LEBANON: AMR MOUSSA BROKERS INCONCLUSIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000081 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA FRONT OFFICE AND NEA/ELA; NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2028 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM LE SY EG SUBJECT: LEBANON: AMR MOUSSA BROKERS INCONCLUSIVE HARIRI-AOUN MEETING, FLOATS NEW PROPOSAL THAT FAVORS MARCH 8-AOUN REF: BEIRUT 0049 BEIRUT 00000081 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) On 1/17, Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa finally got his wish: Pestered by Moussa, Saad Hariri met at last with Michel Aoun, talking for more three hours. Hariri brought Amine Gemayel with him to undermine Aoun's inevitable claims that such a meeting affirmed his status as Lebanon's sole Christian political leader. Hariri and Gemayel both told us that the meeting was inconclusive. On the positive side, Moussa underscored to Aoun that the March 14 interpretation of the Arab League Communique is correct: March 8-Aoun should not get a blocking minority, March 14 should not have more than half the cabinet, yet March 14 will have more ministers than the March 8-Aoun bloc. On the negative side, Moussa floated a proposal that would satisfy the March 8-Aoun bloc's desire for veto power, by suggesting that all major cabinet decisions require consensus. ¶2. (C) This would mean, as Marwan Hamadeh pointed out subsequently, a single minister could block everything. Of course Aoun would accept such a scenario, Hamadeh said, as he gains the veto power he seeks. Mohamad Chatah worried that Moussa's proposal meant that March 14 would suddenly appear to be the one rejecting Arab League diplomacy, when in fact it is the March 8-Aoun block that refuses to go along with implementation of the Arab communique. In terms of tangible outcomes, Moussa extracted from Hariri and Gemayel a promise to meet Aoun again under Moussa's sponsorship. For this meeting, to be scheduled when Moussa returns from a one-day trip to Damascus on 1/18, each side is supposed to bring suggested guarantees for the other side, in order to have presidential elections on Monday. (We continue to find the possibility of elections on Monday remote.) End summary. SINGLE-MINDED FOCUS ON GETTING HARIRI TO MEET AOUN -------------- ¶3. (C) Returning to Beirut on January 16, Arab League Secretary General Amre Moussa picked up where he left off SIPDIS after his last trip (reftel): pushing March 14 hard for the meeting between MPs Saad Hariri and Michel Aoun. Moussa's obsession with this meeting stemmed from the insistence from March 8 leaders Hassan Nasrallah and Nabih Berri that such a get-together was essential. Moussa rejected the March 14 argument that, if March 8 leaders could designate their representative to such a meeting, March 14 should have the same privilege and send someone instead of Hariri. (Given the political impact on their own Christian partners, March 14 leaders were trying to avoid the appearance that Aoun and Hariri were somehow equivalent leaders, each the sole representative of his own community.) With the March 8-Aoun forces publicly noting their willingness to meet on Moussa's terms (terms that, conveniently, they themselves had established),March 14 leaders realized that maintaining their refusal to meet posed unwanted political costs. CAVING, HARIRI GRABS AMINE GEMAYEL AND MEETS AOUN FOR INCONCLUSIVE TALKS -------------- ¶4. (C) Hariri, however, persuaded Moussa to allow Kataib leader and former president Amine Gemayel to accompany Hariri, a demand that delayed the session for a few hours, while Moussa in turn ran to Aoun to obtain concurrence. By mid-afternoon on 1/17, the four principals -- Hariri, Gemayel, Aoun and Moussa -- met in the Lebanese Parliament building. Hani Hammoud accompanied Gemayel and Hariri as notetaker, and Gebran Bassil took notes for Aoun. We spoke with Gemayel by phone and saw Hariri and Hammoud in person for a briefing. The meeting, they said, lasted for over three hours and was inconclusive. The discussions concentrated on cabinet formation and hardly touched on the constitutional amendment issue regarding presidential elections. Moussa extracted a promise for a second meeting, to be scheduled upon Moussa's return from Damascus. All BEIRUT 00000081 002.2 OF 004 sides agreed not