LEBANON: MARCH 14'S DIVISION OF LABOR FOR WINNING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000789

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S SILVERBERG AND PDAS WARLICK
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/KUMAR/PHEE
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR ASEC UNSC EAIR SA IR LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: MARCH 14'S DIVISION OF LABOR FOR WINNING
THE 2009 ELECTIONS

REF: A. BEIRUT 780

B. BEIRUT 770

C. BEIRUT 766

D. BEIRUT 747

E. BEIRUT 733

F. BEIRUT 724

Classified By: CDA Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Following March 14's nomination of Fouad Siniora as
prime minister in the next cabinet, March 14 Secretariat SYG
Fares Suaid envisions a division of labor over the next 10
months to ensure its success in the 2009 parliamentary
elections. PM Siniora reportedly told March 14 leaders that
his role would be to look after the economic and security
issues facing the country, including confronting Hizballah.
In Suaid's view, the Secretariat's role should be to focus on
overall political messaging, especially vis-a-vis Hizballah,
leaving coalition-building to majority leader Saad Hariri and
others. Suaid views Hizballah SYG Hassan Nasrallah's May 26
speech as a "gift to March 14" by making Hizballah an easy
target for criticism. End summary.

OPPOSITION'S ACQUIESCENCE ON
SINIORA SIGNALS UPCOMING
BATTLES ON CABINET FORMATION
--------------


2. (C) Pol/Econ Chief and Senior LES Political Advisor met
with March 14 SYG Fares Suaid at his home in Rabieh on May

28. Suaid had participated in the May 27 meeting of March 14
leaders in which they announced their selection of Fouad
Siniora for the premiership (Ref A). Suaid said that Saad's
"inner core" of advisors (Ghattas Khoury, Nader Hariri, Hani
Hammoud, Bassem Saba, Deputy Speaker Farid Makkari) had
pushed hardest for Saad, arguing that Saad needed "fresh"
blood in his entourage. Saad, after taking a severe beating
in Beirut, is afraid of Hizballah and Sunni extremists and
needs strong U.S. support, he added.


3. (C) Michel Sleiman and March 8 also preferred Saad, Suaid
said. The opposition did not view the Hariri family as
fighters, he explained, recalling that even former PM Rafik
Hariri had tried to have a good relationship with Hizballah
SYG Hassan Nasrallah. Suaid agreed that the opposition, by
not openly contesting Siniora's nomination, was hoping to
extract more concessions on other portfolios. The opposition
would accuse March 14 of not being willing to turn over a new
leaf after Doha by nominating a candidate whom the majority
knows is loathed by the opposition.


4. (C) Contrary to what as-Safir newspaper was reporting,
Suaid said it was not true the Transportation Minister
Mohamad Safadi had tried to insert his name into the process,
adding that Safadi was "mute" during the meeting.

SINIORA'S MESSAGE
TO MARCH 14
--------------


5. (C) Suaid said Siniora had stressed four key points in the
May 27 meeting: 1) the necessity of cohabitating with
President Sleiman; 2) the need for March 14 (vice the
government) to prepare for the 2009 parliamentary electons;
3) the need for the government to focus insead on the
difficult economic and security issue facing the country;
and 4) the need to confront Hizballah.


6. (C) Siniora stressed the need for March 14 to develop a
good relationship with the newly elected president to make it
clear that the opposition (Hizballah in particular),and not
Michel Sleiman, was the enemy. Suaid labeled Sleiman a
"smart guy whom we can work with, but we need to get him on
our side." There is a new player on the scene, he said,
referring to the new President, and we need to work with him.
Predicting that Sleiman's first overseas trip would be to
Qatar and Syria, followed by Washington and Paris, Suaid also

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said March 14 needed to get the Qataris on board.


7. (C) Siniora made it clear in his remarks that he would
grant no gifts to March 14 in terms of governmental actions
that would help lead to a March 14 victory in 2009. His
message to the coalition was that it was up to them to
undertake the necessary measures to win the election, and
they should not rely on him. "I can't do March 14's job," he
reportedly said. Siniora told March 14 leaders that his role
as prime minister would be to address Lebanon's economic and
security situations, noting that facing a "very insecure
year." Siniora was, in Suaid's assessment, determined to
confront Hizballah.

SECRETARIAT'S NEXT STEPS:
POLITICAL MESSAGING TO
COUNTER HIZBALLAH
--------------


8. (C) Suaid said Siniora also expressed a desire to develop
a better relationship with the March 14 Secretariat, of which
he reportedly spoke highly, citing good coordination over the
past several months. Siniora is a fighter, Suaid said, and
is determined to have a better relationship with Saad via the
Secretariat. However, Saad currently was more focused on
cabinet formation that coalition-building.


9. (C) Noting the "election fever" that was taking over the
country, especially in Christian areas, Suaid said that if
the Secretariat's role was to prepare the coalition for the
2009 elections by reconciling the competing interests of
Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea and Druze leader Walid
Jumblatt, he did not want to be the Secretary General. In
the March 14 meeting, Siniora had advocated running in the
elections as a "coalition," which Suaid believed would be
difficult, given interparty disagreements, but that party
leaders knew this was necessary to win.


