LEBANON: DRUZE LEADER ARSLAN READYING FOR THE NEW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000739

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S SILVERBERG AND PDAS WARLCK
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/KUMAR/PHEE
NSC FORABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 0520/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC SY IR LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: DRUZE LEADER ARSLAN READYING FOR THE NEW
CABINET

REF: A. BEIRUT 729

B. BEIRUT 618

C. BEIRUT 652

D. BEIRUT 664

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Druze leader and opposition-aligned former minister
and MP Talal Arslan, while avoiding specifics, predicted to
the Charge on May 21 that the new president (presumably
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Michel Sleiman) will
likely choose the Minister of Interior, and that the next LAF
Commander will be a focal point for the majority and
opposition. Having spent the previous day in Damascus,
Arslan told us that Syria was eager for a deal to be made in
Doha.


2. (C) Recounting the May 11 fighting between Hizballah and
Druze rival Walid Jumblatt, Arslan described his mediation
efforts in brokering a ceasefire, and said he did not expect
future clashes. Hizballah's weapons cannot be discussed
until there is a peace agreement with Israel, Arslan
asserted. An admirer of American democracy, George
Washington University graduate Arslan requested that the U.S.
export its system of checks and balances to Lebanon. End
summary.


3. (C) On May 20, the Charge, accompanied by EmbOffs, met
with March 8 Druze leader Talal Arslan at his residence in
southern Beirut. Former minister Marwan Abu Fadl and Dr.
Saleem Hamadeh, nephew of Telecommunications Minister Marwan
Hamadeh (who is allied with rival Druze leader Walid
Jumblatt) and member of Arslan's Lebanese Democratic Party,
also attended.

PREDICTING CABINET
DESIGNATIONS
--------------


4. (C) In anticipation of an imminent presidential election,
Arslan said he expected "major" discussions between the
majority and opposition on which side will fill certain
ministerial posts, specifically, the Interior, Defense,
Finance, Justice, and Foreign Affairs ministries. Arslan
reasoned that if the majority wants to choose the next
Defense Minister, then the opposition will demand that it
select the Interior Minister.


5. (C) He also paired the Foreign Ministry with Finance, as
well as Justice with Telecommunications, arguing that the
majority will select one of the pair and the opposition will
select the other. (Comment: We got the distinct impression
that Arslan is angling for a ministerial post in the next
Cabinet. End comment.)


6. (C) He reported that he heard the new president will
choose the Minister of Interior, and that it would not be
current Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Elias
Murr. Regarding the debate over the Ministry of Defense,
Arslan predicted that the political leaders would focus more
on selecting the next Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander.
He said he heard current head of LAF G-2 (military
intelligence) BG Georges Khoury was a likely candidate,
adding that he also heard LAF BG Jean Kahwagi's name
mentioned. Mount Lebanon G-2 Colonel Joseph Njeim, could
replace Khoury as head of the LAF G-2, he suggested.

OK FINE, I WENT TO SYRIA!
--------------


7. (C) Discussing the differences between the Syrian and
Lebanese Druze, Arslan said that he shared the same
"political leanings" as the Druze in Syria and the Golan
Heights. Arslan explained that the Druze in Syria (numbering
450,000 compared to 160,000 in Lebanon) are more traditional
and nationalistic. He told us that the Druze in Syria "are
very angry with Jumblatt," reportedly believing he has

BEIRUT 00000739 002 OF 003


departed from Druze traditions. Arslan added that he is
respected in Syria.


8. (C) In response to the Charge's question, Arslan
acknowledged that he was in Syria the previous day. He
explained that he has a "friendly relationship" with Syrian
President Bashar Assad's family (while avoiding mentioning
the president himself). Arslan relayed that "they" in Syria
were very anxious for a deal to be made in Qatar and for a
solution to Lebanon's political impasse (Ref A). "They did
not want anyone to leave Doha with empty hands," he said.

DISAPPROVAL OF
CABINET'S DECISIONS
--------------


9. (C) Criticizing the Siniora government, Arslan stated that
the Cabinet "exposed" the opposition to Israel when it
decided to transfer the head of airport security and declare
Hizballah's fiber optics network illegal (Ref B). He faulted
Siniora for taking an unprecedented step in taking these
decisions, explaining that although the opposition considers
the Siniora government as illegitimate, it does not react
with such strong measures. He argued that a government based
on confessional balance requires certain stability factors,
and the Cabinet's decision upset this stability.


