LEBANON: ONE MONTH LATER, HOW CAN THE U.S. SUPPORT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000936 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, PM/FO ALSO FOR IO A/S SILVERBERG AND PDAS WARLICK P FOR HERRO MUSTAFA USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/KUMAR/PHEE NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS SY LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: ONE MONTH LATER, HOW CAN THE U.S. SUPPORT SLEIMAN? REF: A. BEIRUT 933 ¶B. BEIRUT 766 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) One month since he became president, the optimism and celebration that followed President Sleiman's election seem to have faded. The Lebanese political scene has returned to its all too familiar picture of squabbling leaders unable to resolve their differences, this time on cabinet formation, a disappointing start to Sleiman's presidency. As a result, some observers believe the President's initial shine may be fading; rather than the new era of consensus that the Lbanese hoped his election would usher in, Lebanon emains deeply divided, with intermittent sectarian clashes an indication of what is brewing beneath the surface. ¶2. (C) Sleiman could well use an international vote of confidence, before, as some have already warned, he is dismissed as being more of an end of term "lame duck" rather than newly elected president. The U.S. must continue to publicly and privately support President Sleiman, avoiding references to the "Siniora government," a loaded term that carries connotations of U.S. interference. (We often hear this suggestion from Siniora's caretaker cabinet, we note.) As happened with the PM, however, too much U.S. praise could backfire, subjecting Sleiman himself to criticism of being an American "puppet." Tangible U.S. military, financial, political and diplomatic support (particularly on Shebaa Farms) is urgently needed now to shape the path of Lebanon's first post-Syrian withdrawal president. End summary. SHEBA'A FARMS HEADLINE TALKS WITH FOREIGN VISITORS -------------- ¶3. (C) During his first month in office, Sleiman received a number of prominent international visitors, including the June 7 visit of French President Sarkozy, and also including Secretary Rice, U.S. Under Secretary for Defense Policy Edelman, German Foreign Minister Steinmeier, British Foreign Minister Miliband, British Special Middle East envoy Williams, Arab League SYG Amr Moussa, and a Vatican delegation led by Cardinal Jose Saraiva Martins (in Beirut to attend the June 22 beatification of Lebanese priest Yaacub Haddad). In what probably will be his first overseas trip, Sleiman will travel to Paris for the July 13 Mediterranean Union summit, to which Syrian President Bashar Asad also has been invited. ¶4. (C) During these meetings, Sleiman repeatedly stressed the liberation of Sheba'a Farms, urging international mediation to expedite a resolution. Sleiman reportedly presented historical maps never seen before to build the case that the territory belongs to Lebanon. DELAYS IN CABINET FORMATION: PRESIDENCY OFF TO A BAD START -------------- ¶5. (C) Sleiman's shine is most tarnished by the delay in cabinet formation, now in its fifth week. The Doha agreement and his election as the consensus candidate spurned hopes that feuding Lebanese politicians would at long last put their differences aside and that the next steps, cabinet formation and a new electoral law, would follow suit. Instead, the various blocs continue to jockey for cabinet positions, threatening to prolong the process and feeding criticism that Sleiman has been unable to exert leadership to persuade political factions to form a cabinet. Some Lebanese comment that he appears to be at the end of his term, rather than the beginning. Meanwhile, Sleiman has held several consultations with PM Siniora on cabinet formation, and has resumed weekly meetings with Speaker Nabih Berri, a tradition suspended since the 2005 assassination of former PM Rafiq Hariri. BEIRUT 00000936 002 OF 004 ¶6. (C) Sleiman is determined to nominate the Ministers of Interior and Defense himself (he is hoping to nominate Christians to both posts, with Elias Murr remaining as Defense Minister). We view Sleiman exerting control over the two security ministries as a wise move, given the role of these ministries in overseeing the country's security services. However, they also opened the door for Michel Aoun to impede cabinet formation. Aoun, accusing Murr of being pro-March 14 rather than independent, is demanding a sovereign ministry for his own Christian bloc, urging Sleiman to select one Christian and one Muslim to maintain Christian-Muslim balance in the four sovereign ministries (Interior, Defense, Finance, and Foreign Affairs). Aoun's tactics are twofold: to raise his stature in the cabinet and to discredit Sleiman, the biggest threat to his efforts to secure the support of the majority of Lebanon's Christians. Aoun also harbors lingering resentment against Sleiman, whom he believes "stole" the presidency from him. HIZBALLAH'S ARMS: ALL TALK AND NO ACTION? -------------- ¶7. (C) In his inaugural speech, Sleiman promised to pursue a national defense strategy that would incorporate Hizballah's arms (Ref B). While the inaugural speech was tough on Hizballah's weapons, referring to them in the past tense, his subsequent remarks have been less so, and recent remarks by Hizballah indicate it intends to hold fast to its weapons even if Israel withdraws from Sheba'a Farms. ¶8. (C) Observers note that inaugural speeches often set the bar high, but fail to result in matching actions. They point to former President Emile Lahoud's inaugural speech in 1998, in which he also "said all of the right things." SPIRITUAL SUMMIT: MORE GOOD WORDS, WITH LITTLE RESULTS -------------- ¶9. (SBU) On June 24, as part of his call for national reconciliation, President Sleiman hosted a spiritual summit that included 15 Muslim and Christian religious leaders. In his