Serbia's Kosovo Minister Pledges No Violence and No

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 000053 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PREF PGOV PHUM KV SR SUBJECT: Serbia's Kosovo Minister Pledges No Violence and No Recognition Ref: Schroeder-Brush 01/04/2008 Fax Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Serbia's Kosovo Minister Samardzic told UK, US, French, German and Italian COMs on January 11 that Serbia was committed both to no-violence and no-recognition of Kosovo. In response to a UK-headed "Quint" demarche, Samardzic said EU and U.S. policy toward Serbia was stuck in a Milosevic-era time warp, but nevertheless Serbia was committed to a negotiated Kosovo settlement. Until that time, which he estimated would take one to four more years, Serbia would continue to treat the "loyal Serbian citizen" population (which includes Gorani and Roma),as Serbian citizens and attend to their needs as a responsible government should. End Summary. UK Demarche -------------- ¶2. (SBU) On January 11, UK Ambassador Wordsworth led a Quint (UK, U.S., Italy, France and Germany) demarche to Serbia's Kosovo Minister Samardzic protesting the opening of the Kosovo Ministry Office in North Mitrovica without UNMIK approval. Wordsworth introduced the demarche requesting that the contents not be made public and that Samardzic understand the demarche as an effort to cooperate with Serbia on Kosovo status. Text of UK Demarche follows: Begin Text: -- We recognise your objections to the whole idea of independence. But be clear: it is going to happen. This is not about 'punishing Serbia', or 'taking territory away' from Serbia. It is, in our view, the only possible way forward now, after the unprecedented crimes of the Milosevic regime in 1998/99 which, by their scale and because they were undertaken by the Serbian state, created a wholly new situation; -- You may not agree with our view - but you should not publicly cast aspersions on our motives, or doubt our seriousness to see this through; -- Despite our differences, we assume that we share some common objectives: * we want to avoid any step, by either side, which would escalate tension, putting livelihoods or even lives at risk; * we want minority communities to stay, and flourish; * we want the whole region to make progress towards the EU, to bring lasting stability and prosperity; -- Supervising Kosovo's independence, in the interests of Kosovo's minority communities and wider regional stability, is a substantial contribution on the part of the EU and US, which will last many years at great cost to our taxpayers. The December 2007 European Council confirmed the EU's readiness to launch the ESDP mission, and to contribute to the ICO; -- Serbia, as a country that sees its future as a member of the EU, will have to come to terms with this. Serbia cannot simultaneously seek rapid progress towards EU membership, including the early granting of candidate status, yet impose bilateral sanctions on trade, power supplies etc to Kosovo which will be destabilising regionally. You cannot simply refuse to cooperate with the EU's efforts. Your economic future, in particular your ability to attract investment from EU countries and the US, depends on your continuing to move towards integration; -- For our part, we recognise that domestic political realities might place some restraints on the ability of the Government of Serbia to cooperate with the international community over Kosovo. Given some good will on your part, we are willing to develop 'work arounds' that will make it possible for day-to-day cooperation to continue; -- Specifically, we are willing to work with you to support the co-ordinated and transparent development of links between Serbia and K-Serb municipalities in the areas of their competencies, which would help to reassure those communities and encourage them to stay, including the provision by Serbia of financial and technical assistance, expert personnel and equipment; -- In return we expect cooperation from you in avoiding steps to which we would have to respond - e.g. the uncoordinated creation of Serbian Government presences on Kosovo territory, specific actions that would publicly challenge our view of status, challenges to the freedom of movement of international presences in Kosovo, including KFOR, the EU Mission and the ICO, or unilateral attempts to conduct local elections. -- Existing Serbian presences - such as the Kosovo Ministry office BELGRADE 00000053 002 OF 003 in Kosovska Mitrovica - must be re-established on a mutually agreed footing as a matter of urgency. UNMIK has already made clear to you its concern that this office was not established in accordance with UNSCR 1244. The Government of Serbia needs to formally request a change with UNMIK. The office should be closed if it does not have UNMIK permission to operate, and Serbia should not open further such offices elsewhere in Kosovo without UNMIK's approval. End Text. Time Warp Politics -------------- ¶3. (SBU) While keeping his tone cordial, Samardzic accused the United States and the EU of "time-warp" politics -- treating Serbia as if it were still in the Milosevic era. "In spite of all our advances in democratic and economic reform and good-neighborly relations, you treat us the same way you did pre-1999." In contrast, Samardzic countered, Kosovo under UNMIK had stagnated and was now ineptly governed by a criminal elite, assisted by UNMIK. Serbia was not the problem, Samardzic insisted, the problem was the inertia of bad policies. No Recognition, Ever (for now) -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Samardzic said the Serbian Government would never, ever, recognize Kosovo's independence and that the Troika process had not been a real negotiation since one side - the Albanians - already had been promised their desired result. Since there was no real negotiated settlement, Serbia would continue to consider Kosovo a constituent part of Serbia and attend to its citizens accordingly. Serbia would be practical in this approach, however, and attend to the needs of those who considered themselves Serbian citizens, which in addition to Serbs, included Gorani (a small Muslim/Slav group of less than 100,000 living in the mountains on the Albanian/Kosovo/Macedonia border) and Roma. As a practical matter, Serbia would not attempt to impose its citizens' services on the Albanian population. "The Albanians will be the first to understand Serbia's actions, they have lived 10 years under parallel institutions, and it's better for them that way." ¶5. (SBU) The North Mitrovica Office of the Kosovo Ministry, Samardzic said, was the legal heir to the Coordination Center established in 2001 with UNMIK consent. This office was now subordinate to the Kosovo Ministry but its legal status had not changed, he said, therefore there was no need to request permission from UNMIK to establish the office. ¶6. (SBU) In response to the Italian Ambassador's question about whether Serbia's goal was a hard partition, Samardzic responded that the current situation was not the end of the story. "We couldn't negotiate when the other side already knew it would get what it wanted." Samardzic said Serbia remained interested in a negotiated settlement and would continue to negotiate with the Kosovar Albanians to obtain a mutually acceptable result, which could take "anywhere for one to four years." Punitive Actions -------------- ¶7. (SBU) In response to the demarche's language on possible use of Serbian "sanctions" in the event of a declaration of independence, Samardzic said, "the only ones talking about punitive actions are the EU and the United States, we have no interest in punitive actions, they would only hurt us." Specifically addressing concerns about trade, Samardzic countered, "we had free trade and open borders, until UNMIK arrived and established a customs regime." Samardzic reminded that maintaining free movement of goods and people was a centerpiece of Serbia's "substantial autonomy" model. The biggest challenge in the interim, Samardzic said was Kosovar participation in international organizations, which Serbia would not tolerate. Serbia remained committed to non-violence in any case, Samardzic reiterated. Comment -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Though Samardzic, predictably, rejected both independence and criticism of the Northern Mitrovica office, he claimed he and the Serbian Government were committed to non-violence and were not considering punitive measures against Kosovo. Samardzic said he welcomed future such discussions with the Quint. End Comment. MUNTER BELGRADE 00000053 003 OF 003 2