LEBANON: BERRI CITES SYRIAN-SAUDI RELATIONSHIP AS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000077 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: BERRI CITES SYRIAN-SAUDI RELATIONSHIP AS KEY TO LEBANON'S POLITICAL CRISIS BEIRUT 00000077 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMAY -------------- ¶1. (C) In his last meeting with the mbassador, a pessimistic Parliament Speaker Nabi Berri cited better RELATIONS between Syria and audi Arabia as the key to resolving Lebanon's poitical crisis. He continued to insist on a 10-10-0 cabinet formation, and stressed that a meeting etween majority leader Saad Hariri and Free Patrotic Movement leader Michel Aoun was necessary t demonstrate that Arab League Secretary Amr Mousa's visit to Lebanon resulted in some progress. Berri also reiterated his view that no constitutinal amendment is needed to elect Lebanese Armed orces Commander Michel Sleiman as president. End ummary. BERRI OFFERS CONDOLENCES -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied y Pol/Econ Chief and Senior FSN POLITICAL Advisor paid a farewell call on Parliament Speaker Nabi Berr a his ffic inAin el-Tineh on January 7. Berri advisor Ali Hamdan also was present atthe meeting. Berri, expressing condolences for th January 15 car bomb that hit an Embassy vehicle, injuring two Embassy local employees, did not beieve the attack was directed at the Ambassador, ut said it might have been a message to the U.S.in light of the President's Middle East trip and hs comments on Lebanon. Stating that he was not defending Hizballah, Berri also said he did not beieve the group was responsible for the attack, aguing that it was not in Hizballah's interests t target the U.S. and noting that Hizballah Secreary General Hassan Nasrallah himself had strongly condemned the attack. SYRIAN-SAUDI RELATIONS KE TO LEBANESE CRISIS -------------- ¶3. (C) Turning to Arab League ecretary General Amr Moussa's ongoing visit, Beri, who had met with Moussa the previous evening and was scheduled to meet with him again later in th day, cited the Syria-Saudi Arabia relationship s key to resolving Lebanon's POLITICAL crisis. e said he was "less optimistic" than before thata solution would be found given that the two countries were unable to talk to each other. BERRI ISISTS ON 10-10-10 -------------- 4 (C) Berri also continued to insist on a 10-10-10 distribution for the majority, opposition, and pesident in the next cabinet. He claimed Moussa had told him that Arab League leaders from Syria, audi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Qatar, in a meetng with Moussa ten days earlier in Cairo, had no discussed actual numbers, to avoid causing probles amongst themselves (i.e., between Syria and Saudi Arabia). But Berri reportedly told Moussa thatthe declaration issued after the meeting was hisoric in that it demonstrated that Arab countriespreferred to give Christians weight in Lebanon, hich, in his view, implied a 10-10-10 distribution of cabinet seats. Berri told the Ambassador he wuld open parliament to elect a president today i there was agreement on this formula. ...AND USHES FOR AOUN-HARIRI MEETING -------------- ¶5. (C) Berri stressed that Moussa's success in arranging a meeting between majority leader Saad Hariri and Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun was necessary to demonstrate that Moussa's visit resulted in some progress, though he admitted that such a meeting probably would not lead to a solution to the crisis. (Note: The meeting, which Moussa attended, occurred shortly thereafter, with former President Amine Gemayel attending with Hariri to dispel Aoun's claim that he is the sole representative of the Christians. End note.) NO NEED FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT -------------- BEIRUT 00000077 002.2 OF 002 ¶6. (C) Finally, Berri reiterated his view that no constitutional amendment is needed to elect Lebanese Armed Forces Commander Michel Sleiman, arguing that Article 74 of the constitution (which addresses the election of a president under unusual circumstances) overrides Article 49 (which stipulates that sitting high-level government officials need a two-year cooling off period before being elected president). The Ambassador pointed out that, under this logic, Article 74 could also override other provisions in the constitution, including the two-thirds quorum requirement. Berri immediately rejected this possibility. COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (C) Berri, not wanting to use the term "pessimistic," said he was less optimistic than before about finding a solution to the ongoing crisis. This time, however, he pinned the blame on external actors, Syria and Saudi Arabia. Berri's recounting of the Arab League meeting in Cairo is not consistent with what Moussa told the Ambassador in their January 12 meeting (reftel),i.e., that the Arab League memebers had not discussed the 10-10-10 formula. ¶8. (C) Berri's interpretation of Article 74 is equally selective. While, by his own admission, Berri opposes a constitutional amendment in part because he does not want PM Siniora to come to parliament (the cabinet would be present for the parliamentary vote) and thus suggest that he sees the Siniora cabinet as legitimate, we find his efforts to pick and choose bits of the constitution that suit him more disturbing. Furthermore, Aoun, in his own eternal quest for the presidency, will surely challenge any election that has even the slightest hint of possible legal impropriety. FELTMAN