Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BEIRUT765
2008-05-26 13:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: SAAD HARIRI WARNS CODEL RAHALL OF

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER PINR ASEC UNSC EAIR SA IR LE 
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DE RUEHLB #0765/01 1471335
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 261335Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2033
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2391
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2694
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000765 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, H/FO
ALSO FOR IO A/S SILVERBERG AND PDAS WARLICK
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/KUMAR/PHEE
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR ASEC UNSC EAIR SA IR LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SAAD HARIRI WARNS CODEL RAHALL OF
IRANIAN TAKEOVER OF LEBANON

Classified By: CDA Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000765

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, H/FO
ALSO FOR IO A/S SILVERBERG AND PDAS WARLICK
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/KUMAR/PHEE
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR ASEC UNSC EAIR SA IR LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SAAD HARIRI WARNS CODEL RAHALL OF
IRANIAN TAKEOVER OF LEBANON

Classified By: CDA Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Hours before the parliamentary election of former
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Michel Sleiman as
president, Saad Hariri, leader of the parliamentary majority,
thanked visiting CODEL Rahall for continuing U.S.
Congressional support for the Lebanese security forces.
Repeatedly warning of Iranian influence in Lebanon, Hariri
stressed the need for more sophisticated U.S. military
assistance. Hizballah was the victor at Doha, he said, and
although he was looking ahead to the 2009 parliamentary
elections, the March 14 majority would be unable to tip the
balance of power away from Hizballah without more U.S. help.
Hariri gave no indications as to his thinking on whether to
become the next prime minister, but Arab leaders attending
the parliamentary session later reportedly conveyed their
preference for current PM Fouad Siniora to stay on. Saad met
with Iranian FM Mottaki the followind day, May 26. End
summary.


2. (C) CODEL Rahall, accompanied by Charge Sison, DCM, and
Pol/Econ Chief, met with majority leader Saad Hariri at his
headquarters in Qoreitem on May 25 just hours before the
swearing in of Lebanese President Michel Sleiman. Hariri
aides Ghattas Khoury and Nader Hariri and others also
attended. The CODEL consisted of three members of Congress
of Lebanese descent: Nick Rahall (D-WV),Darrell Issa (R-CA)
and Ray Lahood (D-IL),as well as Charlie Melancon (D-LA),
John Linder (R-GA) and Jack Kingston (R-GA).


3. (C) Rahall began by recounting the meetings the CODEL had
just had with PM Fouad Siniora and president-elect Michel
Sleiman. He conveyed House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's greetings
to Hariri, and noted that Maronite Patriarch Boutros Sfeir
had had a good lunch with President Bush. Rahall commented
that there had been no victors and no losers in Doha, and
that it was time for Lebanon to turn a new page.


4. (C) Hariri thanked the CODEL for its presence in Lebanon,
adding that the U.S. Congress had consistently stood by the
March 14 majority, which appreciated all of its support.
Lebanon had experienced three years of agony and
assassinations, including March 14 parliamentarians.
Hizballah's recent takeover of downtown Beirut was in reality
an "invasion of the Iranian Revolution Guard," he said. This
is the most dangerous show of Iranian power to date; they are

telling us they can control the country if they want, he
warned. The "Gaza" model we feared in Lebanon has happened,
he stated grimly.

EYES ON 2009
--------------


5. (C) Doha may have been a truce between the opposing
parties, Hariri continued, but it was only round one. The
main battle was the 2009 parliamentary elections. He
expressed confidence that if the majority worked hard, it
would win the elections. However, he feared that if the
opposition sensed a March 14 victory, it would again take to
the streets, as evidenced by the opposition's continuing
intimidation through burning cars and other actions. (Note:
We also have heard numerous stories of Hizballah using
torture while interrogating Lebanese citizens. End note.)

MORE U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE
NEEDED TO COUNTER HIZBALLAH
--------------


6. (C) On U.S. military assistance to the Lebanese Armed
Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Forces (ISF),Hariri noted
that the wide discrepancy between the "Vietnam-era" equipment
of the LAF and Hizballah's more modern weapons empowered
Hizballah. We need more helicopters, tanks, and ammunition,
he stressed several times. Unfortunately, the U.S. always
has a question mark as to whether its assistance will fall
into the wrong hands, he noted. But the LAF has demonstrated
repeatedly, even during the civil war, that this will not

BEIRUT 00000765 002 OF 003


happen. "What the army has, the army has," he said.


7. (C) Hariri said he sensed no sense of urgency on the part
of the U.S. to provide the necessary military assistance. He
advocated a Marshall Plan for the army, he said, to tip the
balance of power in March 14's favor. We get statements of
support from the U.S., he said, but not the small things that
matter so much more. We need Cobra attack helicopters, he
repeated, and "a little bit sophisticated tanks" and
uparmored vehicles to create a mobile army and provide
necessary deterrence. Ten Cobras would not be a threat to
Israel, he added.


8. (C) If we had had Cobras at Nahr al-Barid, we would not
have had 175 LAF casualties -- the equivalent in proportional
terms of two to three thousand U.S. soldiers, Hariri said.
We are not asking for ballistic missiles, but to go to peace
we have to prepare for war. The LAF and ISF are not
prepared, he complained. Under the Syrians the ISF had 9,000
members; today it had 25,000, but not enough cars, forcing
them to use their personal vehicles or even bicycles to
pursue criminals.