10. (C) According to Suaid, therefore, the Secretariat's role
should be to develop a unified political message rather than
establishing the "technical conditions" of coalition
politics. The message should focus on Hizballah's arms, he
elaborated, by emphasizing the sovereignty of the state and
its monopoly on the use of force. Hizballah would try to
counter this by arguing that its militia was not a purely
Shia militia, but one that embodied wide confessional
membership, Suaid said, referring to an al-Manar (Hizballah's
TV station) clip showing a multi-confessional militia
training camp that is supporting Hizballah. Hizballah will
argue that it is not only the Shia who have arms, but also
other opposition members such as Druze Wiam Wihab, the Syrian
opposition parties, and Aoun's bloc.


11. (C) Suaid confirmed that the state-building and other
workshops launched after the March 14 Biel convention were
continuing. Furthermore, the Secretariat continued its
outreach to civil society and now had over 700 signatories on
the petition for civil peaceful resistance and Hizballah
disarmament (Ref F). However, the Secretariat needed more
funding, which he hoped Saad would provide, and had not yet
opened its new headquarters in Ashrafieh.

NASRALLAH'S SPEECH:
A GIFT TO MARCH 14
--------------


12. (C) Suaid called Hizballah SYG Hassan Nasrallah's May 26
speech (Ref B) a "gift to March 14." In 48 hours, he
explained, we have seen two contrasting pictures. The first
was the election of Michel Sleiman, supported by the entire
Arab and international community, and his speech stressing
the importance of the Taif Agreement and UNSC resolutions.
(Suaid credited Sleiman's brother, Antoine, governor of the
Bekaa and acting governor of Mount Lebanon, and Philippe Abi
Akl, an independent journalist from Sleiman's hometown region
of Jbeil with helping Sleiman with the speech.) The second
was Nasrallah's "Che Guevara"-style speech talking about
force. Hizballah exemplifies the "anti-state," Suaid said,
adding that even those who are not pro-March 14 were not
happy with the speech.


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13. (C) The Arab part of Nasrallah's speech was the most
significant, Suaid continued, opposing two approaches:
Hizballah's victory in Lebanon's 2000 "liberation" from and
2006 "defense" against Israel, proving that Hizballah's
military strategy was the only way to get results, as opposed
to the ongoing negotiations between Arab regimes and the U.S.
and Israel. Now Syria is negotiating with Israel, and the
U.S. is talking with Iran about Iraq, so Hizballah is sending
a message to Damascus and Tehran that they need to take into
account Hizballah, Suaid said.


14. (C) "Is Hizballah alone? Afraid?" Suaid asked aloud,
answering, "I don't know." But after UNSCR 1701 Hizballah
could no longer use its arms south of the Litani River, and
after the Doha agreement it could not use them inside
Lebanon. Nasrallah was therefore trying to stress the need
for cohabitation between the state of President Michel
Sleiman (according to Taif) and Hizballah's "wilayat
al-faqih," with the former responsible for governance and
economic issues, and Hizballah responsible for Lebanon's
political and security welfare. This is how Hizballah dealt
with former PM Rafiq Hariri, Suaid said, and this is how they
want to deal with the next Siniora government. The unspoken
message to Saad is that if you do not accept this
arrangement, we will kill you.


15. (C) The Secretariat's goal, therefore, would be to paint
a clear picture of these two opposing visions (the Lebanese
state versus Hizballah's "anti-state" state) to President
Sleiman, rather than push him into open confrontation with
Hizballah. Asked what the majority's strategy would be to
ensure that the new cabinet's inaugural statement to
parliament contained strong language on Hizballah's arms,
Suaid said March 14 leaders had discussed this at the meeting
the night before, and all agreed it should be based on
President Sleiman's acceptance speech. However, he
acknowledged that negotiating the statement would be
difficult. Siniora's references to Shebaa Farms at Doha
(which he termed a "charm operation" vis-a-vis Hizballah)
were especially unhelpful, he said, because it only gives
Hizballah more credibility. After the release of Lebanese
prisoners from Syria, Hizballah would have no more "alibi"
for its weapons were it not for Shebaa, he explained.


16. (C) Hizballah is the "Iranian instrument in Lebanon,"
Suaid concluded; the only real tool against Hizballah is
pressure on Iran. Siniora's statement that Shebaa remains
under Israeli occupation gives Hizballah a justification for
including a reference to its right to bear arms in the
ministerial statement. Suaid agreed that the majority would
have difficulties in striking a balance between stressing
Lebanon's adherence to UNSCRs 1559 and 1701, and not
endorsing Hizballah's weapons.

COMMENT
--------------


17. (C) By all accounts March 14 has an uphill battle ahead,
not only in terms of cabinet formation and agreement on the
cabinet's first official address to parliament, but also in
consolidating its political base over the next 10 months.
The division of labor outlined by PM Siniora makes sense; it
allows him to make (and eventually be the scapegoat for) the
tough economic decisions necessary to put the GOL's fiscal
house in order and qualify for additional Paris III
assistance, as well as to continue his role as "bad cop" in
confronting Hizballah. Saad is now free to focus on what he
needs to focus on, building up March 14's constituency base
and building better relations within the coalition. The
March 14 Secretariat, as Suaid rightly asserts, can then deal
on the bigger picture of coalition messaging, although we
would still like to see its efforts focused more on what
March 14 represents (in terms of state-building, Shia
outreach, etc.) rather than what it opposes. End comment.

SISON