LEBANON: FM SALLOUKH CORDIAL IN FIRST MEETING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000080 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: FM SALLOUKH CORDIAL IN FIRST MEETING SINCE 2006 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) The Ambassador paid a farewell call to Foreign Minister Fawzi Salloukh on January 18, his first official visit to Salloukh in over a year. Salloukh is among the Shia ministers who resigned from the Siniora government in November 2006. Salloukh condemned the January 15, 2008 bombing that hit a U.S. Embassy vehicle and assured the Ambassador that the GOL recognizes it is responsible for diplomats' security in Lebanon. Salloukh was pessimistic at the prospects of ending the political impasse in the near-term, and stressed the line advocated by the opposition that the presidential election should coincide with, rather than precede, the formation of the cabinet. In foreshadowing of what will no doubt be a major dispute when cabinet formation issues arise, Salloukh insisted that the Shia should have the Finance Ministry, giving them a "veto" over most cabinet decisions. Salloukh described such a veto as "fair," given that the Sunnis through the prime minister and Christians through the president also have vetoes. End summary. FIRST AND FINAL VISIT IN OVER A YEAR -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador paid a farewell call on Foreign Minister Fawzi Salloukh on January 18, the Ambassador's first official visit since Salloukh's November 11, 2006 resignation. The Ambassador was accompanied by DCM and Poloff; Salloukh's notetaker was his ubiquitous aide Rami Mourtada. (Note: Salloukh was one of six ministers, including all five Shia, who left the cabinet then, a move widely seen as intended to block the planned formation of the Special Tribunal to investigate former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri's assassination. Prime Minister Fouad Siniora did not accept the resignations. Embassy Beirut's practice has been to engage minimally with the resigned Shia ministers, and not at all with those who are from Hizballah. On Foreign Ministry matters, we routinely deal with Tariq Mitri, the Culture Minister and Siniora ally who was named Acting Foreign Minister after the resignations. This meeting was provoked by a call from the protocol-obsessed Salloukh to the Ambassador, to ask when he was paying his official farewell call. The Ambassador consulted with PM Siniora and MP Marwan Hamadeh, all of whom advocated that the Ambassador pay the farewell call so as not to appear petty or cause bureaucratic problems for the Embassy or GOL over a trivial matter. End note.) CONDEMNED BOMBING; REITERATED GOL COMMITMENT TO DIPLOMATS' SECURITY -------------- ¶3. (C) Following up on his earlier phone call less than an hour after the bombing, Salloukh condemned with sincerity the January 15 bombing that hit an Embassy vehicle and asserted that the GOL is responsible for ensuring the security of its guests in Lebanon. He lamented that the attack took place on Lebanese soil, praising effusively the high level of security protection and respect given to him by the USG when he accompanied then -president Emile Lahoud to New York in September for the UN General Assembly. "SPEAKER BERRI HAS BEEN PATIENT WITH YOU" -------------- ¶4. (C) Salloukh, an ally of opposition leader and fellow Shia Speaker Nabih Berri, reflected on the Ambassador's sometime tense relationship with Berri, saying "The Speaker has been patient with you", prompting laughs. Giving his own version of history, Salloukh recapped how his 2006 resignation played out within the Siniora government. Since Siniora rejected the Shia ministers' resignations, many decrees were still sent to Salloukh for signature, and Acting FM Mitri also was receiving decrees. Then all documents started going to Mitri exclusively. Salloukh said that the situation was very bad for several months, eventually prompting him to resume some of his functions and return to his office after nine months of working from home. But given the presidential impasse, the situation remains stagnate. Nonetheless, he asserted "there is only one single MFA." BEIRUT 00000080 002 OF 003 ¶5. (C) The Ambassador informed Salloukh that, understanding the sensitivities over presidential prerogatives, the U.S. did not expect the cabinet, which now has the powers of the president, to give agrement for his successor, and the USG would send his successor out as Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Salloukh relayed that he denied agrement to the German