LEBANON: TIME TO REVIEW USG INVOLVEMENT IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000094 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL MASS MCAP SY IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: TIME TO REVIEW USG INVOLVEMENT IN FALTERING GERMAN BORDER SECURITY PROGRAM REF: A. A. BERLIN 83 ¶B. B. BERLIN 77 ¶C. C. SECSTATE 3975 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). Summary and Recommendations -------------- ¶1. (C) The German-led Northern Border Pilot Project (NBPP) has been plagued with coordination and implementation problems for months. Despite repeated requests and suggestions from other donor country representatives, the German leadership in Beirut and Berlin (reftels A and B) remain convinced that their low key stewardship of the program is sufficient to ensure a successful outcome of the NBPP. Furthermore, the Germans naively believe that the experience of this project on Lebanon's northern border with Syria, which we view as a failure, should serve as the model for an even more ambitious and complex roll-out to the eastern Lebanese-Syrian border. The time has come to reassess USG involvement in this German-led initiative and explore other options to fulfill the mandate of UNSC 1701, which calls upon Lebanon "to secure its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry, without its consent, of arms and other materials." Embassy Beirut recommends working directly with the Government of Lebanon and the UK to prepare an assessment and strategic plan for a roll-out to the eastern border. See Post Recommendations, para 10. End Summary. NBPP Will Hobble to the Finish Line, But Months Late -------------- ¶2. (C) The German-led NBPP has experienced a series of delays across the board. The program was due to begin in September 2007 and has not yet officially started. Late delivery of U.S. provided communications equipment is one of the causes of the delay, as the Germans have cited to us several times (reftel C),but larger problems of German mismanagement dwarf this one factor. A few examples include: - Power for field stations and the Common Operations Center: The UK noted months ago that there were problems ensuring a secure and reliable power supply for the sophisticated U.S. and UK equipment that had been purchased in the support of the program. Repeated requests that the Germans analyze this cross-cutting issue were ignored. As a result, installation of both U.S. secure radio base stations and UK have been delayed. - Vehicle power sources: U.S. and UK donors noted that vehicles purchased by the Germans and Canadians would not support the GPS, secure radio communication equipment, and law enforcement light bars. No "test car" had ever been assembled and equipment requests were placed before the vehicle models had been decided upon. The German project head announced at a January 4th meeting that the solution was for the USG to purchase $150,000 of power adapters for the radios. U.S. and UK donor reps asked for a formal analysis of the problem, as General Motors representatives had privately told us that a larger fix was needed to provide more overall power for all of the equipment -- a simple solution which would entail in-country modifications to the vehicles. The Germans, once again, said that it was not their job to coordinate a solution for donors. As a result, installation of communications technology in the vehicles has been delayed. - Unrealistic start date: Even with the two delays mentioned above, the Germans have announced that the project will be fully operational on February 1, with the impact assessment to occur in March. This does not reflect reality on the ground. U.S. and UK donor reps agree that the NBPP's capabilities may not be ready until March or April and a useful assessment of the NBPP's capabilities won't be available until June, at the earliest. The Germans Just Don't Get It -------------- ¶3. (C) As reftel demarches show, the German leadership in Beirut and Berlin have repeatedly refused to adapt their management style to accommodate donor requests for better BEIRUT 00000094 002.2 OF 003 coordination. As a result, key cross-cutting issues, which also include force protection, public diplomacy and social impact strategies, have never been addressed in a consistent and organized manner. ¶4. (C) Embassy Beirut Special Assistant has been attending weekly donor meetings and joining with other donor representatives for months in calling for changes to the original German project plan, which would take into account the strains on the LAF's Northern Brigade after the Nahr al-Barid fight, the current political stalemate and its impact on GOL inter-agency cooperation, and delays in equipment arrival including the U.S. radios. The Germans have ignored or rejected all suggestions. "It's not my job to coordinate," Stoltz has told donors on numerous occasions. We had hoped this attitude would change when he replaced his German predecessor in October 2007, but the same problems continue. Instructions to the local Germans for limited coordination and stewardship of the NBPP appear to be coming from Berlin at political levels. Germans Ready to Start Spending Donor Money for Eastern Border -------------- ¶5. (C) The statements to Embassy Berlin by German government representatives reftels A and B) that they would remain engaged in the NBPP over the long-term contradicts what the their representatives have been telling donors in Beirut. During a briefing on December 6, German General Stoltz told donors that his government was ready to turn their attention to the eastern border project. "We don't want to languish in the north," Stoltz informed the group and he stood by his intention to end German involvement and complete the turnover of the northern project, the NBPP, to the Lebanese in March ¶2008. ¶6. (C) Stoltz then presented a plan for expansion to the east that stunned