welcoming speech, he expressed hope that the summit would pave the way for launching the national dialogue, adding that the differences among Lebanese have reached the point of "committing suicide." Sleiman also stressed the need to speed up cabinet formation even if that meant making concessions. ¶10. (C) The religious leaders issued a statement stressing Lebanon's unity and its pluralistic nature. The statement condemned fanaticism and violence and banned the use of weapons, adding that constitutional institutions are the tools for solving differences. The religious leaders urged cooperation with President Sleiman to facilitate his mission and also urged the expedition of launching the national dialogue. Again, however, strong statements so far have failed to produce any concrete results. U.S. SUPPORT FOR SLEIMAN -------------- ¶11. (S) Visible, concrete U.S. support in terms of increased military assistance to Lebanon's security forces--Lebanese Armed Forces and the Internal Security Forces--is the most critical way to demonstrate U.S. confidence in President Sleiman's leadership, strengthen his ability to counter Hizballah, and convince the Lebanese that the U.S. is sincere in its efforts to help build the Lebanese state to enable it to counter extremism. ¶12. (S) Such support would also would counter criticism (voiced by majority and opposition members alike) that the U.S. is all talk and no action, and that our Israel policy limits our ability to support Lebanon. Attack helicopters for the army remain the most significant deliverable, and we should expedite a decision on this issue, as well as RAVEN BEIRUT 00000936 003 OF 004 UAV's, to strengthen Sleiman's hand in light of ongoing sectarian clashes and the LAF's recent ineffectiveness in preventing Hizballah from occupying much of downtown Beirut and fighting in Aley and Chouf. ¶13. (C) Movement on Sheba'a Farms also would be a strong feather in Sleiman's cap, boosting his credibility among the Lebanese and undermining Hizballah's primary justification for keeping its weapons, despite Hizballah's comments to the contrary. While we may disagree with the GOL on next steps on Sheba'a, we should stress to Sleiman that the U.S. shares the ultimate goal of seeing the area returned to Lebanon. ¶14. (C) Similarly, addressing the issue of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (a key theme during Sleiman's June 16 meeting with Secretary Rice) would give Sleiman a political boost. We should capitalize on the $22 million U.S. pledge at the June 23 Nahr al-Barid donors' conference in Vienna to publicize our efforts to help better the lives of both refugees and Lebanese affected by violence in the camps, while at the same time actively stressing the U.S. view that ultimately the refugees should return to a future Palestinian state, once a two-state solution is reached. Such statements would help counter continuing accusations, especially from Michel Aoun, that the real U.S. (and Sunni) intent is permanent resettlement of the Palestinians in Lebanon. ¶15. (C) Now that Lebanon has a new president -- the first in many years not imposed by the Syrians -- the U.S. should focus its public support on the presidency, and not the "Siniora government," which evokes images of a U.S.-dominated government in the minds of many Lebanese, thanks to effective media campaigns engineered by the opposition. However, too much U.S. praise opens the door to the opposition to label Sleiman as a U.S. "puppet," as it has done with PM Siniora. U.S. public statements therefore should be used judiciously, and also include support for the Lebanese people, while in private meetings we should of course express our full-fledged support for the president. ¶16. (C) We should encourage Sleiman to visit Washington soon, around the time of the UN General Assembly, and roll out the red carpet when he does. (Note: Sleiman's political advisor, Nazem Khoury, recently asked whether Sleiman's visit should be delayed until after the U.S. presidential election; we strongly discouraged this dea and stressed that we would welcome a visit a soon as possible to continue to build on the strong relationship between the U.S. and Lebanon. End note.) ¶17. (C) At the same time, we should continue to encourage high-level U.S. visits to Lebanon, following the visits of Secretary Rice, USDP Edelman, and upcoming visits of CODEL Green and Acting CENTCOM Commander Dempsey. We also should encourage moderate Arab states to send prominent envoys (most of Sleiman's visitors have been Europeans) and extend invitations for him to visit their countries. COMMENT -------------- ¶18. (C) All in all, we give Sleiman grade of "B-" for his first month in office. His tough words on Hizballah and UN Security Council resolutions during his inaugural speech have not yet translated into concrete results; on the contrary, his follow-up statements have been disappointing. However, as was the case when his presidency was still in doubt, it may be that Sleiman is reluctant to take strong stands at this juncture that could further derail progress on cabinet formation. ¶19. (C) Furthermore, Sleiman's performance to date can be blamed partially on the fact that he and his staff are not yet up to speed; in our meeting with political advisor Nazem Khoury, Khoury, fumbling for materials in his newly refurbished office and struggling to operate a newly provided telephone, repeatedly complained that he did not yet have adequate staff and resources to do his job. With Baabda Palace vacant for six months, and dominated by Syrian influence before that, we expect there is little BEIRUT 00000936 004 OF 004 institutional memory or continuity on which Sleiman can rely. ¶20. (C) The bottom line is that stepped up U.S. support now can help shape the path of Sleiman's president. Tangible U.S. military, political, and diplomatic support up front will go a long way in restoring the shine to the promising May 25 start of the Sleiman presidency. SISON