LEBANON: HOW CAN THE GOL COEXIST WITH HIZBALLAH?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000820 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA ALSO FOR IO A/S SILVERBERG AND PDAS WARLICK USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/KUMAR/PHEE NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR ASEC UNSC EAIR SA IR LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: HOW CAN THE GOL COEXIST WITH HIZBALLAH? REF: BEIRUT 711 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- 1.(C) Following up on our analysis of Hizballah's strategic goals in Lebanon (reftel),this message, the second of three, addresses GOL strategies for coexisting with Hizballah in the wake of the May 21 Doha agreement. It is largely based on numerous discussions with Mohammed Chatah, senior advisor to PM-designate Fouad Siniora. Chatah is one of the GOL's most level-headed and strategic thinkers and advocates a realpolitik approach to redefining the GOL's relationship with Hizballah. End summary. CHATAH ADVOCATES RULES OF CO-EXISTENCE -------------- ¶2. (C) In conversations just after Hizballah's May siege of downtown Beirut and Beirut International Airport, Mohamad Chatah, senior advisor to Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, having digested the new realities on the ground, told us that the GOL needs to think about defining its relationship with Hizballah and establishing "rules of co-existence." Although Chatah believes Hizballah should ultimately be brought under the umbrella of the government, he also argues that given recent events, the GOL needs to acknowledge the "elephant in the room, before the elephant decides to step on the government." ¶3. (C) Previously, Chatah said, Syria did the thinking for the government, but when Syria withdrew, the national security apparatus did not change much despite the government's new independence. Some in the majority believe that if the relationship is even discussed, it will mean that Hizballah is accepted. But "Hizballah is de facto accepted!" Given this reality, Chatah advocates clear guidelines regarding the do's and don'ts. He proposes that a political/security negotiating team sit down with Hizballah to work those out. Otherwise, he warned, the elephant in the room will indeed step on the legitimate government. ¶4. (C) According to Chatah, the crux of the issue is that "the GOL has never declared Hizballah a renegade organization, but instead has de facto recognized it. Hizballah and the GOL co-exist in reality on the ground in Lebanon, but there is a big gap in their ability to co-exist in the country's legitimate political and security institutions. In this fuzzy relationship, "there are no clear rules of engagement." Ultimately, "any final arrangement" with Hizballah will be addressed in the national unity government, which has yet to be formed. In the meantime, the GOL and Hizballah must work to define a new model for communication and co-existence. Clarifying the "fuzzy relationship" between the state and Hizballah will mitigate the risks of violent flashpoints, such as those that erupted throughout the country in the last weeks. ¶5. (C) Citing the example of Hizballah's monitoring cameras at Beirut International Airport, Chatah said that with clearer rules of co-existence between the two sides, the government could determine whether, and where, Hizballah can install cameras. Another example requiring rules of co-existence is the seizing of Hizballah's weapons. Currently, when a Hizballah truck full of weapons is stopped by an LAF checkpoint, the LAF response depends on the officer on duty. "This is dangerous," according to Chatah. ¶6. (C) Chatah said that developing an understanding between the GOL and Hizballah is worth the risks associated with trying to develop a clarified relationship. "With an understanding," he predicted, "we can have a functioning government. It is a matter of choosing to manage a relationship with Hizballah", or running the risk of losing in the 2009 election and having Lebanon succumb to a new "Syrian-influenced government," he concluded. "Hizballah does not want to take over the country and overthrow a legitimate government," Chatah argued, "It is much more subtle than that. It is worse to continue in this current, fuzzy situation where Hizballah becomes increasingly protective of its interests." GOL FACES POST DOHA REALITIES -------------- ¶7. (C) As many of our interlocutors have commented, Doha was neither a truce nor a reconciliation. Rather, it was the best solution possible for restoring immediate calm in Lebanon, while deferring resolutions of the tough issues such as Hizballah's arms. The opposition entered the Doha talks from a position of strength following its military siege of Beirut. It appears to have emerged the winner, having