9. (C) We do not want to fight with Hizballah, he assured the
delegation; a civil war would destroy the country. But we
need to give more teeth to the armed forces. Iran has a very
strong hold in Lebanon; it showed it is ready to use force to
counter decisions it does not like. If Hizballah wins the
2009 elections, he warned, this will be the U.S.' problem.


10. (C) The Charge noted that the USG was already providing a
$300 million-plus package in military equipment and training
to the LAF and $60 million police training program for the
ISF. U/S Defense for Policy Eric Edelman would be returning
to Lebanon on May 31 to discuss bilateral defense issues.
Rahall added that Chairman of the House Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee John Murtha was willing to help,
and that he himself had discussed the matter with Lebanese
Charge d'Affaires to Washington Ambassador Antoine Chedid.


11. (C) Hariri noted that the U.S. Department of Defense had
everything Lebanon needed, it was just a matter of getting
approval. Iran has given much more than $300 million, he
said; it has provided more in the last two years "than anyone
has dreamt." Make no mistake, he said, Iran has taken
Lebanon hostage.


12. (C) Issa stressed the need to ensure that the new LAF
Commander would be a strong leader willing to protect the
institutions of the state. We also need continuity in the
prime ministership, he added. He acknowledged Hariri's
comment that there was now a "cold war" between Iran and
freedom, and that he would use that to sell USG assistance to
Lebanon to Congress. But Hariri needed to help him by
providing the right tools in terms of strong Lebanese
leadership. Lahoud later reinforced this point, saying
Lebanon was on the cusp of a whole new day, but had been
without real leadership since the assassination of former PM
Rafik Hariri. Hariri agreed with Lahoud that President Bush
should invite President Sleiman to Washington soon.


13. (C) Hariri responded that there had been a golden
opportunity after the LAF's victory at Nahr al-Barid to
solidify the army. However, because U.S. military assistance
was not accelerated, Lebanon was now in a more difficult
position than it had been a year ago. Hariri also stressed
the need for accelerated Paris III assistance.


14. (C) Rahall, noting that he had recently met with a
delegation of independent Lebanese Shia visiting Washington,
asked whether Hariri was reaching out to these groups, who
also were being intimidated by Hizballah. Hariri responded,
"definitely," adding, however, that they also need to take
some risks. Furthermore, it was not only Shia who were being
intimidated by Hizballah; the Sunnis also were targets, he
stressed, noting Osama bin Laden's frequent references to
Hizballah SYG Hassan Nasrallah. The Druze and Christians are
also targets, he added The Iranians have a long-term
strategy in Lebanon, and currently are digesting their
political gains. The Charge cited the recent ousting of the
Shia Mufti of Tyre Ali al-Amine and vandalism at the home of

BEIRUT 00000765 003 OF 003


Lebanese judge Ralph Riachy as other examples of intimidation.


15. (C) It was not true that there were no winners at Doha,
Hariri continued. Hizballah was the victor. March 14
compromised to put things back in order, but it was uncertain
how long this would last. We have to be ready, he said.
Hizballah realized it had made a mistake and "broken a major
wall" by using weapons against Lebanese, especially Sunnis,
and provoking Sunni/Shia tensions. He dismissed Rahall's
assertion that Hizballah would be ostracized if it attempted
to take over Lebanon, explaining that Hizballah did not care.
This is just one of the many cards in their hands in their
battle against Israel, he said.

COMMENT
--------------


16. (C) Hariri gave no indication during the meeting whether
he had made up his mind to take on the prime ministership. In
a subsequent conversation at Beirut International Airport
with the Charge, however, UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh
Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan (AbZ) said he had told Hariri
the Arabs' preference was for Siniora to stay on. (We hear
the Saudis told Siniora the same.) He reportedly told Hariri
that Siniora should do the heavy lifting in terms of pushing
through Paris III reforms and making other difficult choices.
AbZ said he had spoken frequently with Saad over the past
few months and had even sensed two-three months ago he had
been on the brink of leaving March 14. AbZ also reported
that the moderate Arab states were preparing a $1 billion
assistance package for the LAF and ISF. AbZ also said
current LAF G-2 (military intelligence) Director Georges
Khoury should not be the next Commander-in-Chief.


17. (C) Berri advisor Ali Hamdan called Pol/Econ Chief late
in the evening the same day to report that he was hearing
Siniora would become prime minister. March 14 MP Mohammad
Hajjar also told us his personal preference was Siniora.
However, the following day, May 26, Rafik Hariri's sister,
Bahia, predicted Saad would take the job.


18. (U) Saad Hariri met with Iranian FM Mottaki on May 27 at
this residence in Qoreitem (Mottaki also met earlier in the
day with President Sleiman and PM Siniora). After the
meeting, Saad said to the media that the meeting "focused on
relations between the two countries." He also said, "There
was an abnormal situation in the absence of a President of
the Republic, but we are very optimistic after the election
actually took place."


19. (U) CODEL Rahall departed Beirut beforethis message was
sent.

SISON

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