SERBIA: IF THE RADICALS WIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BELGRADE 000452 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/7/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM TAGS SUBJECT: SERBIA: IF THE RADICALS WIN BELGRADE 00000452 001.2 OF 004 CLASSIFIED BY: Jennifer Brush, DCM, Embassy Belgrade, State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) A victory of the war crimes indictee Vojislav Seselj-led Serbian Radical Party (SRS) in the May 11 parliamentary elections would bring to power a leadership with no international experience and little common ground on the U.S. or EU priorities for democratic and economic development in region. A Radical-led government would fight for Kosovo, fight corruption, oppose privatization and economic reform, fight western influence in regional affairs, and establish closer ties with Russia. Cooperation with the international war crimes tribunal would stop and, with it, formal progress toward Serbia's membership in the European Union. Government support for human rights and other civil society concerns would decline or disappear. Given the reactionary nature of a Radical government, public support might be short-lived. Democratic Party insiders suggest that President Tadic might refuse to approve a Radical government list and would in short order call for new elections, with the hope of mobilizing a greater democratic turnout, in reaction to what they would bill as a brush with disaster. End Summary. Populist Platform -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Serbia's May 11 parliamentary elections are too close to call, but the most recent and reliable polling data available to the Embassy puts the Radical Party less than two percentage points ahead of President Tadic's "For a European Serbia" coalition. While SRS local leader Tomislav Nikolic (Seselj, the party leader runs the party in absentia from a jail cell in the Hague) has invited Prime Minister Kostunica to declare his party's coalition interests, neither the PM nor any other major party leader has done so, presumably for fear of losing votes of those on the political extremes of their respective parties. In any event, Embassy, and most local political analysts, believes DSS support would be essential and might be sufficient for SRS to achieve a parliamentary majority to form a government. ¶3. (SBU) SRS campaign literature and speeches reflect a platform that addresses bread-and-butter issues of Serbia's middle and lower economic strata. The principal planks are: -- Keeping Kosovo; -- Eliminating official corruption and crime; -- Returning to a heavily subsidized economy and reducing unemployment; -- Addressing privatization of Serbia's public assets; -- Making private housing affordable; -- Developing/prioritizing the agricultural sector through the development of cooperatives and an agricultural bank; -- Pension reform; -- Free healthcare; and -- Free education. The SRS platform has remained constant while the party has been in opposition, and has successfully won the party the largest share of seats in Parliament, currently with 82 of 250. A Radical Government -------------- ¶4. (SBU) In forming a government, the SRS leadership would face two significant hurdles: a party president leading from a prison cell and lack of talent and experience. Braca Grubacic, the editor of the widely-distributed VIP English language news digest, told poloff on May 5 that staffing the ministries would be a challenge, with no more than 30 or 40 SRS members capable of serving in government. Grubacic said that Seselj still influenced the party, planned to return to Serbia, and would try to reclaim the party presidency. Seselj, Grubacic said, would try to block Nikolic from becoming Prime Minister and insist, instead, that SRS cede the post to Kostunica, in exchange for DSS support. Nikolic would presumably serve as Deputy PM. Even War Criminals Can't Get Along -------------- BELGRADE 00000452 002.2 OF 004 ¶5. (C) In a February meeting with a local OSCE official, Nikolic himself revealed a strained relationship with Seselj. Seselj, he said, had tried to take over active leadership of the party and election campaigning from The Hague, a dangerous step in Nikolic's opinion, and ONE that led Nikolic to consider leaving the party. Nikolic told the OSCE official that "times had changed" and, he implied, Seselj's time had passed. He said that Seselj was "a stubborn personality who would never seek compromise with other political leaders." Novi Sad Mayor Maya Gojkovic told DCM on two occasions that she had left the Radicals because Nikolic refused to stand up to Seselj and move the party out of the shadow of an indicted war criminal. ¶6. (SBU) Nikolic has publicly stated that the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS),the party of former Serbian President and indicted war criminal Slobodan Milosevic, would not be part of a ruling coalition with SRS -- despite the SRS having previously served alongside SPS during the Milosevic era. Nikolic has stated he expected SRS would be able to "destroy" SPS during the campaign. SPS, on the other hand, is enjoying its role as kingmaker with its projected 7%, and at this point is only saying its natural role is with Kostunica and DSS. Though SPS President Dacic continues to deny in the press he would agree to govern with Tadic's coalition, senior DS advisors tell us the SPS deal is "done" in exchange for DS support for SPS candidacy for the Socialist International. Foreign Affairs -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The SRS lack of experience in foreign affairs would make them particularly vulnerable to pressure to cede the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the DSS. This would be a mistake, said Grubacic, since Kostunica's currency with the west was so low. Kostunica could sink them before they started, he said. ¶8. (SBU) A Radical government, Grubacic said, would have ONE foreign policy objective: to convince the country and the international community of Serbia's political and economic stability. Nikolic has publicly stated that he welcomed international investment and he told Grubacic that he would respect pre-existing deals, even with the west. Grubacic thought that the Radicals would lean hard on Serbia's foreign currency reserves to "ride out" the first six months and keep Serbia stable. (More on the Radicals probable economic policy