AOUN'S KIDNEY STONE AND AMR MOUSSA'S PLANS:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000086 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA FRONT OFFICE AND NEA/ELA; NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2028 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM LE SY SUBJECT: AOUN'S KIDNEY STONE AND AMR MOUSSA'S PLANS: LEBANON'S PRESIDENTIAL STALEMATE CONTINUES REF: BEIRUT 0081 BEIRUT 00000086 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa's plans for a second Aoun-Hariri meeting collapsed under the weight of Michel Aoun's kidney stone. Nevertheless, in a 1/20 meeting with the Ambassador, Moussa, describing the Lebanese protagonists as still "at Square One," claimed forward movement within that first square, based on what he described as a "mechanism" through which feuding Lebanese politicians can debate serious issues. Among his self-proclaimed successes was the "authoritative interpretation" he offered of the Arab communique. Pressed for details, Moussa seemed to retreat, in noting that a 10-10-10 cabinet (as demanded by March 8-Aoun forces) fell within such an interpretation. Noting Nabih Berri's intentions to postpone presidential elections again, perhaps until early February, Moussa talked of the possibility, but not certainty, of having elections by the end of February. ¶2. (C) Moussa also expressed concern about street demonstrations and about initial signs that Michel Sleiman's chances might be fading. Regarding his trip to Damascus on 1/19, Sleiman dismissed Lebanese rumors that the Syrians had pitched Fares Bouez as president. In what appeared to us (but not to Moussa) to be a veiled threat, Syrian President Asad told Moussa he was willing to play a helpful role in reducing media incitement and street violence, while adding that pressure should be applied equally to the Saudis regarding their Lebanese friends. Moussa reported that Asad, while "interested" in the Arab Summit in March, emphasized that Syria's interests in Lebanon trumped the Arab Summit. End summary. SECOND AOUN-HARIRI MEETING CANCELED; MOUSSA RETURNING TO CAIRO TODAY (1/20) -------------- ¶3. (C) Meeting with the Ambassador on 1/20, Amr Moussa (accompanied by aide Hisham Youssef) lamented that the sudden illness that had befallen Michel Aoun had unraveled the plans for a second meeting between Aoun and Saad Hariri (accompanied by former president Amine Gemayel) that had been scheduled for 1/19. (See reftel for a description of the 1/17 meeting.) It is "too bad," for he had hoped a second meeting would make permanent what is only a nascent process. It is not true, Moussa insisted, that Aoun had invented a malady in order to avoid the meeting; Aoun is in genuine pain with a kidney stone. With Aoun temporarily out of commission, Moussa said that he would leave for Cairo later in the day. Saying that "this phase of our efforts is over," he did not plan to return until after the 1/27 meeting of the Arab Foreign Ministers. He is prepared, however, to deploy his deputy Hisham Youssef back to Lebanon at any time to help facilitate discussions between March 8 and March 14 politicians. MOUSSA SEES POSITIVE ELEMENTS TO WHAT OTHERS SEE AS USELESS TRIP -------------- ¶4. (C) Describing the status of his mission to implement the Arab Foreign Ministers' communique on Lebanon, Moussa admitted that "we are still at Square One." Nevertheless, he claimed to have created forward movement within that square. Those who claimed he achieved nothing are wrong. He said that his mission had three primary accomplishments: first, success in bringing the parties together; second, establishment of a "mechanism" via the Aoun-Hariri channel (with Gemayel never mentioned) for the opposing sides to discuss real issues; and, third, the transmission of an authoritative interpretation of what the Arab communique actually means in terms of the cabinet formation. The Ambassador asked whether Moussa honestly expected his Aoun-Hariri "mechanism" to operate in his absence. That is why, Moussa said, Youssef may come back soon and often. "AUTHORITATIVE INTERPRETATION" BEIRUT 00000086 002.2 OF 004 VS. PRIVATE COMMENTS ON CABINET -------------- ¶5. (C) Answering the Ambassador's question, Moussa said that both March 8-Aoun and March 14 politicians accepted his authoritative interpretation. Specifically, he cited "ceilings": the minority cannot