SERBIA: NEW CONFIGURATIONS ON THE SERBIAN RIGHT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 001189 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2018 TAGS: PGOV SR SUBJECT: SERBIA: NEW CONFIGURATIONS ON THE SERBIAN RIGHT REF: A. BELGRADE 1108 ¶B. BELGRADE 1072 ¶C. BELGRADE 913 Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Thatcher Scharpf for reas ons 1.4(b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The aftermath of the September split in the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) has ushered in a period of realignment on the Serbian right as parties struggle to define themselves as alternatives to President Tadic,s dominant Democratic Party (DS) coalition. While ex-Radical Tomislav Nikolic,s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) claims to be targeting the political center with pro-European rhetoric, the SRS continues to occupy the ultranationalist space with unreformed rhetoric and tactics. Meanwhile, Vojislav Kostunica,s Democratic Party (DSS) of Serbia has aligned itself with the New Serbia Party (NS) and ex-Radical Maja Gojkovic,s recently-formed People,s Party (NP) in an attempt to present themselves as a viable nationalist alternative. Vuk Draskovic,s Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) at the same time is claiming the mantle of the pro-European Serbian right. While the pro-European rhetoric from the SNS and SPO is encouraging, we still await more evidence of pro-European political will on the political right. End Summary. Progressives: Targeting the Moderate Center-Right -------------- -------------- ¶2. (S) The emergence of the SNS, founded by former Radicals Tomislav Nikolic and Aleksandar Vucic, has been the catalyst for recent realignments on the Serbian right. Diplomatic and political contacts have reported that the split between ICTY-indicted war criminal Vojislav Seselj,s Radicals and Nikolic,s Progressives was in large part prompted by the pragmatic recognition by Nikolic and his tycoon financiers that the Serbian electorate was turning toward Europe. In addition, Midodrag Rakic, a close adviser to President Tadic, told the DCM on November 3 that Tadic had tasked him six months earlier with encouraging Nikolic to split with the SRS because the SNS support base would be important for advancing Serbia,s pro-European agenda. Our media contacts report that Rakic actively sought press coverage for the SNS founding congress on October 21. Nikolic publicly has denied speculation that the SNS would form a coalition with the DS but has been careful not to rule out post-election scenarios. ¶3. (SBU) Recent national polling showing the SNS as the second most popular party nationally behind the DS was recently supported by the SNS,s first electoral test in four municipal elections on November 9. The SNS came in second behind the DS in Ruma, Vrnjacka Banja, and Prijepole, and came in third in Knjazevac. In all contests the SNS outpolled the SRS by an average of two-thirds. In the municipality of Ruma, a Seselj stronghold, the SNS won over 17% to the SRS,s 8%. Party leaders on November 12 confirmed that the victorious Sandzak Democratic Party in Prijepole would seek to form a coalition with the SNS and the DS-led coalition bloc. A national Medium Gallup poll released on November 8 showed that the DS was supported by 38.9% of the electorate, while the SNS and SRS won 22.7% and 10.8%, respectively. ¶4. (C) A key part of the SNS political strategy is to present a moderate image of SNS leadership while seeking to disassociate the party from the ideas Nikolic and Vucic had embraced during their days with the SRS. Pamphlets distributed at kiosks around Belgrade in recent days have highlighted SNS,s principles of preserving territorial integrity, assisting Serbs everywhere, equal justice under law, tolerance, neutrality, anti-corruption, and social justice. In a mid-October conversation with Poloff, SNS spokesman and member of the presidency Nebojsa Stefanovic noted that the top priority of the SNS would be to focus on economic development to assist Serbia,s impoverished regions. The party,s first policy proposals in this realm, Stefanovic said, would be made public in November. (Comment: The SRS has long catered to the unemployed, pensioners and others who lost economic standing during the transition. End Comment.) Stefanovic said that the SNS has been successfully winning over the SRS electoral base as well as attracting moderate members of the DSS, NS, and even the DS-linked oligarch Miodrag Nikolic Feman from Jagodina. The SNS, Stefanovic said, does not adhere to ideology but to a party &idea,8 which is less rigid than ideology and merely &gives people something to stand for.8 BELGRADE 00001189 002 OF 003 ¶5. (C) Commenting on foreign policy, Stefanovic said that Nikolic and Vucic would condition the Serbian public to realize that the idea of Greater Serbia was &a dream that could not be realized.8 Quickly disavowing Greater Serbia would make Nikolic and Vucic appear like hypocrites or opportunists, Stefanovic said. (Vucic on October 30 publicly stated that Greater Serbia was &unrealistic policy.8) Stefanovic reaffirmed his party,s desire for Serbian membership in the EU, and estimated that a permanent resolution to Kosovo could be achieved within 4-5 years. The EU, however, needed to be more conscious of sending positive signals before the electorate would be prepared to accept a Kosovo solution. Regarding Bosnia, Stefanovic stated that the SNS would not support separatist groups or movements in the Republika Srpska (RS),but would support RS independence if Bosnian Serbs vote for it. SRS: Still the Ultranationalist Refuge -------------- ¶6. (SBU) While the SNS tries to demonstrate that its moderate stance is a credible break from the past, the SRS continues to offer ultranationalist, chauvinistic rhetoric and remains under Seselj,s firm control. In response to post,s Defense Attache,s request to meet with Dragan Todorovic in the latter,s capacity as chairman of the Defense Committee, the SRS on October 21 issued a vitriolic public statement condemning U.S. policy toward Serbia and Kosovo. The statement emphasized that Radicals do not meet with officials of countries that have recognized Kosovo, and that the SRS would not meet with the U.S. representatives &because Washington is the creator of the NATO state of Kosovo and heads the campaign for its recognition, thus seriously threatening Serbia's sovereignty and territorial integrity.8 (Other non-Radical members of the Defense Committee criticized Todorovic,s