a number of donors by its oversimplification and naivete. According to Stoltz, the Germans had come up with the preliminary budget of 150 million euros for this project. "If you give me the money by April 1, I'll have the program up and running by December 2008," said Stoltz. When asked how the Germans arrived at that figure and timeline, Stoltz told the group that his team figured the eastern border was three times as long as the northern border, so they just multiplied the NBPP budget by three. And as for the timeline, Stoltz said, "We estimate that procurement usually take about six months, so that is how we based the timeline." The British Ambassador retorted that the eastern border was at least ten times more complicated due to the geography and the presence of heavily armed elements. She also asked where he planned to get the funds, as the maximum they could hope to get from the EU on such short notice for 2009 (not even 2008) was approximately 20 million euros. Chivers told Special Assistant that the British Ambassador paid a private call on the German Ambassador shortly after to complain that the German plan for an eastern roll-out was based in fantasy rather than reality. Canadian, Danish, and EU donor reps have told us privately that they agree with this assessment. Brits Deeply Concerned and Willing to Explore Plan "B" -------------- ¶7. (C) The British Embassy in Lebanon, frustrated by the current situation, dispatched Jeremy Chivers, Reconstruction and Stability Officer, to Berlin on January 15 to elevate their concerns to the political level. Special Assistant met with Chivers for a debrief on January 18. Chivers was told that the Germans see themselves as advisors only, not coordinators and not mentors. "We only will answer questions that the Lebanese think to ask us," he was told in Berlin. Chivers bemoaned this attitude, noting that when a function or operation is completely new, it is unreasonable to expect the Lebanese to know what questions to raise and that this is why problems and delays keep occurring. "The Lebanese are stumbling through the process and the Germans are standing on the sidelines -- or more accurately, sitting in their Beirut office tower -- watching the whole thing without a word," a frustrated Chivers thundered. ¶8. (C) Chivers said there had been UK discussions about an alternative to the NBPP, as no change seems to be forthcoming from the Germans. He is, however, confident that the NBPP BEIRUT 00000094 003 OF 003 will eventually hobble its way to the finish line and he added that no matter what happens, UK and USG donations did provide the CBF with important capabilities and training which can either be built upon for border security initiatives to the east or used for alternative purposes such as counternarcotics work. Chivers noted that the British are thinking about pulling future funding for this program. ¶9. (C) Chivers has told us that the UK is looking for four things before they even consider a move to the east - with or without the Germans: - A sound evaluation of the NBPP that quantifies the effectiveness of the CBF in combating arms trafficking. - Evidence of Lebanese political will and expression of their own vision for compliance with UNSC 1701. In addition, there must be a financial commitment of some kind from the GOL to ensure that these pilot programs are sustainable. - A joint operational concept, developed in advance with donors and the GOL. These must be comprehensive and done before any cost figures or timelines are announced or estimated. - A robust project management structure with a steering committee that is accountable for the outcome of the program. Post Recommendations -------------- ¶10. (C) Based on our experiences, Embassy Beirut submits the following recommendations for consideration: -- The NBPP should not serve as a platform for future border security cooperation programs to the east. Yes, lessons learned from the NBPP will be of use, but donors would be better served by a new start. -- Future financial offers of assistance to the Germans for the NBPP should be carefully scrutinized. There have been costly errors due to German mismanagement. Post remains concerned that the Germans think there is an unlimited USG checkbook to correct errors in coordination. -- The USG should establish a coordination structure with the UK to approach security initiatives on the eastern border from a fresh perspective. It would be more useful to work in harmony with the UK alone for the time being, rather than continue unproductive discussions with the Germans. -- The USG and UK must consult closely with the Government of Lebanon before committing resources and personnel to an eastern border initiative. Post agrees with the UK that firm political, financial and manpower commitments are needed before moving into operational planning for the east. The current political impasse in Lebanon presents a short-term challenge, as it is difficult to obtain long-term commitments from a prime minister and LAF commander who may not be in their current jobs for much longer. The ongoing political crisis also provides an excuse for inaction, as there will be those who argue against picking such a sensitive time to engage on a confrontational issue. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Embassy Beirut staff has participated in donor coordination meetings from the beginning of this program. At this time, all donated equipment has arrived at its final destination and the LAF has been provided with a full-time subcontractor to deal with training and installation issues. The Germans have requested assistance on technical matters and the subcontractor is in place to satisfy this request. With the German reluctance to accept input from donors on larger policy and coordination issues, participation in weekly donors meetings has become increasingly less productive. End Comment. FELTMAN