to follow septel.) ¶9. (SBU) Grubacic claimed that the Radicals did not really care about the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU, which Serbia signed (and the DS celebrated) on April 29, over the objection of PM Kostunica. In fact, the SRS has hardly mentioned it during the campaign, and Grubasic said that SRS Secretary General Vucic had told him that the party did not believe it would influence voters significantly. Nikolic has repeatedly said that he did not oppose Serbia's joining the European Union, insisting that it do so "on Serbia's terms -- i.e., with Kosovo. No Cooperation with ICTY -------------- ¶10. (SBU) ONE of the SRS's main campaign planks was stopping cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY),a prerequisite for EU ratification of the SAA with Serbia. "Nobody in Serbia will be indicted by The Hague Tribunal... and not ONE Serb will be handed over to The Hague," he told a Moscow daily. Cooperation with Russia and Select Friends -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Nikolic insists that an SRS government would not lead to Serbia's isolation; but has made clear that he seeks to prioritize strengthening Serbia's relationship with Russia. In an interview with a Moscow daily, quoted in online news outlets on May 6, he said, "We plan to develop relations with Serbia's true friends, among whom Russia holds a crucial place. Serbia also has to cooperate closely with China, India, Arab and African countries, as well as with the EU." In the same interview, Nikolic suggested that, after the elections, Serbia would address Russian-Serbian political-military cooperation. Demonstrating the SRS special friendship with Russia, at a May 2 SRS rally, the Russian Ambassador to Serbia appeared onstage, at Nikolic's side. At the SRS closing campaign rally in Belgrade, May 6, Heinz-Christian Strache, head of the Austrian Freedom Party (of Jorge Haider),spoke onstage in support of the Radical Party. Radical MOD -------------- ¶12. (SBU) SRS leadership could stall the most positive element BELGRADE 00000452 003.2 OF 004 of the U.S.-Serbia bilateral relationship- our political-military relationship. - Serbia's Constitution reserves to the Presidency oversight of the military, and Serbia's Chief of Defense (CHOD),General Ponos, reports to President Tadic. While an SRS MinDef would have the authority to halt military cooperation and joint exercises, and could equip and move troops, he would lack authority to deploy them in battle. Only the CHOD, under presidential order, could send the armed forces into combat. The general belief is that President Tadic will insist that General Ponos stay on as CHOD if the SRS assumes the position of MinDef. This would give the President some leverage with the SRS MinDef. The bottom line with an SRS led Ministry of Defense would be stagnation. Cooperation with NATO would likely cease. Interior -------------- ¶13. (SBU) SRS will need this ministry to fulfill its anti-corruption campaign promises and some analysts variously suggest Vucic or party Vice President Dragan Todorovic for the job. DSS will likely try to hold onto this post, although the incapacitation of current Interior Minister Jocic (paralyzed in an automobile accident in early 2008) has left a void at the head of the ministry, now run out of the PM's office. Other Ministries -------------- ¶14. (SBU) In addition to the PM's office, Interior, and Intelligence, DSS may put up a fight for the Kosovo Ministry. SRS vice presidents and party leaders would likely fill remaining cabinet seats. The list below is purely speculative, especially with respect to specific ministries, but might include: Milorad Mircic (Agriculture),head of the Vojvodina Radicals, member of parliament, and Minister for the Diaspora in the 1998 government of Mirko Marijanovic; Dragan Todorovic (Economy),president of the SRS Executive Council, engineer, member of parliament, Minister of Transportation and Communications in the Marijanovic government; Gordana Pop Lazic (Local Administration),Mayor of Zemun, Minister of Local Self Government under Marijanovic, former MP, SRS vice president; Jorgovanka Tabakovic (Finance),MP, economist; Nemanja Sarovic (Youth),head of Belgrade SRS branch; Bozidar Delic (Defense): Retired general (under Milosevic),MP, member of defense and security committee; and Zoran Krasic (Justice),lawyer, Seselj defense advisor. A Chill on Civil Liberties -------------- ¶15. (C) A Radical government will threaten civil liberties. In a live debate televised on B92 on May 5, SRS VP and Mayor of Zemun, Gordana Pop Lazic said that the SRS "will have to fight the media that supports Euro-integrational forces, because these forces are destructive, and with the NGOs that are doing the same thing." NUNS, the independent association of journalists released a statement in response to Lazic's remarks, noting that this was "not the first time that the SRS openly frightened journalists, politicians, and citizens of Serbia who do not think radically." NUNS recalled that the previous Radical government introduced legislation authorizing censorship and "one of the worst media laws ever." The youth NGO No Alternative to Europe similarly expressed concerns that "when the Radicals come to power, there will be no freedom of speech." To the OSCE, Nikolic said, "We don't mind if you internationals stay, but don't expect government support." Comment -------------- ¶16. (C) For nearly eight years, democratic forces have struggled with reform in Serbia. For the first time, their opponents (with a boost from Prime Minister Kostunica) may be able to halt the reform process. If this happens, it will be in part because of the democrats' failure to end corruption or contain unemployment. It would also be a result of nationalist forces exploiting anger over Kosovo's independence. Should the Radicals come to power, Serbia's reforms will stall. ¶17. (C) Comment continued: For the U.S., a Radical government will be a hostile government. While we must remain engaged with a country that has strong economic and military potential and is a natural leader in the region, we will need to calibrate any BELGRADE 00000452 004.2 OF 004 response to a Radical government carefully: we must continue to support those in Serbia who envision a free and democratic future in Europe while making it very clear to such a government when its actions are unacceptable. End Comment. MUNTER