Ambassador when Germany requested it, in part because the Germans had not participated in Lebanon's last National Day or New Year's events with ex-president Lahoud. The minister expressed his desire to meet the incoming U.S. Charge soon after her arrival and to assist her as needed. AND LOOKING AHEAD WITH PESSIMISM -------------- ¶6. (C) Salloukh faulted the Arab League's recent efforts to encourage election of a president and formation of a national unity government for not being explicit on how to distribute cabinet positions to the majority, the opposition, and the president. Lamenting that the Arab League is steering the situation in Lebanon, he declared, "We should be taking our decision to the Arab League, not the other way around." He added that the president should be elected at the same time the national unity government is formed; otherwise, he argued, a president elected first would be weak because it could take a long time to form the cabinet. SHIA FOR THE FINANCE MINISTRY: ANOTHER WAY FOR VETO POWER -------------- ¶7. (C) In an extended one-on-one with the Ambassador, Salloukh covered familiar ground about the alleged sins of the "illegitimate" Siniora cabinet. Echoing the words of Berri (but with less enthusiasm and wit),Salloukh rejected immediate presidential elections as the best way to move forward, arguing that an entire cabinet package must be worked out first. The Ambassador pushed back that the March 8-Aoun opposition could achieve its goal of forcing Siniora to resign by proceeding with presidential elections now. If one tries to achieve a package, the presidential vacancy will continue indefinitely, the Ambassador warned, and the Siniora cabinet Salloukh claims to reject will remain empowered. ¶8. (C) Salloukh countered that if there was "good will," then the cabinet would come together quickly, with the package deal easing the presidential elections. The Ambassador predicted that the Finance Ministry promises to be a problem. Salloukh claimed that Rafiq Hariri had unjustly seized the Finance Ministry from the Shia, and thus it was the Shia right to have it back. (Note: In Lebanon's history, only two cabinets had Shia Finance Ministers. End note.) ¶9. (C) Perhaps revealing more than he should, Salloukh said that the Shia deserved the Finance Ministry because almost every cabinet decree, even simple ones that do not require cabinet voting, need the Finance Minister's signature, given the financial implications of nearly everything. Thus, the Finance Minister has effective veto power. This is only fair, since the signatures of the Prime Minister and President are required on all decrees. That gives the Sunnis and Christians vetoes, so now the Shia need the same. COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) To a large extent, the atmosphere in this meeting did not indicate that it has been over 14 months since the Ambassador paid an official call on Salloukh: it was the same Salloukh we remember, never unbuttoning his jacket and sitting stiffly on the edge of his chair. He did not admonish the Ambassador for ignoring him, and he was relatively warm, even presenting a coffee table book of Lebanon as a farewell gift. Depending on the topic, we've been in chillier meetings, frankly, with the sometimes exasperatingly stubborn Fouad Siniora, someone we have not intentionally snubbed for over a year as we have Salloukh. ¶11. (C) But the comments on the Finance Ministry are ominous. Nabih Berri once mentioned, in a comment orchestrated to appear as though it was merely a passing remark, that he would prefer the Shia to have Finance in the next cabinet rather than Foreign Affairs. In the Ambassador's farewell call, the senior official Shia cleric in the country, Abdulamir Qabalan, raised the need for the BEIRUT 00000080 003 OF 003 Shia to have Finance. At the same time, we know that Saad Hariri, following his father's advice that "he who pays is boss," wants to retain Finance for someone in his circle, if not for himself. ¶12. (C) With the two major Shia movements clearly in Syria's grip, it would seem that Syria's allies are looking for redundant ways to exercise veto power over the cabinet: get the blocking/toppling third by some means, get agreement on major decisions (such as the appointment of an army commander) in advance to ensure your demands are met, and (citing Shia equities) hold the Finance portfolio to have veto power over any cabinet decision with financial implications. This is a hint of the complications facing March 14 when cabinet formation issues are at last addressed in detail. FELTMAN