have blocking/toppling share (or no more than 10 ministers in a 30-member cabinet) and the majority cannot have more than half the cabinet. The Ambassador asked about differences in cabinet share of the majority and minorities. "I offered my view," Moussa said, "that the majority is a reality and should be reflected in the cabinet." Most Arab foreign ministers share that view, he claimed. In his "personal capacity" he suggested a 13-10-7 cabinet split, which he thought March 14 leaders would eventually accept. But March 8-Aoun politicians continued to insist on 10-10-10. ¶6. (C) After much back-and-forth, Moussa clarified that his "authoritative interpretation" of the Arab communique did not include those "private" comments on the majority-minority split. So, yes, 10-10-10 fell within the definition of the Arab communique, and the March 8-Aoun forces do not violate the Arab communique in insisting upon that. Youssef interjected that 15-10-5 would also fall within the definitive interpretation, so March 14 could claim that if it wished. The Ambassador expressed dismay that Moussa seemed to be walking back from his earlier clarifications of the Arab communique and indeed the negotiating history behind it, both of which had indicated that the majority would have a larger cabinet share than the minority. The communique's actual words say nothing about majority-minority shares, Moussa said (channeling Nabih Berri). He said that he himself came up with the 13-10-7 formula by considering the earlier proposal (before the end of Emile Lahoud's presidential mandate) to have a cabinet split 17-13. To give the new president a cabinet share and to stay within the authoritative definition of the Arab League communique, Moussa simply subtracted four ministers from the majority and three from the minority. DISTANCING HIMSELF FROM CONSENSUS PROPOSAL HE HAD TABLED TO AOUN, HARIRI, AND GEMAYEL -------------- ¶7. (C) The Ambassador asked about the status of Moussa's bridging proposal (see reftel),tabled to Aoun, Hariri and Gemayel, to have major cabinet decisions decided by consensus (rather than by two-thirds, the current constitutional requirement). That, the Ambassador noted, would give each minister absolute veto power, something even Lebanon's president did not enjoy. Seeming to distance himself from an idea that had deeply alarmed March 14 leaders, Moussa said that he was merely floating an idea, in the hopes that he could spark the two sides into thinking creatively. The two sides were free to take his proposal or not; it has no status on its own. Maybe they will find it useful as a way to approach the way ahead; maybe not. It is not an integral part of the Arab communique but merely a way to "look at the problems." 24 HOURS IN DAMASCUS: SYRIA PUTS HIGHER PRIORITY ON LEBANON THAN SUMMIT -------------- ¶8. (C) Answering the Ambassador's questions about his 24-hour trip to Damascus concluded the previous evening, Moussa said that he told the Syrians that they could not simply say that they would stand behind whatever the Lebanese decide. They had to take concrete steps in getting their Lebanese friends to play a constructive role. Syrian President Bashar al-Asad told Moussa that Syria's attitudes could influence questions of street action and media incitement. The Ambassador noted that such a statement could be a veiled threat; Moussa shook his head. Asad also told Moussa that he did not accept pressure only on Syria; Saudi Arabia, which also has friends in Lebanon, should also push for a solution. With Saudi Arabia and the others off the hook, March 14 leaders "never" offer compromises, while Syria has persuaded its allies to offer many compromises. Asad, according to Moussa, also insisted on a 10-10-10 cabinet for Lebanon. Moussa claimed to have told Asad that, without a BEIRUT 00000086 003.2 OF 004 president in Lebanon, there will be no Arab Summit in Damascus. Asad responded that the Arab Summit was important, but Syria's interests in Lebanon were more important. "They realize that they have a Summit problem," Moussa said, "but it's not their only, or even their most important, priority." DENYING RUMORS THAT THE SYRIANS PITCHED FARES BOUEZ AS PRESIDENT -------------- ¶9. (C) On the presidency, Moussa said that Asad verbally accepted Michel Sleiman as the Lebanese consensus choice. While clearly familiar with the rumors, Moussa