LEBANON: PM-DESIGNATE SINIORA BEGINS CABINET

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000799

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S SILVERBERG AND PDAS WARLICK
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/KUMAR/PHEE
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR ASEC UNSC EAIR SA IR LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: PM-DESIGNATE SINIORA BEGINS CABINET
FORMATION; LET THE HORSE-TRADING BEGIN

REF: A. BEIRUT 780


B. BEIRUT 770

C. BEIRUT 766

D. BEIRUT 747

E. BEIRUT 733

F. BEIRUT 724

Classified By: CDA Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Following President Sleiman's May 28 nomination of PM
Siniora to head the next government, Siniora will begin the
difficult process of cabinet formation. The slight margin of
votes in his favor is sure to encourage the opposition, which
accuses him of being the "American" and not a consensus PM,
to extract as many concessions as possible. While the
complicated horse-trading involved in cabinet formation makes
it difficult to predict who will emerge victorious, we do not
see Round Two of the Doha process proceeding nearly as
quickly nor as smoothly as the election of President Sleiman.
We expect Round Three -- formulation of the ministerial
statement to parliament, including the government's position
on Hizballah's arms -- to be even more contentious. End
summary.

THE LONG ROAD TO
CABINET FORMATION
--------------


2. (SBU) On May 28, President Michel Sleiman held binding
consultations with the various parliamentary blocs to
nominate the prime minister of the next cabinet after the
majority chose Fouad Siniora to reassume the post of
premiership. 68 out of 127 parliamentarians nominated PM
Siniora to form the new cabinet (as opposed to 126 out of 128
votes he received when he was designated as PM in July 2005).



3. (SBU) All of the March 14 blocs voted for Siniora, with
vote tallies as follows: Samir Geagea's Lebanese Forces (5),
Walid Jumblatt's Democratic Gathering (17),Saad Hariri's
Future Movement (32),and the Tripoli bloc (4). Other
independent parliamentarians who voted for Siniora were
Ghassan Tueini, Boutros Harb, Nayla Mouawad, Samir Franjiyeh,
Solange Gemayel, Robert Ghanem, Michel Murr, Mosbah Ahdab,
Elias Atallah and Jawad Boulos.


4. (SBU) While the Shia bloc represented by Amal movement and
Hizballah cast &blank8 votes, Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic
movement and the Zahle popular bloc of MP Elie Skaff
nominated different candidates for the premiership, including
former Minister of Industry Leila Solh, Transportation
Minister Mohammad Safadi, and MP Bahije Tabbarah. The
Armenian Tashnaq party also cast blank votes. Others who
cast blank votes or voted against Siniora were: Hussein
Husseini, Nader Sukkar, the SSNP bloc, the Syrian Baath,
Usama Saad, Bahije Tabbarah (who voted for Hariri),Pierre
Daccashe (who voted for Bahije Tabbarah) and Alawite MP
Mustafa Hussein.


5. (SBU) PM-designate Siniora began the process of cabinet
formation on May 29 by first consulting with former PMs, as
protocol dictates, and will begin consulting with
parliamentary blocs on May 30. According to the Doha
agreement, the cabinet will be comprised of 30 ministers, 16
for the majority, 3 for President Sleiman, and 11 for the
opposition (a blocking third).


6. (SBU) Under the Taif agreement, half of the cabinet
members are Christians, and the other half Muslim. The
Christians are divided as follows: 6 Maronite, 4 Greek
Orthodox, 3 Catholic, 1 Armenian, and 1 other minority
Christian (Protestant, Syriac, etc.). The Muslims include 6
Sunni, 6 Shia, and 3 Druze. The four "sovereign ministries"
(Foreign Affairs, Defense, Interior, and Finance) will be the
most hotly disputed, with Justice a close fifth.


7. (SBU) After the consultation process (which many are

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predicting could last weeks or more),Siniora, along with
President Sleiman, will issue a decree forming the new
cabinet. Once formed, the cabinet must agree, by two-thirds
majority, on its general policy statement ("bayan wizari").
It then submits the statement to parliament within thirty
days in order to obtain the vote of confidence, which
requires a simple majority (64 out of 127 parliamentarians --
in 2005, the Siniora cabinet obtained 92 out of 128 votes).

