LEBANON: POTENTIAL SHIA CABINET MEMBER STRESSES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000908 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, S/P DAVID GRODON, S/CT DELL DAILEY, DRL/FO AND NEA/ELA NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER AND JZARATE/AKIFAYAT DEPT PASS TO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2018 TAGS: PHUM PTER PINR IR AR SY IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: POTENTIAL SHIA CABINET MEMBER STRESSES STATE-BUILDING AS BEST WAY TO COUNTER HIZBALLAH REF: BEIRUT 515 BEIRUT 00000908 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: CDA Michele J. Sison for reasons section 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Respected Shia leader Ibrahim Shamseddine, rumored to be a possible March 14 candidate for a position in the next cabinet, stressed his political independence in a June 17 meeting with the Charge. Shamseddine welcomed the Secretary's statement stressing the need to resolve Sheba'a Farms, arguing that this would go a long way toward undermining Hizballah's justification for its weapons. According to Shamseddine, the best way to counter Hizballah and its efforts to control the Shia population through fear tactics was through enhancing the state's own legitimacy through institution-building, a more representative electoral system, judicial reform, transparency, and a state monopoly over the security services. Shamseddine also is looking to partner his vocational training school with accredited U.S. universities. End summary. ¶2. (C) CDA Sison, Pol/Econ Chief and Senior LES Political Advisor met with Ibrahim Shamseddine, leader of the Islamic Cultural Center in Beirut and son of the late Imam Mohammad Mehdi Shamseddine, at his office in Shatila in south Beirut on June 17. AN INDEPENDENT, FUNDAMENTALIST SHIA -------------- ¶3. (C) Shamseddine noted that he planned to run for a seat in Beirut in the 2009 parliamentary elections in the predominantly Sunni district (Shamseddine lost in 2005, which he blames on the quadripartite agreement between Hizballah, Jumblatt, Hariri, and Amal for squeezing out competition). He stressed his political independence, stating that he was not interested in politics and came with "no strings attached." Acknowledging rumors that he would be asked to join the next cabinet, Shamseddine said that although he was a respected Shia, there were some who did not like him, and he expected he would be vetoed by one side or the other. ¶4. (C) Describing himself as a "true fundamentalist Shia", in the sense that he adheres to Shiite religious values, Shamseddine explained that although he sports a beard, he is not a terrorist, and although he wears a necktie, he is not an American agent. He called hmself a friend of the U.S., despite the "harsh ad difficult friendship." SECRETARY ON SHEBA'A: "GOOD NEWS" -------------- ¶5. (C) Commenting on the Secretary's visit the previous day, Shamseddine hailed her declaration that it was time to resolve the issue of Sheba'a Farms as good news. Israeli occupation of Lebanon was, like the original sin, the source of all problems in Lebanon. Shamseddine admitted that even if Sheba'a is resolved, there would still be a "resistance," but Israeli withdrawal would allow the Lebanese to address their problems directly with each other, without accusations of outside interference. Withdrawal also would remove Hizballah's justification for its weapons, increase internal political dynamism, and allow civil society groups to be more vocal, he said. STATE-BUILDING KEY TO COUNTERING HIZBALLAH -------------- ¶6. (C) The Shia in Lebanon are imprisoned, he continued, and are being pushed in to a corner through intimidation. Fear is the greatest warden, he said, adding that money was also involved, helping to keep dissenters quiet. However, if he had one wish, it would not be to get rid of Hizballah, despite the group's "arrogance of power" and presumed "project" for the country. Instead, it was better to build a BEIRUT 00000908 002.2 OF 003 modern, civil state, a "laissez-faire" approach to government, he explained, that would be completely in tune with Islamic principles rather than imposing one confession's ideas. Referring to his "30 points argument" in 2006 in which he argued that the Siniora government was legitimate under Islamic law, Shamseddine said Hizballah's call for "vilayat al-fiqah" (Persian concept of a Islamic state) was not a legitimate option because it was not chosen by the Lebanese. Lebanese Shia are not a transnational group, he said, but citizens of their own country. ¶7. (C) The ultimate power of the state lies in its legitimacy, Shamseddine continued, not in some extra-constitutional authority. The basic idea of the state still does not exist in Lebanon, he said, adding that principles such as rule of law and an independent judiciary take time to build. He agreed that training for parliamentary staff also would help build a stronger