not currently planned at the district level where the need is greatest. Germany should be urged to accelerate the deployment of EU trainers to Afghanistan, increase the number of trainers, and broaden the geographic range of activities. -------------- RUSSIA: Split Approaches -------------- ¶9. (C) There are significant differences between the Chancellery and the Foreign Office on Russia, which invites Russian wedge-driving. Merkel has never shied away from plain talk about disturbing trends inside Russia. Steinmeier was the first foreign visitor to get a meeting with presidential candidate Medvedev after his nomination (a meeting with President Putin was thrown in as well). Lately, the combination of Russian CFE suspension, backsliding on democracy, and intransigence on Kosovo has pushed even some in the SPD to offer criticism. Still, the Foreign Ministry will likely continue to seek an unhelpful bridging role with Russia, in particular on CFE and other matters related to arms control. The Chancellery can help constrain these impulses, but we will also need to keep up pressure among the Quad partners as well as from other key allies (e.g. Turkey and Norway) to make clear that German unilateral initiatives put transatlantic solidarity at risk. -------------- KOSOVO: Close Cooperation -------------- ¶10. (C) We discern very little daylight between the Chancellor and Steinmeier on Kosovo, and there is keen interest in working closely with the U.S. to resolve status and seal the EU's leadership role. While the Bundestag will engage in intensive debate following an anticipated coordinated declaration of independence, we expect the multiparty consensus in favor of independence and the KFOR and ESDP missions to hold. -------------- COUNTERTERRORISM: Building on Success -------------- ¶11. (C) Your visit comes at a time when U.S.-German bilateral cooperation on security issues is as close as it has ever been. The successful cooperation surrounding the September 4 arrests of three individuals planning large-scale attacks and the upcoming conclusion of a new bilateral agreement on fingerprint, DNA and other data sharing are the latest evidence of this trend. Furthermore, no German senior official pushes as hard, or argues so publicly, for closer bilateral cooperation on security issues as Interior Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble. Should the opportunity arise, you should inform German officials that we are eager to build on our successful record of counterterrorism cooperation and explore how we might work together to address threats such as European residents who seek terrorist training at overseas camps and become jihadists in Iraq or Afghanistan. -------------- ECONOMICS: Commitment to TEC -------------- ¶12. (C) Merkel highly values the U.S.-EU Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) -- a centerpiece of her 2007 EU presidency -- aimed at reducing regulatory barriers to transatlantic trade and investment. She is concerned, however, about maintaining the momentum in the TEC and fears that the European Commission and future EU presidencies (including France) may lose enthusiasm for the project. German officials also worry that a changing U.S. Administration could derail what they regard as a highly successful new transatlantic economic instrument; we should emphasize our continued commitment to the TEC, and encourage the Germans to maintain a leading role in it. The German economy is expected to grow at only 1.7 percent this year. Previous higher estimates were lowered due to rising oil prices, the strength of the Euro, slower U.S. growth, and continuing turmoil in financial markets. German economists and business leaders are also worried about the possibility of a national minimum wage as well as increased labor union demands for wage increases, both of which could affect the economy adversely. Merkel plans to highlight employment gains -- as opposed to minimum wages -- as the focus of her economic plan looking ahead to the 2009 national elections. -------------- CLIMATE CHANGE: Aggressive Measures -------------- ¶13. (C) Chancellor Merkel and the rest of Germany's political leadership remain serious about pursuing aggressive international measures to meet the challenges of global warming. Merkel has made climate change a priority of her Chancellorship and enjoys the overwhelming domestic support on this. Merkel's support for mandatory, targeted global limits on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and an international cap-and-trade regime reflects a deep-seated belief that only drastic, concerted efforts on the part of the international community can slow -- and ultimately reverse -- the human contribution to global warming. If anything, Steinmeier supports tougher standards. While the Germans have been willing to consider alternative solutions, such as new technologies for clean coal and renewables, fundamental differences in our approaches to the issue of climate change remain, and could lead to more public disagreement in the future. For example, while Germany will send a delegation to the January 30 Major Economies Meeting (MEM),the German Government remains skeptical about the value that the Major Economies Process (MEP) adds to the UNFCCC track. The Germans are particularly concerned about the need to avoid duplication of effort in the various other climate change-related forums, including the UNFCCC and the G-8. TIMKEN JR