to speak publicly of the meeting (and, so far, they seem to have complied, an astonishing development in Lebanon). TELLING AOUN THAT HIS INTERPRETATION OF ARAB LEAGUE COMMUNIQUE IS FLAWED -------------- ¶5. (C) According to Gemayel, Hariri and Hammoud, Aoun continued to insist on a blocking/toppling minority for the March 8-Aoun opposition. Moussa eventually tired of the General's single-mindedness and instructed Bassil to "write this down." The Arab initiative, Moussa explained, does not mean a blocking/toppling third for the opposition. Without skipping a beat, Aoun then advocated as forcefully for a 30-member cabinet divided in three equal shares between March 14, March 8-Aoun, and the new president. Moussa again explained that the Arab League also recognized that the majority-minority split in Lebanon was real, and that March 14 would have more cabinet seats than March 8-Aoun. March 14 would not, however, have an absolute majority of the cabinet. BUT THEN MOUSSA FLOATS NEW IDEA TO ALLOW MARCH 8-AOUN FORCES A VETO -------------- ¶6. (C) So far, so good: in practice, Moussa's interpretation of the Arab League Communique (assuming Aoun actually listened) would allow for a cabinet along the lines of 14-10-6, 13-10-7 or something similar. March 14 accepts this approach. But Moussa, listening to Aoun's objections, then floated an idea that he claimed had just popped in his head: why not, Moussa asked, accept his interpretation of the cabinet divisions, but add an additional guarantee for Hizballah, Aoun, and Berri? As amended by the Taif accord, Article 65 of Lebanon's constitution specifies those major cabinet decisions requiring a two-thirds majority. Why not take those issues and have a gentlemen's agreement that they will be decided not by two-thirds (which March 14 could get if the president's ministers also agreed) but by consensus? Aoun reportedly reacted that this may be a good solution, while Hariri hesitated and Gemayel objected. Moussa reportedly kept playing with this idea, with lots of discussion about whether "consensus" and "unanimity" in Arabic were, in practice, identical terms. Hariri, Gemayel, and Aoun all told Moussa that they needed to consult with their allies, with Aoun sounding positive and Hariri and Gemayel sounding negative. SEEKING EACH SIDES' IDEAS FOR "GUARANTEES" -------------- ¶7. (C) Regarding the next meeting to be organized upon his return from Damascus (where he is currently),Moussa asked each side to go back to his interpretation of the Arab League communique: presidential elections according to Lebanon's constitution, a cabinet split along the lines discussed above, and a new election law. What sort of guarantees, Moussa asked, is each side prepared to offer the other in order to permit presidential elections to proceed on Monday? What guarantees does each side need? Each side undertook to prepare a paper for the next meeting. HAMADEH, CHATAH OBJECT STRONGLY TO MOUSSA'S "CONSENSUS" PROPOSAL -------------- ¶8. (C) Upon getting the read-out from Hariri and Hammoud, MP Marwan Hamadeh and Mohamad Chatah (senior advisor to PM Siniora) both objected strongly to Moussa's proposal for consensus decision making in the cabinet. Hamadeh claimed that Moussa's idea was "worse" than a blocking/toppling third or a 10-10-10 cabinet. A single minister in Syria's clutches could cripple the entire cabinet. What Moussa was proposing was nothing less than dismantling the Taif accord, since the two-thirds voting requirement resulted from long and difficult discussions. Moussa was essentially using different language, a different formula, to let March 8-Aoun forces have the veto they have sought for more than a year. But by needing only one minister to object, it becomes harder BEIRUT 00000081 003.2 OF 004 to pin the blame where is belongs. Moussa's idea is anti-constitutional and unacceptable, Hamadeh declared. ¶9. (C) Chatah objected on both procedural and substantive grounds. Procedurally, he complained, Moussa had -- as he had done with the Hariri-Aoun meeting -- succeeded once again in putting the pressure on March 14 rather than the forces allied with Syria. March 14 accepts Moussa's interpretation of the Arab League communique, and March 8-Aoun forces do not. That should be the "headline," Chatah said. Instead, Moussa has now floated a proposal that, while it is not