LEBANON: SINIORA URGES PRESSURE ON SYRIANS,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000096

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SINIORA URGES PRESSURE ON SYRIANS,
SHARES CONCERNS ABOUT POSSIBLE HIZBALLAH PLANS AGAINST
ISRAEL


BEIRUT 00000096 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b)
and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) In the Ambassador's January 22 farewell call, Prime
Minister Fouad Siniora shared concerns that Hizballah may be
planning some sort of action against Israel as a way to
improve its image domestically and within the Arab League.
Siniora also asked the Ambassador to carry two messages back
to Washington: the need to support the GOL and increase
pressure on Syria. End summary.


2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, paid a
farewell call on PM Fouad Siniora at his office in the Grand
Serail on January 22. Siniora advisors Mohamad Chatah and
Rola Noureddine also were present. Before meeting with
Siniora, Ambassador also spoke briefly with UN Special
Coordinator for Lebanon Geir Pedersen, who had just finished
a meeting with the Prime Minister. Following the Siniora
meeting, the Ambassador and Pol/Econ chief met with Telecom
Minister Marwan Hamadeh.

HIZBALLAH PLANNING DIVERSIONARY
ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL?
--------------


3. (S) The Ambassador began the meeting with Siniora asking
whether he shared Pedersen's concern -- based on the UN
envoy's meetings with Hizballah officials, plus his analysis
of Hizballah public remarks -- that Hizballah may be planning
something with Israel. Siniora concurred, adding he believed
it probably would be some sort of provocation intended to
elicit an Israel response, rather than a direct attack, to
give Hizballah an "excuse" to react. He mused that the
deteriorating situation in Gaza could provide this excuse,
but said the real question was Hizballah's motive for
provoking Israel. Was is at the behest of Syria or Iran, or
just an attempt to gain sympathy domestically?


4. (C) Chatah suggested that the January 27 Arab League
meeting also factored into Hizballah's thinking as a way to
shift attention from the domestic political situation.
Hizballah's support for the Palestinians (which Siniora
termed "lip service") was an attempt to improve the party's
image and gain the sympathy of the Arab world. Hizballah
senses that the Arab attention on Lebanese domestic politics
does not work in Hizballah's favor, but a clash with Israel
could lead to Arab solidarity on Hizballah's side.


5. (S) In a meeting immediately following the Siniora
meeting, Telecom Minister Marwan Hamadeh told the Ambassador
and Pol/Econ Chief that Pedersen had told him his concerns
about Hizballah the previous evening. Hamadeh agreed that,
since the issue of prisoner exchanges seems to have reached a
deadlock and the ongoing political stalemate situation was
beginning to harm its image, Hizballah might be planning
something, though maybe not "something big," he added. He
agreed with the Ambassador that, since under UNSCR 1701
Hizballah was no longer supposed to have arms south of the
Litani River, it could no longer send "reminders" to the
Israelis in the form of launching grenades into Shebaa Farms.
But, he reminded, all recent strikes against Israel were
done "anonymously," albeit from areas over which Hizballah is
presumed to have significant influence and control.


6. (S) Hamadeh also agreed that Hizballah's real motive might
be to drag the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) into a conflict
with Israel, in the hopes of destroying LAF Commander Michel
Sleiman's prospects for the presidency. Hizballah is looking
for a way out, he reasoned, and cannot afford an internal
conflict, since this would undermine its claim that its arms
are only for the "resistance."

SINIORA URGES STRONGER U.S. PRESSURE AGAINST SYRIA
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Turning to Arab League SYG Amr Moussa's efforts to
find a solution to the ongoing political stalemate, Siniora
said both the Egyptians and Moussa himself had said no to a

BEIRUT 00000096 002.2 OF 002


10-10-10 cabinet distribution. However, Moussa told him that
the Syrians, whom he reportedly acknowledged were feeling
"very comfortable" with the current situation, were not
satisfied even with this formula; they also wanted to know
what the content of the next cabinet's statement to
parliament would be, and other conditions. Moussa reportedly
admitted he was not even sure the Syrians were interested in
having Sleiman as president.


8. (C) Chatah agreed that Syrian opposition to Sleiman was
twofold: both because they no longer trusted him enough to
be president, and because of the negative impact his
presidency would have on rival Christian opposition leader
Michel Aoun. Recent protests against increased prices and
food shortages in Lebanon were intended to provoke a
confrontation with the army, Noureddine noted, with Siniora
adding that such demonstrations would continue -- though
limited to "little skirmishes" -- as a way to keep testing
the army and play on the nerves of the majority to keep
everyone tense.


9. (C) Siniora, noting that March 14 leaders would meet later
that evening, stressed the need for the majority to
consolidate and get back on an offensive position rather than
defensive. Chatah added that they needed to rally people to
vote for Sleiman now, and leave other decisions for later.


10. (C) Asked what message the Ambassador should carry back
to Washington, Siniora responded with the need to support the
government on numerous fronts, and the need to increase
pressure on Syria in order to expedite the process of
electing Sleiman. Speaker Berri, he said, had made it clear
that the solution was not in Lebanon, pointing instead to the
Syrian-Saudi relationship. Chatah added that the Arab League
would not pressure Syria.

COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) Even if he did not share specific ideas, we do not
recall Siniora ever stressing increased pressure on Syria as
strongly as he did in this meeting. While we are not sure
whether this stems from his meetings with Amr Moussa or
elsewhere, we believe his message is on target. All
indications are that the opposition's current strategy is to
repeatedly attack both the army and the government (not to
mention the Maronite church) using valid economic issues to
stir up public discontent, albeit refraining from escalating
tensions to the point of armed confrontation, which would
discredit Hizballah.


12. (C) Not known to us as an alarmist, Pedersen's warning on
Hizballah's intentions to provoke some sort of confrontation
with Hizballah are cause for concern. We note that the July
2006 war, instigated by Hizballah, also occurred at a time of
unrest in Gaza and domestic political uncertainty in Israel.
Hizballah is unlikely to make the same mistake twice (i.e.,
being blamed by many Lebanese for starting a war they didn't
want). But we can see it as the behind-the-scenes architect
of an incident aimed at provoking an Israeli reaction that
would in put the LAF -- present in south Lebanon since the
end of the 2006 war -- in a no-win situation that diverts
attention away from the political stalemate while at the same
time undermining Sleiman's candidacy. If the army fails to
respond to an Israeli measure, Sleiman will be finished as a
candidate, accused of being a U.S.-Zionist collaborator. If
the army does respond and the Israelis counterattack, causing
LAF casualties, Sleiman -- and Siniora -- will also be
discredited. Dangerous games, to be sure, which again raises
Siniora's question of who is pushing Hizballah?
FELTMAN