secured the blocking third in the cabinet it long sought, agreement on an electoral law of its liking, and no direct mention of Hizballah's arms. In the competition to dominate the country, Hizballah had a head start that predates Doha, but the new agreement has provided Hizballah with a political tailwind it can use to strengthen its position in Lebanon. ¶8. (C) Once a cabinet is formed, Hizballah will have a veto over cabinet decisions, which it can wield to block proposals it opposes regarding its arms or fiber optics network, the Special Tribunal, or other actions that threaten the opposition and its Syrian and Iranian allies. In reality, Hizballah already demonstrated its capacity to exert a veto when it stormed the streets of Beirut following the Siniora government's May 5 decision to clamp down on Hizballah's fiber optic network and transfer the head of security at Beirut International Airport. Hizballah did not emerge politically unscathed after resorting to violence against Lebanese citizens and may not be eager to use such tactics again. But both sides know it has the capacity and the will to do so, and the new Siniora-led government knows it must tread carefully and not openly confront Hizballah, lest there be another violent reaction. ¶9. (C) Looking ahead to the 2009 elections, most observers view the agreement in Doha to use the 1960 electoral law as a draw that will give both sides time to maneuver in an effort to get an advantage before the vote. The key challenge for March 14 will be to attract some of the divided Christian vote away from Michel Aoun or his current Christian allies to tip the balance in its favor. CHATAH ON DOHA: BEST DEAL UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES -------------- ¶10. (C) Chatah believes the agreement reached at Doha was the best possible under the circumstances and downplays the perception that the agreement rewards Hizballah. Most important, he says, is that Doha reaffirmed the principles governing the use of arms and violence and included a commitment that the new president would convene discussions immediately following the formation of the new cabinet to discuss the relationship between the state and Hizballah. ¶11. (C) Chatah considers the Doha language on Hizballah arms a "major win for March 14," setting the stage for a new "process" to address the issue. In fact, Chatah suspects the opposition did not scrutinize the Doha agreement carefully before signing it, pointing to the text stating that there was agreement "to limit the military and security authorities upon the Lebanese and those residing in Lebanon in the hands of the state." ¶12. (C) The blocking third in the cabinet on which March 14 conceded in Doha, is losing value over time, he continued. Some in March 14 already were willing to concede on this point even before Hizballah's takeover of downtown Beirut, although this was not the unanimous view. Many in March 14 were happy that the original Arab League Initiative had clearly outlined the two principles of no blocking minority for the opposition (i.e., no more than 10 ministers) and no majority for March 14 (i.e., maximum 15 ministers). In the end, the Arab League amended its own principles by adding one minister to each side, a "symmetrical deviation for both sides," he said. This, he stressed, was how the final decision on cabinet formation should be viewed, rather than as a surrender for March 14. March 14 had secured an absolute majority in the cabinet. ¶13. (C) Chatah cautioned against viewing the Doha negotiations as if the 2009 parliamentarians elections were tomorrow, stressing that there would by many changes over the next ten months. The agreement on the electoral law, which he called "reasonable," was less important than it looked; although it appeared March 14 "paid a certain price" in terms of districting, it was a limited price. March 14 would lose one or two seats maximum in Beirut, and it would be their own fault if they did not get the Christian vote that will be particularly important there. We cannot win an election based on gerrymandering, he stressed. ACES IN THE GOVERNMENTS HAND: DOHA AGREEMENT, SLEIMAN SPEECH -------------- ¶14. (C) Most March 14 leaders do not consider direct confrontation with Hizballah as an option. Therefore, the best alternative is that the GOL use all political tools at its disposal, beginning by seizing upon the strong language in the May 21 Doha agreement and President Michel Sleiman's May 25 acceptance speech as the basis for its approach to Hizballah. Doha commits the parties to abstain from using weapons or violence in order to achieve political gains, calls for a dialogue to reinforce the state authority over all of the Lebanese territory and limits the military and security authorities to the hands of the state. The