LEBANON: INDEPENDENT SHIA FIGURES DISCUSS HOW TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000919

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, NEA/PI, DRL/FO
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO AND ZARATE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2018
TAGS: PHUM PTER PINR EAID LE IQ IR SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: INDEPENDENT SHIA FIGURES DISCUSS HOW TO
COUNTER HIZBALLAH

REF: A. A. BEIRUT 918

B. B. BEIRUT 456

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) On June 19, the Charge and visiting S/P staff member
Jared Cohen met with a series of independent Shia, including
activist Lokman Slim, journalist Ali Alamine, and political
figure Ahmad Assad (ref A covers June 19 meeting with deposed
Shia Mutfi at Tyre Syed Ali al-Amine). Slim proposed
creating a moderate Higher Shia League, headed by Shia cleric
Sayyed Ali al-Amin. Slim believes March 14 needs to do more
to support Sayyed al-Amin and provide him with greater
political legitimacy, eroded after Hizballah removed the
Sayyed as Mufti of Tyre during the May clashes. Journalist
Alamine, who reports on affairs in southern Lebanon, noted
that he is "free to criticize Hizballah"--except for three
key areas: Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, Hizballah's
role as a resistance movement, and its weapons. Ahmad Assad
was unimpressive in his demands for U.S. funding; he had
apparently not thought through his proposals. End summary.

MARCH 14 NEEDS TO INCLUDE
MODERATE SHIA VOICE
--------------


2. (C) In a June 19 meeting with the Charge and visiting
State Department Policy Planning staff member Jared Cohen and
emboffs, independent Shia activist Lokman Slim promoted the
idea of creating a moderate Higher Shia League (HSL) composed
of clergy and intellectuals, which could counter the
Hizballah dominated Higher Shia Council (HSC). The head of
the HSL would be independent Shia cleric Sheikh Sayyed Ali
al-Amin, whom the Charge and Cohen had met with immediately
before this meeting (septel). Two tracks are needed to
facilitate the creation of such an organization and to
promote the status of Amin within the Shia community, said
Slim: political support from the March 14 bloc and grassroots
development.


3. (C) Slim emphasized the need for March 14 to provide clear
political support and legitimacy to Sayyed al Amin. He added
that majority leader Saad Hariri continuously promises to
promote the status of Sayyed al-Amin but has yet to follow
through. Slim said no one in March 14 had expressed
political support for al-Amin and added that al-Amin feels
mistreated by the group. (Note: Slim pointed out the
example of the recent public event commemorating the
one-year anniversary of the assassination of MP Walid Eido,
to which Sayyed al-Amin was not invited. In contrast, Sayyed
al-Amin had been the only Shia figure to participate on
February 14, 2008 at the Martyrs' Square three-year
commemoration of Rafiq Hariri's assassination, which was held
the same day in Beirut as Hizballah leader Nasrallah spoke at
Imad Mugnieh's funeral. End Note.)


4. (C) Slim suggested approaching an interlocutor such as
Walid Jumblatt, PM-designate Fouad Siniora, or caretaker
Cultural Affairs Minister Tariq Mitri to ask one of them to
speak to Hariri to garner more support for Amin. (Note:
Mitri, a Greek Orthodox, would be the best choice because he
appears to understand the importance of promoting independent
Shia and it may be best to have a interlocutor who is neither
Shia nor Sunni, in Slim's view. Charge followed up with
Mitri at a dinner later that evening. End Note.) There is a
need to keep al-Amin within the group, said Slim. Slim
believes March 14 will lose al-Amin if Sayyed al-Amin did not
gain the means required to counter Hizballah.


5. (C) Slim added that an al-Amin-led HSL also needed GOL
institutional support. He suggested that if Amin could
deliver social services to the Shia, in the way that
Hizballah and Amal do, then Amin could compete for Shia
support. Assistance for the HSL from the Ministry of Social
Affairs, Ministry of Culture or the Ministry of Health would
be a good start, he said. However, Slim reiterated that the
best support would be for March 14 to provide "political
legitimacy" to Sayyed al-Amin.