denied the story in Lebanon that the Syrians had pitched former Minister Fares Bouez as a new compromise presidential candidate. Bouez is going on a private trip to Qatar, Moussa noted. Lebanese conspiracy-theorists will naturally jump to the conclusion that Bouez is going there to receive a message from Syria. Moreover, since Bouez is personally close to former Minister (and fellow game hunter) Suleiman Franjieh, who has begun attacking Michel Sleiman publicly, the Lebanese will assume there is some kind of deal pending on Bouez. "To the best of my knowledge," Moussa said, "there is nothing" to the rumors of the Syrians now pitching Bouez. "SMELLING" MICHEL SLEIMAN'S DAYS AS CONSENSUS CANDIDATE MAY BE NUMBERED -------------- ¶10. (C) Moussa said that he believed Michel Sleiman remained the sole consensus candidate, in part "because there are no other possibilities." But he was starting to "smell something" that suggested to him that some people "may" start trying to destroy Sleiman's chances of being elected. The possibility of losing Sleiman was another reason to hope for a quick solution to the presidential crisis. "STREET" ACTION LIKELY -------------- ¶11. (C) Moussa also thought that the Hizballah-Aoun threats of using street demonstrations to advance a political agenda were real. He expected to see demonstrations beginning later this week but becoming larger after the Arab Foreign Ministers' meeting on 1/27. He did not believe that Hizballah would want sustained clashes, given the fear of provoking Sunni-Shia violence, but "these things are hard to control." The danger of street demonstrations, too, suggests that, the faster presidential elections take place, the better. He urged that the U.S. and international community not comment publicly on the possibility of street demonstrations before they occurred, claiming that western admonishments might very well increase the participation in any demonstrations and make them more dangerous. PERHAPS ELECTIONS BY FEBRUARY'S END; PERHAPS NOT UNTIL SUMMER -------------- ¶12. (C) Asked about when realistically elections might occur, Moussa -- who had just seen Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri before receiving the Ambassador -- noted that Berri would soon announce the postponement of the presidential election session scheduled for the following day (1/21). Berri intended to call for the next session sometime after the Arab Foreign Ministers' meeting, Moussa said, so the next round may not be until early February. The next three to four weeks are critical, Moussa said. If the Arab Summit card is played well, then maybe there will be a president by the end of February. ¶13. (C) But Moussa also teased the Ambassador (who departs post soon) that, if he were planning to stay until a new president is elected, "you'd better unpack your bags and assume you're staying until summer." The Ambassador asked whether, in the event of an agreement on cabinet shares, Moussa thought that March 8-Aoun forces would raise new demands about specific portfolios before proceeding with elections. "I would not rule out that possibility," Moussa said. Maybe, he said, they will insist on guarantees that Saad Hariri will not be prime minister. But such demands are outside of the Arab initiative; "we would not be involved" in BEIRUT 00000086 004.2 OF 004 trying to find solutions. COMMENT -------------- ¶14. (C) When the Ambassador asked Moussa what he planned to report about Lebanon to the Arab foreign ministers who will meet in Cairo on 1/27, he responded, "exactly what I told you." In other words, Moussa has found a way to avoid pointing fingers and assigning blame: by dropping recognition of the majority-minority realities from the "authoritative interpretation" of the Arab communique, Moussa allows March 8's insistence on a 10-10-10 cabinet to be considered equally valid as March 14's acceptance of Moussa's proposal that the majority ends up with less than half the cabinet. By constantly putting on equal footing the side blocking constitutional institutions and the side wanting to move forward with president elections, Moussa does not apply Arab diplomatic weight where it is most needed. At best, his efforts buy time. At worst, they obscure just which side (and which outside powers) are responsible for Lebanon's presidential vacuum. March 8-Aoun forces must be thrilled. FELTMAN