LEBANON: GEAGEA SAYS HIZBALLAH AND SYRIA DO NOT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000962 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA ALSO FOR IO A/S SILVERBERG AND PDAS WARLICK USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/KUMAR/PHEE NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR MCAP SY LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: GEAGEA SAYS HIZBALLAH AND SYRIA DO NOT WANT FIGHTING IN THE NORTH Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea argued that the fighting in the north was ignited by the May clashes, stemming from decades of tension, and is perpetuated by the lack of response from the Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces. Countering the notion that Syria and Hizballah are provoking the fighting, Geagea rationalized that Syria and Hizballah prefer the fighting to be contained so as to avoid attracting the attention of regional states and igniting a Sunni-Shia conflagration. ¶2. (C) Geagea criticized President Sleiman and March 14 leaders Saad Hariri and Walid Jumblatt for being too accommodating to Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun's demands regarding cabinet formation, believing that Sleiman should cease his efforts at consensus and move ahead with forming the government. Commenting on the relationship between Saad and Jumblatt, Geagea said that Jumblatt is the primary strategizer (albeit with "narrow-minded, knee-jerk" strategies) and that Saad adopts much of what he proposes. End summary. LAF, ISF NOT RESPONDING TO FIGHTING IN THE NORTH -------------- ¶3. (C) The Charge, accompanied by PolOff, met with Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea and his advisors Elie Khoury and Joseph Nehme at Maarab on July 2. Pointing to the fighting in the Bab al-Tabbaneh and Jabal Mohsen areas north of Tripoli between rival Sunnis and Alawites, Geagea complained that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Forces (ISF) are "completely paralyzed and doing nothing." ¶4. (C) He reported that the Alawites and Sunnis have been calling for their intervention, and with each request, the security forces condition their intervention on the implementation of a ceasefire. "This is backwards!" Geagea declared, "The LAF and ISF should impose the ceasefire. Intervention is not necessary if there is already a ceasefire in place! They are treading lighter than UNIFIL." Geagea inquired if the Charge would be willing to address this issue with caretaker Defense Minister Elias Murr, noting that "everyone is asking" for LAF and ISF intervention. ¶5. (C) Illustrating his point, Geagea spoke of a protected natural water source in his family's hometown of Bcharreh, which has at times been used by Sunnis from the north in Dinnieh. Mentioning that a decree prohibits drawing water from this source, Geagea explained that the Bcharreh municipality guards have frequently warned against taking the water. ¶6. (C) Recently, the guards physically attempted to stop the Dinnieh residents, and the intervention was met with shooting. Geagea relayed that he called ISF Director General Ashraf Rifi and a number of other security officials, but they all refused to intervene, despite this being a matter fully in their realm of responsibility. HIZBALLAH, SYRIA PREFER STABILITY -------------- ¶7. (C) Geagea compared the situation in Bcharreh to the fighting in the north: Neither situation is pre-meditated, he reasoned, but both are spiraling out of control because the LAF and ISF are not intervening to maintain order as they normally would. Geagea assessed that the tensions between the Alawites and the Sunnis in the north date back decades, and have been re-ignited by the May clashes. ¶8. (C) Acknowledging that Hizballah has been arming the Alawites, Geagea disputed the notion that Hizballah and Syria are provoking the fighting in the north. He countered that Hizballah and Syria prefer stability at this time because the BEIRUT 00000962 002 OF 002 Sunni-Shia conflict is attracting too much regional attention and they do not want Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, or other states to become involved. Further, he reasoned, Syria fears a destabilizing effect within its own borders. ¶9. (C) Geagea pointed out that the Sunni fighters are not just Saad Hariri's Future supporters, but also Salafists and fighters allied with other Tripoli figures, including former PMs Omar Karami and Najib Mikati and caretaker Minister of Transport and Public Works Mohammed Safadi. JUMBLATT, SAAD, SLEIMAN "TOO ACCOMMODATING" -------------- ¶10. (C) Recognizing that Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader Michel Aoun cannot "truly be broken" until the next parliamentary elections, Geagea was adamant that March 14 and President Michel Sleiman stop consulting with the opposition on the cabinet formation. Geagea, noting that Prime Minister Fouad Siniora fully agreed with him as of ten days ago, advocated that the majority move ahead with forming the cabinet, to include Aoun, without running every proposal by him. ¶11. (C) Geagea acknowledged that "consensus-driven" Sleiman was reluctant to do this, as were majority leader Saad Hariri and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt. Geagea relayed that he urged Jumblatt to push Sleiman to move ahead with the cabinet, but that Jumblatt does not want to upset Hizballah. Instead, Geagea surmised, Saad and Jumblatt are "waiting for a better balance of power" and until then, strive for "complete consensus." ¶12. (C) Admitting that he cannot predict Hizballah/Amal's reaction to halting the consultations and forming the cabinet, Geagea pointed out that Hizballah and Amal have not made any complaints on the proposals -- only Aoun raised objections. Nevertheless, Geagea equally faults Hizballah and Amal and the majority for permitting Aoun to obstruct the cabinet formation. JUMBLATT STRATEGIZES, SAAD ADOPTS HIS IDEAS -------------- ¶13. (C) Explaining his view of the Saad/Jumblatt dynamic, Geagea said, "95 percent of the time, Saad and Jumblatt are on the same page. Walid comes up with the strategy, and Saad adopts his ideas." Believing this to be problematic, Geagea said that Jumblatt tends to overreact and be narrow-minded. Since Jumblatt is focused on the Druze interests, Geagea continued, he often lumps the Christians together (opposition and majority). "Jumblatt's strategies are tailored to his needs, not to those of March 14," Geagea concluded. ¶14. He said he hoped Saad would focus more on strategy because his popularity enables him to implement "big-picture strategies." If the strategizing were left to Siniora, he assessed, March 14 would be in a much better place. SISON