BEIRUT 00000919 002 OF 004


EUROPEANS CAUTIOUS IN
SUPPORTING INDEPENDENT SHIA
--------------


6. (C) Answering a question regarding international support
for Slim's NGO, known as "Hayyabina," Slim said aid from
other donors had been limited. The EU wants to remain on the
safe side and has avoided public support for Slim's
independent Shia movement. Support from Japan was
"cautious." Slim added that possibly, if the EU saw the
emergence of a strong alternative to Hizballah and Amal, then
perhaps it would begin to support Hayyabina. (Note:
Haayabina is a working with the International Republican
Institute through State's Middle East Partnership
Initiative--MEPI--and is currently engaged in a new project
funded through USAID/OTI. End Note.)

OTHER MODERATE
SHIA ACTIVE
--------------


7. (C) Slim said that there were many independent Shia taking
risks without being asked to do so who should not be
overlooked. Sheikh Mohammed Ali al-Hajj was one imam that
Slim mentioned. Hajj works in the Sadd al-Bushreieh area
(northern Mount Lebanon). He was once close to the Sayyed
Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah (considered to be Hizballah's
spiritual leader),but they had a falling-out after Hajj
began to criticize the "feudal lords" of southern Lebanon and
especially after Hajj publicly criticized the Syrian presence
in Lebanon. Hajj is well-respected among Shia and other
religious groups and has good relations with several
Christian churches in the Mount Lebanon area (he is also
involved with Embassy Beirut's Public Diplomacy-sponsored
"Teaching Women English" program),according to Slim.


8. (C) Sheikh Iyyad Jamal al-Dine could also play a big role
in the new HSL, Slim said. He was the first to speak out
against Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah.
Hussein Oulayyan (the son-in-law of al-Amin),is a
charismatic and courageous sheikh who is based in Tyre and
was formerly affiliated with Nabih Berri's Amal party,
according to Slim. He is intelligent and very knowledgeable
concerning religious matters, Slim added. Sheikh Mohammed
Jamal Hamoud, a sheikh who resides in the center of the
Hizballah-controlled Dahiyeh southern suburbs, is "very
knowledgeable" and "cannot be touched" by Hizballah, Slim
noted. Hamoud runs a small religious school in the
Hizballah-held southern suburbs and has emphasized the
importance of strengthening GOL institutions.

INTERNATIONAL/REGIONAL
MODERATE SHIA GATHERINGS NEEDED
--------------


9. (C) Slim said he was open to the idea of having more
regional and international summits in which moderate Shia
clerics could come together to network and share ideas. This
includes moderate Shia clerics from the region such as Sheikh
Iyyad Jamal al-Dine (Note: Dine currently resides in Iraq,
but is originally from the city of Baalbek in the Bekaa
Valley of Lebanon. End Note.) Slim suggested that more
meetings hosted by independent NGOs such as the Aspen
Institute at which moderate Shia from Iraq, Bahrain, and
Saudi Arabia could come together to talk about issues
moderate Shia face in their respective countries be
organized. Slim added that including moderate Shia clerics
from the United States in such efforts would also be useful.

USG SUPPORT CRITICAL
--------------


10. (C) When asked how the USG might help, Slim responded
that providing technical assistance or funding to al-Amin's
proposed HSL online fundraising website (Zakat) would be a
start. Inaddition, Slim supported the idea of developing
istance-learning courses for Shia that would provide an
alternative to extremist views. Slim said Amin would need
support to set up an office for the HSL (which would be
located somewhere close to the principally Shia-populated
southern suburbs).