official, will become Moussa's major objective. March 14 will have to say no. So the story then becomes that March 14 has rejected the Arab League negotiating proposal, rather than that March 8-Aoun forces reject the overall initiative. ¶10. (C) Chatah's substantive arguments against Moussa's proposal mirrored Hamadeh's. Chatah found it very "suspicious" that Moussa's idea resembled an idea floated earlier by Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. Nasrallah, according to Chatah, had suggested that the March 8-Aoun forces could accept having less than the blocking/toppling minority if those ministers allied with the president agreed to abstain from voting in the case of a perfect split along March 14-March 8 lines. This essentially gave the veto to March 8 indirectly, Chatah said, but in a "more positive-sounding way" than Moussa's proposal. The Ambassador asked what the difference was between this and last summer's March 14 proposal for a 19-10-1 cabinet, by which the single "neutral" minister would not vote in the case of partisan splits, again giving an effective veto to March 8-Aoun for those decisions required a two-thirds majority. Chatah said that the 19-10-1 idea was floated by March 14 as a bridging measure to the presidential elections, not as something permanent to remain in place after presidential elections. If the Lebanese accept Moussa's proposal now, as the price for presidential elections, then the new precedent of consensus (meaning minority veto rights) will be impossible to erase. COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) Moussa's Lebanon diplomacy remains a highly suspect operation. We have not yet figured out any good reason why he was so insistent upon that Hariri-Aoun meeting that offered no benefits to March 14 and had the promise of elevating Aoun's status. Surely, given the lack of any preparation, Moussa realized that the meeting would not produce anything positive other than a photo op. Moussa (whom the Ambassador is supposed to see over the weekend) will no doubt trumpet to us his categorical rejection of March 8's interpretation of the Arab League communique, while underplaying the fact that he undercut March 14 severely by making a proposal that is even worse than the blocking third insisted upon by Aoun. ¶12. (C) Our experience with Moussa in Lebanon is that when he claims merely to be floating an idea, he is in fact starting a process that he will not abandon even when its considerable faults become apparent. And that means that his "consensus" approach to cabinet decision making will, most likely, continue to dominate his discussions here. If he pushes this idea, he will provoke March 14 objection that will obscure the basic refusal of March 8-Aoun forces to accept the Arab League communique. March 14 will look equally, perhaps more, intransigent than Syria's allies. Through such a proposal that is so clearly unacceptable to March 14 (and that goes well beyond what the Arab foreign ministers discussed),Moussa will be able to avoid pointing fingers at only one side. We wonder if that is Moussa's goal: to avoid, in the run-up to the January 27 Arab League Foreign Ministers' meeting, having to blame Syria's friends for Lebanon's mess. ¶13. (C) Presumably the Arab League ministers expected Moussa to promote implementation of the communique rather than initiate a negotiating process on new elements. Compounding the problems of his approach, Moussa traveled from Beirut to Damascus today, and he will come back to Beirut from Damascus tomorrow. Whatever the reality, this BEIRUT 00000081 004.2 OF 004 will appear to be a negotiating trip. While there, we doubt that Moussa will pressure the Syrians to tell their allies to be constructive. To the delight of March 8 partisans, Lebanon will be faced with the impression of negotiations in Damascus about Lebanon, without any Lebanese involvement. We cannot imagine Moussa will be successful than the French were in that distasteful approach. Those who wish that the road to Lebanon's presidency leads through Damascus will be comforted by Moussa's trip. We have come a long way from the days of UNSCR 1559, when the international goal was to restore decision making to the Lebanese: now the Syrians will hide behind the pretext that they cannot "force" their Lebanese allies to give up their demands. FELTMAN