democratic tradition in Lebanon. Transparency was key, he stressed: "If you want to marry my daughter, you go through me; likewise, any activities affecting the Lebanese state need to go through the government." We need a "self-cleaning" system, he said, to remove the potential for manipulation. ¶8. (C) Furthermore, democracy is not just about majority rule; even though the Shia make up the majority of the population in Lebanon, this does not mean it has an automatic right to rule the country. Hizballah wants a big electoral victory to show they have popular support and to crowd out other Shia, he explained. The resistance is not a political party, he stressed, although they share some of the same goals, but the state should have exclusive decisions on military policies. Unfortunately, Hizballah had succeeded in mobilizing the "tripod" of money, power, and religion to its advantage, while politicians in the majority continued to commit errors, had no plans on how to get things done, and refused to listen to advice. ¶9. (C) Shamseddine criticized the "self-reproducing dinosaurs" of Lebanon's political classes, blaming the lack of a good electoral system for stunting the emergence of new leaders. The current system was based on the idea that each confessional group should elect its own leaders, he said, asking, Why should I have to vote for a Shia just because I am Shia? He warned that the Doha Agreement's decision to use the 1960 electoral districts would pit Lebanon's different confessional groups against each other and would promote isolation at a time when they needed to be opening up. Instead, he advocated an electoral law based on proportional representation and adopting reforms outlined in the Boutros commission on electoral reform. ¶10. (C) Shamseddine also reiterated his criticism of the Siniora government's failure to replace the six opposition ministers who resigned in 2006, arguing that doing so would have put the burden on Hizballah to refuse the appointments of new ministers. Instead, the opposition had succeeded in eroding the government's power. Hizballah is teaching people to intimidate the state, he said, adding that any time the state is not allowed control (i.e., Hizballah's recently dismantled downtown Beirut tent city),this constitutes an "occupation." ¶11. (C) Shamseddine stressed the need to convince President Sleiman to be independent and "act like a president." He needs to be supported with intelligence, not missiles, he said, and should stand firm on choosing the Ministers of Interior and Defense to maintain control of the security forces. Hizballah would try to put its people in key positions as a means to keep tabs on the government's activities, he warned. Agreeing that Hizballah might use violence to impede the 2009 elections, Shamseddine said the President also must convince Hizballah to allow the police into Hizballah areas, citing a recent incident in which Hizballah officials had beaten up two police officers who had tried to make an arrest in Beirut's Hizballah-controlled southern suburb. EMPHASIS ON EDUCATION BEIRUT 00000908 003.2 OF 003 -------------- ¶12. (C) Shamseddine said demand for vocational training in Lebanon had decreased in recent years, as many Lebanese viewed blue collar work as "below" them. Agreeing that this would lead to a lack of skilled Lebanese laborers needed to rebuild Lebanon, he said he had discussed the issue with former PM Rafiq Hariri when Shamseddine was still Vice President of the Council for Reconstruction and Development. Foreign workers were filling the gap, creating a spider web of foreign networks throughout the country. To address this problem, Shamseddine hoped to partner his vocational school with accredited U.S. universities. ¶13. (C) Shamseddine also lamented the brain drain from Lebanon, noting that he himself had debated whether to return to Lebanon from California in 1982, where he had been studying, at the University of California-Irvine, due to the Israeli invasion. He was seeking funding from Gulf states and partnerships with acclaimed foreign universities to improve opportunities for higher education in Lebanon. BIOGRAPHIC NOTE: -------------- ¶14. Shamseddine, is the son of late Shia scholar Allama Mohammad Mehdi Shamseddine, who was the President of the Higher Islamic Shia Council and a highly respected religious figure. Ibrahim Shamseddine is currently the head of the Islamic Cultural Center, a charitable foundation that provides donations to the needy. Additionally, the center operates a school and a vocational training center in Beirut. Prior to that, Ibrahim served as the Vice President of the Council for Reconstruction and Development (CDR),a government body that was formed during the early stages of the civil war (1975-1990). Shamseddine, born in 1959, earned a Masters degree in political science from the American University of Beirut and did graduate studies at University of California at Irvine. SISON