REACTIONS
--------------


8. (C) The March 14 decision to nominate PM Siniora prompted
swift reactions from the opposition. Ali Hamdan, press
advisor to Speaker Berri, said that the national unity
government (NUG) was the second step in the Doha process,
after the election of the president. Hamdan said the
selection of Siniora was the majority's choice, but added
that the NUG was a partnership, and the opposition fully
expected to have its fair share. Shia MP Yassine Jabber,
from Berri's parliamentary bloc, explained the bloc had cast
blank votes because it was inappropriate for it to support
Siniora since it did not have a good relationship with him
over the last two years; however, the bloc was ready to
participate in the new government.


9. (C) Alain Aoun, member of General Aoun's Free Patriotic
Movement (FPM),told us that the FPM was unhappy with
Siniora's nomination for the premiership. Aoun MP Ibrahim
Kenaan also labeled Siniora's a negative signal; explaining
that his bloc had hoped to "turn a new page" after the Doha
conference, but instead the majority had selected the
"American candidate." Hamdan later joked that Michel Aoun
himself was happy with the decision; if Aoun, who represented
the majority of Lebanon's Christians, could not be president,
then Hariri, who represented the majority of Lebanon's
Sunnis, should not be prime minister.


10. (C) Armenian opposition Tashnaq MP Hagop Pakradonian said
that although Tashnaq disagrees with the majority's decision,
it refrained from nominating an alternative candidate out of
respect for March 14's decision. Hizballah also refrained,
with MP Mohamad Raad explaining that the Doha agreement
stipulated that the prime minister would head a national
unity government and should therefore represent the traits of
national unity. The Lebanese people are looking for a prime
minister with a "positive attitude," he said.

COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) The narrow margin in favor of Siniora this time
around compared to 2005 reflects the deep divide between the
majority (who all voted in favor) and the opposition (who all
either abstained or voted for a different candidate).
Siniora, leader of what the opposition claims was an
"illegitimate" government following the resignation in
November 2006 of six opposition ministers (including all five
Shia),is loathed by the opposition, which does not view him
as a "consensus" prime minister. However, the Shia
opposition, by refraining from nominating an alternative
candidate, is playing along for the time being, most likely
in hopes of extracting concessions in terms of cabinet
portfolios.


12. (C) The horse trading over portfolios is in full pursuit,
and all bets are on and rumors abounding. Laest thinking is
that President Sleiman will keep Interior for himself, as
well as possibly Defense. March 14 is angling for Finance
(the purse strings) and Justice (Special Tribunal),both of
which are key objectives for Michel Aoun. The wily Murrs
would like Interior, which will play an important role in the
run-up to the 2009 parliamentary elections, but at the same
time would like to keep the younger Elias as Minister of
Defense. Foreign Affairs is largely ignored by most, and
presumed to go to the Shia.


13. (C) To complicate matters even more, there may not be a
neat division of the six Sunni ministers for the majority
and the six Shia ministers for the opposition. (Note: In the
last Siniora government, all of the Sunni ministers were in

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the majority, while all the Shia ministers were with the
opposition. End Note.) This time, March 14 may take an
independent Shia (to avoid an entire confessional bloc from
resigning as occurred in 2006),and in exchange March 8 will
take a Sunni. Other confessional distributions may also cut
across majority/opposition lines. We can only hope PM
Siniora has a sophisticated computer program to sort this all
out.


14. (C) The only thing we can say for sure at this point is
that we expect Round Two of the Doha agreement will be a
lengthy process, and more contentious than the Round One
election of President Sleiman. If and when there is a new
cabinet, Round Three will be even more bruising, as the
opposing sides seek to reach agreement on the ministerial
statement, and in particular the wording regarding
Hizballah's arms. Doha was but the beginning of what will be
a long and difficult road to restoring political stability in
Lebanon. End Comment.

SISON