INDEPENDENT MAGAZINE

BEIRUT 00000919 003 OF 004


ATTEMPTS TO COUNTER HIZBALLAH
--------------


11. (C) In a meeting the same day with Ali Alamine, a
journalist from the moderate Shia publication "Shoun
Janoubiyeh," Alamine identified his main challenge as
maintaining his independence while operating a magazine in
Hizballah dominated southern Lebanon. His magazine covers
political, social, and economic issues facing Lebanese in the
south. Alamine added that criticizing Hizballah was indeed
possible when the criticism revolved around the group's
political stances. However, three red lines not to be
crossed were (1) any criticism against Hizballah SYG
Nasrallah, (2) Hizballah's role as a self-perceived
resistance movement, and (3) Hizballah's weapons.


12. (C) Alamine said that when he had crossed one of these
red lines in the past, he had received death threats. The
threats only ceased when Alamine backtracked from his
criticism. His magazine tries to reflect what is going on in
the south and attempts to reflects all points of view, he
said. (Note: Alamine's "Shoun Janoubiyeh" has received USAID
and USAID/OTI support over the past year. End Note.)

HIZBALLAH WILL NEVER
GIVE UP ITS ARMS
--------------


13. (C) On the issue of Sheba'a Farms, Alamine declared that
Hizballah would not give up its arms even if the Israelis
left Sheba'a. Alamine said the issue of Hizballah's arms is
a regional matter. He believed that Hizballah would consider
relinquishing its weapons if part of wider negotiations
between Israel, Syria, and Iran.

RECENT FIGHTING STRATEGIC
--------------


14. (C) Alamine said that fighting this week in the Bekaa
Valley was an attempt by Hizballah to move its operations
from the south (where UNIFIL is operating alongside the
Lebanese Armed Forces) to the Bekaa. According to Alamine,
Hizballah has control over the northern Bekaa region and the
southern Bekaa valley, but not the central Bekaa area, which
is where the recent fighting took place.


15. (C) Alamine said that in central Bekaa, Hizballah is
forced to compete with Sunnis and Christians. This
competition led to the fighting. He noted that the Sunni
Mufti of Zahle and Bekaa, Sheikh Khalil al-Mays, said in a
statement this week that "the recent battles in Thalabya and
Saadnayel are a way to reach a new objective, by those who
are trying to open a link from the south to the north;
however, the citizens of this area will stop them from
reaching their goals."

HIZBALLAH STRONGEST
WHEN CONFLICT EXISTS
--------------


16. (C) Alamine believed that Hizballah was at its strongest
whenever clashes erupted. When the situation in the country
is calm, Hizballah is at its weakest, he stated. However, he
felt that Hizballah did not want another war with Israel--but
if Iran wanted such a war, then there would be conflict, he
surmised. He added that Hizballah wants the GOL to be
"functional enough" to provide a moderate level of services
to the people, but not strong enough to challenge its
influence in the areas Hizballah dominates. The best thing
may be to somehow incorporate Hizballah into the state,
Alamine posited, because there was "no way" to challenge the
organization directly.

THIRD ANTI-HIZBALLAH INTERLOCUTOR
UNIMPRESSIVE
--------------


17. (C) In the last meeting of the day with independent Shia
figures, the Charge and Cohen met with Ahmad al-Assad,
anti-Hizballah Shia leader and head of the Lebanese Options
Group (LOG)-- (ref B.) Asad requested USG funding to hold a
conference in Beirut with Shia from the region. Assad
described the conference to be a launching pad for LOG's

BEIRUT 00000919 004 OF 004


"bigger plan" (an ambitious catalogue of ideas passed to us
during an earlier meeting which included a very expensive and
not-well-thought out proposal to put 300 clerics on LOG's
payroll). Assad dismissed the idea of a Shia League grouping
independent Shia as "unrealistic," insisting that only his
own LOG represented the independent Shia reality. (Note. Of
the day's four meetings with independent Shia activists,
Assad was clearly the least impressive and most
self-centered. End Note.)

COMMENT
--------------


18. (C) We should continue to urge U.S. NGOs and our
European, Asian and Arab allies to support Lebanon's
independent Shia. We believe that Lokman Slim's work with
deposed Mufti of Tyre al-Amin is important. Linking Al-Amin
with moderate Shia in Iraq and the Gulf should also be a key
goal. End Comment.)
SISON