(C) NSG CHAIRMAN EXPECTS PUSHBACK ON INDIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 001117

SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/CE
STATE FOR ISN RICHARD STRATFORD
STATE FOR ISN/RA TADD KOCA
STATE FOR SCA/RA JASON MCCLESSAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2033
TAGS: PARM PREL IAEA KNNP ENRG ETTD IN GM
SUBJECT: (C) NSG CHAIRMAN EXPECTS PUSHBACK ON INDIA
CIV-NUKE DEAL

REF: A. BERLIN 1051

B. STATE 85948

Classified By: Economic Minister-Counselor Robert Pollard
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: At an August 13 meeting with EMIN and
Econoff, Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Chairman Viktor
Elbling, along with staff advisors Goetz Lingenthal and Joerg
Polster, stressed support for an NSG exception for India and
agreed with the USG on the need to press for a consensus at
the upcoming Extraordinary NSG Plenary in Vienna on August
21-22. He was not optimistic about the odds of reaching an
agreement in August, however, given likely objections from
other NSG members, he foresaw the need for a second meeting.
Members of the German delegation reported that Germany is
inclined to favor text modifcations reflecting a concern
about India's non-proliferation credibility. Despite the
significant obstacles ahead, we believe that in the end, both
Elbling and the Germans will strenuously work to shape a
result that will support the fundamental principles of the
U.S. approach. End Summary.

KEEPING THE SCHEDULE ON TRACK: PUSHING FOR AUGUST CONSENSUS
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2. (C) As NSG Chairman, Elbling said he would manage the
deliberation process in a way supportive of USG objectives to
reach an NSG consensus in the August 21-22 Plenary. He
strongly discouraged hypothetical discussions about a date
for a second Plenary, even though he admitted that one
probably would be necessary. (COMMENT: On July 25, MFA State
Secretary Reinhard Silberberg told the Charge d'Affaires
(CDA) that according to Elbling, it may actually require
three meetings to cover all the issues. END COMMENT) Elbling
took exception to recent media speculation on an alleged
second Plenary date scheduled for September 2 and denied that
either he or the MFA had ever proposed this. In fact, he
feared that such speculation would actually undermine the
goal of achieving consensus at the first meeting, as some NSG
members would lose focus, and others would use it as an
excuse for further delay. (COMMENT: In his remarks to CDA,
Silberberg also noted that Germany did not want to convey the
impression that "the job can not get done in the first
meeting". END COMMENT) He did worry, however, that even if
the NSG reached consensus, certain members would naturally
feel compelled to consult with their Cabinet or Parliament,
adding another element of uncertainty on the timing.

NOTHING SAID YET, BUT GERMANY ANTICIPATES OPPOSITION
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3. (C) Elbling anticipates dissenting voices among the NSG
members because of proliferation concerns, but so far he has
not received any official notice from any NSG member, nor any
word on the issues they are likely to bring up. He had
heard, for example, that New Zealand, Switzerland, Sweden,
Ireland, and Austria are among the likely skeptics, but all
remain tight-lipped about their concerns.


4. (C) Nonetheless, Elbling said he fully expects that some
NSG members would challenge the agreement because of the
alleged weakness of India's assurances. Elbling noted that
critics had claimed, inter alia, that
-- India's moratorium on nuclear testing is strictly
voluntary and not in any way legally binding;
-- there was no guarantee that even if an NSG agreement were
in place, India would not recommence testing if Pakistan, for
instance, were to begin testing weapons of its own;
-- the deal might set a bad precedent. If this deal were put
in place for India, what would stop other non-NSG countries
from lining up for similar concessions?


5. (C) Elbling made clear it that he did not share these
views and was prepared, if necessary, to forcefully counter
these points and promote the advantages of an accord with
India at the Plenary, but as the NSG Chair, he would not want
to be drawn into an extended debate. Moreover, the
opportunity to air complaints on the first day could in his
view set the stage for movement toward a possible consensus
the next day.

GERMANY MAY RAISE CONCERNS FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL REASONS
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6. (C) Elbling had previously warned us (REF A) that Germany
would raise questions about the draft text, in part to
satisfy skeptics in the Bundestag and their constituencies.
In this meeting, Elbling assured us that there was core
political support from Chancellor Merkel and Foreign Minister
Steinmeier on the India agreement. He likewise reiterated
his support of U.S. objectives, balanced by his obligation to
serve as an honest broker.


7. (C) Elbling, on the other hand, was careful to distance
himself from the German delegation, making it clear that its
function is separate from his role as NSG Chair. Polster and
Lingenthal -- members of the German NSG delegation also
present in the meeting -- indicated to us that they would
indeed welcome a discussion in the Plenary on stronger
assurances from India, such as a firmer pledge not to test
again. Elbling also added that the Germans might raise the
issue of what an India deal would mean for the
non-proliferation regime overall. (COMMENT: Although Polster
and Lingenthal are seasoned experts on these issues, they
will not by their own account make the final call; that will
be up to the political leadership. END COMMENT)


8. (C) Lingenthal further observed that there is not a
strong domestic consensus in favor of the deal. Elbling
offered that he fully expected some opposition in the
Bundestag from all sides of the political spectrum, but this
would not influence the government's position. (COMMENT: In
his remarks to CDA, Silberberg highlighted that German
Parliamentarians are very active on this issue and that many
German NPT purists are unsupportive of the deal. END COMMENT)
In the final analysis, Lingenthal stated, NSG members would
need to weigh the advantages of a new strategic partnership
with India against their nonproliferation objectives.


9. (C) COMMENT. In an aside with EMIN, Elbling admitted he
was "not optimistic" about the odds of success in the NSG
deliberations, not because the arguments for the agreement
were not sound, or because the U.S. would not receive strong
support from like-minded countries, including Germany.
Rather, he was gravely concerned because of the need to
achieve unanimity among all 45 NSG members, and because of
the very tight deadline they were working under. We remain
convinced, however, that Elbling will work strenuously to
facilitate success, and Germany will back the India exception
after all is said and done. Elbling indicated that he and
the German delegation would arrive early in Vienna to permit
bilateral discussions with other NSG members, and that he
especially welcomed the opportunity to meet with the U.S.
delegation.
TIMKEN JR