GOL should not hesitate to appeal to Arab states, themselves alarmed at Hizballah's easy ability to take over the Lebanese capital, to help uphold the Doha agreement. ¶15. (C) Sleiman's speech called for political issues to be dealt with within constitutional institutions, coexistence through dialogue, the consolidation of "surveillance organisms," and respect for UNSC Resolutions and the Special Tribunal, all of which can strengthen the hand of the Siniora government in dealing with Hizballah. ¶16. (C) Hizballah is often referred to here as "the resistance." Sleiman's speech was widely seen as balanced, but he spoke of the need to "avoid depreciating the achievement of the resistance in internal conflicts," a diplomatic way of criticizing Hizballah's May takeover, which removed the veil of "resistance" and left Hizballah exposed for what it really is, a militia. He also referred to the resistance in the past tense, and spoke of the need to "elaborate a defensive strategy that will safeguard the country concomitantly with a calm dialogue to benefit from the capacities of the resistance in order to better serve this strategy. ¶17. (C) Chatah believes President Sleiman has made a "certain assessment of Hizballah and of the LAF's operating environment. Sleiman has accepted that Hizballah is more powerful than the LAF and that he will have to live with this fact. Moreover, it "does not enter Sleiman's mind to aspire to be more, or even as, powerful as Hizballah." Sleiman was "realistic and experienced," in Chatah's assessment. "The strength of the LAF is important to Sleiman, but he does not strive to defeat Hizballah." ¶18. (C) In the past, Sleiman has deferred to Hizballah on issues related to Hizballah's security, Chatah notes. Chatah theorized that Hizballah deems its elaborate military structure critical to its strategic objectives; "It is a fact of life, and it is not going away soon." He said that while March 14 deemed unacceptable Hizballah's fiber optics network and monitoring cameras stationed at the airport, Sleiman interpreted these issues as "natural steps" that Hizballah would take to increase its military capacity. Today, absent a mechanism to control its behavior, Hizballah proceeds as it deems necessary to be a strong military organization. ¶19. (C) Chatah agreed on the need to ensure good language on Hizballah's arms in the new cabinet's Ministerial Statement to parliament, but he cautioned that the Ministerial Statement should not aim for more than a commitment to take up this issue in an intensive way. Trying to incorporate substance into the statement would be a "recipe for paralysis" for the government, he said. ¶20. (C) Chatah predicted the opposition would try to replicate the 2005 Ministerial Statement, which included language legitimizing Hizballah's status as an independent militia whose goal is to liberate Lebanon and defend it against Israel. We must avoid this language, he said, and stress dialogue instead. Maybe we'll end up with a little bit of both, he conceded. ULTIMATE BATTLE AHEAD: 2009 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS -------------- ¶21. (C) Meanwhile, the March 14 majority must focus on the real battle ahead: the spring 2009 parliamentary elections. March 14 faces an uphill battle in terms of consolidating its support base, particularly the Christians, in order to stave off potential opposition gains using the 1960 electoral law. To do so March 14 must stay united, and not yield to the temptation of tactical alliances, which hurt it in 2005. ¶22. (C) Despite the tough economic choices the government must address over the next year, March 14 must ensure that it provides services to its grass roots supporters. Sunni leader Saad Hariri, the Parliamentary majority leader, will have to expend extra effort to counter the threat of growing Sunni extremism, especially in the impoverished north. Let there be no doubt that Hizballah's electoral machine is well-greased and ready to roll, giving the opposition a head start in the race toward the elections, while March 14 appears to be only just warming up. COMMENT -------------- ¶23. (C) Chatah's arguments for co-existence are based on a realpolitik assessment of Hizballah's position following the Doha agreement. From his perspective, it is the interests of the GOL to "tame the elephant" by establishing clearer rules of the relationship between the GOL and Hizballah. ¶24. (C) There is a risk, however, that such an effort would encourage Hizballah to increase its capabilities as a military organization and provider of services such as education, health care and communication in place of the GOL. Also, Hizballah has proved it will protect its own interests, with violence if necessary, no matter what "rules of co-existence" are put down on paper. SISON