statement, complaining they were not consulted in the matter and saying the committee needed to have dialogue with foreign diplomats.) The SRS continues to obstruct the work of Parliament without offering alternative policies, and has pledged never to work in conjunction with the SNS. ¶7. (SBU) The SRS is seen as a threatening force that is not reluctant to employ physical violence. Multiple press reports indicate Seselj ordered the SRS to &make a little war8 in Hrtkovic, an SRS base with enormous symbolic significance where Vucic and SNS supporters planned to rally on November 2. The rally was banned by authorities in advance. Though an SRS spokesman denied claims that the SRS had provided firearms to would-be protestors, some press reported that Seselj himself sought to have Vucic assassinated. Vucic and SNS colleagues eventually held a rally in Hrtkovic on November 5 without major incident. (Seselj,s Hague indictment accuses him of ordering the deportation of Croats from Hrtkovic, thereby lending the city additional historic significance.) DSS, NS and NP: The New Nationalist Opposition -------------- -- ¶8. (SBU) As the SRS maintains its ultranationalist bent, Vojislav Kostunica,s DSS and Velimir Ilic,s NS have attempted to create a modern nationalist front while espousing conditional support for Serbian EU membership. On November 4, ex-Radical and former Novi Sad Mayor Maja Gojkovic signed a coalition agreement between her NP and the DSS and NS. The agreement lays out broad principles *such as preserving the &highest moral principles8 in politics, protecting Serbia,s territorial integrity, seeking European integration, combating poverty, and fostering economic development * with no specific policy prescriptions. (Comment: The early alignment between DSS, NS, and NP appears to be a shrewd political move, probably instigated by Kostunica, to deprive the SNS of coalition partners and thus keep the SNS isolated. End Comment.) One of the bloc,s first moves was to call for a motion of no confidence in the government, a move co-sponsored by the SRS with the support of the SNS. A date for a vote on the motion has not been set. The DSS-NS-SRS motion would fall short of succeeding, even with promised SNS support, unless 18 other votes could be won. The unlikelihood of this scenario indicates that the no-confidence motion is an effort by the DSS to regain the initiative as the most credible political alternative on the right to the current government. ¶9. (SBU) The DSS may be facing growing internal divisions. According to the weekly Daily Telegraf and several Belgrade magazines, top DSS officials complained to Kostunica about BELGRADE 00001189 003 OF 003 the role of chief of staff Aleksandar Nikitovic at a late October meeting of DSS leadership to discuss party modernization. Claiming that Nikitovic for too long held unjustified influence over party affairs, the DSS officials told Kostunica that even Dejan Mihajlov, former secretary general of Kostunica,s government, agreed with their position that Nikitovic needed to be reigned in. Kostunica reportedly agreed with the &insurgents,8 but other DSS officials, including Slobodan Samardzic, Predrag Bubalo and Zoran Loncar, remained supportive of Kostunica,s chief advisor. The DSS remains Kostunica,s creature, however, and there are no signs that Kostunica,s role will be challenged (Ref C). SPO: Seeking to Lead Pro-European Conservatives -------------- -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Though bound by its role in the governing coalition, the SPO in recent weeks has attempted to take the initiative in redefining its conservative ideas and role on the Serbian right. At a party congress on October 18, SPO President Vuk Draskovic unveiled its program for the &European Serbian Right,8 which sought to protect the &national, development, security and spiritual interests8 of Serbia. The twenty-page document describes the development of the European Union and argues on historical, religious, and economic grounds for Serbia,s membership in the EU. According to one contact, efforts by Draskovic to strip the platform of calls to return the Serbian king were blocked by SPO delegates. ¶11. (SBU) After the publication of the European Serbian Right platform and subsequent interviews, Draskovic was pilloried in the press for commenting that Serbia would enter the EU without Kosovo. Explaining his statement to the Ambassador on October 24, Draskovic asserted the need to speak the truth and it was important for the public to recognize that Serbia lacked traditional sovereign authority over Kosovo since ¶1999. The only way for Serbia to regain Kosovo, he said, was through gaining EU membership and reestablishing Serbian authority over Kosovo within ten years. Claiming the moral high ground as a conservative who spoke the truth, Draskovic condemned the SNS and its leadership as tools of Milosevic,s secret police, claiming that the SRS split was only the consequence of the Milosevic cadre realizing that Serbia,s future now lay in Europe. Portraying the SPO,s program as reclaiming Serbia,s pro-Western conservative tradition from the 19th Century until World War I, Draskovic voiced confidence that the SPO would attract 90% of NS voters, 90% of DSS voters, and &many8 unnamed intellectuals. Despite his confidence, Draskovic does not appear to have developed a clear political strategy to win these voters. Some SPO contacts have told us that younger SPO members have been looking for ways to sideline Draskovic and his wife to ceremonial positions in the party so as to provide stronger political leadership. Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) Of the parties on the Serbian right, the SNS at present has the greatest potential to tap into the widest cross section of the Serbian population disenchanted with the status quo and seeking a pro-European orientation. However, the combination of Nikolic,s pragmatism and his objective to win over SRS and DSS constituencies makes us cautious to believe that the SNS will be able to permanently relinquish its ultranationalist heritage when pro-European rhetoric becomes politically inconvenient. Support for the DSS-NS-NP coalition, the SRS, and SPO will likely pale in comparison to the SNS, and the parties over the next several months will seek to portray themselves as the true Serbian conservatives as they search for successful political strategies. Each of these parties face an uphill climb toward becoming a viable center-right alternative to Tadic,s increasingly powerful DS. End Comment. MUNTER