10. (C) He further commented that the Siniora government is
unwilling to recognize the legitimacy of an opposition group,
and has tried to rule alone for the last two years. He noted
that his party, Lebanese Democratic Party, is composed of
multiple religions, indicating Abu Fadl, who is Greek
Orthodox and Hamadeh, who is Druze.

MEDIATING BETWEEN
JUMBLATT AND HIZBALLAH
--------------


11. (C) Providing background into how the clashes between
Hizballah and Jumblatt's Progressive Socialist Party (PSP)
began (Ref C),Arslan said that Hizballah Secretary General
Hassan Nasrallah did "not want to go to the mountains (to
fight)." He mentioned that before the clashes in the
mountains began on May 11, Nasrallah had asked Arslan to
mediate between Jumblatt and Hizballah, adding that Jumblatt
made the same request to Arslan the following day. (Note:
We reported in Ref D that Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri told
us he mediated the conflict between Jumblatt and Hizballah.
End note.)


12. (C) Arslan speculated that if Jumblatt had accepted what
Arslan was proposing on May 11 (NFI),the fighting could have
been avoided. Acknowledging Berri's involvement, Arslan told
us he urged Berri to pressure Jumblatt into agreeing to a
ceasefire. Arslan expressed his surprise that Jumblatt's PSP
fighters engaged with Hizballah, because he said Jumblatt
became concerned "after seeing Beirut taken over in three
hours."


13. (C) Rejecting his role as a "go-between," Arslan insisted
to us that while he accepted the role, he is part of the
opposition. He stated that his very participation in the
opposition enabled him to announce the ceasefire between
Jumblatt's PSP fighters and Hizballah on May 11. Arslan
added that he was in contact with Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
Commander Michel Sleiman to ensure the deployment of the LAF
to the Chouf mountains. "As soon as the LAF arrived, the
opposition withdrew," he stated.


14. (C) Arslan credited the division of the Druze as useful
when resolving conflicts, saying, "If the Druze were not
divided in two groups, who would have resolved the fighting
in the Chouf?" (Note: He dismissed the relevance of third
Druze leader Wiam Wahhab, claiming he is not significant and
is merely used by Hizballah "for his loud voice." End note.)
Having received Jumblatt right before he traveled to Doha
for the National Dialogue, Arslan told us that Jumblatt does
not have any designs (or abilities) to fight Hizballah again.

CONFLICT IS POLITICAL,
NOT SECTARIAN

BEIRUT 00000739 003 OF 003


--------------


15. (C) Telling us that he had visited Druze and Shia
villages, accompanied by more than 60 Druze sheikhs on May
18, Arslan suggested that the conflict was political in
nature, not sectarian. He argued that he would not have been
able to make such a trip if there were sectarian strife. He
added that he was received as a "savior" by the people in
these villages.

HIZBALLAH'S WEAPONS DEPEND
ON PEACE WITH ISRAEL
--------------


16. (C) "Any solution regarding Hizballah's weapons cannot
come from inside of Lebanon," Arslan asserted, "and is
contingent upon a peace agreement with Israel." He noted
that Hizballah's military prowess exceeds that of the LAF,
and therefore the GOL cannot take on Hizballah's weapons.
Further, he said, he has been telling the U.S. for two years
that Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, March 14/Future Movement
leader Saad Hariri, and Jumblatt are "do not have the ability
to deliver" on Hizballah's arms.


17. (C) Arslan posited that any discussion of Hizballah's
arms now would lead to civil war. He suggested that when a
regional deal is being discussed, the Hizballah's weapons
will be on the table. The way to ensure the security of our
country, he continued, is through political, tactical
approaches. Nevertheless, he said, "I accept Hizballah's
weapons today because Israel can threaten me at any moment."


18. (C) According to Arslan, the U.S. is best positioned to
be the "godfather" for Lebanon, explaining that the more
successful the U.S. is with its regional goals, the more
Lebanon is protected. At that point, he suggested,
Hizballah's weapons could be on the table.

U.S. SHOULD EXPORT ITS
"CHECKS AND BALANCES"
--------------


19. (C) Arslan cautioned the Charge against putting too many
expectations on the LAF because, "They won't be able to
deliver. Without a political agreement, the LAF structure
cannot hold." Having attended George Washington University
as a Political Science major undergraduate, Arslan opined, "I
wish the U.S. would export its 'checks and balances' system
to Lebanon. Lebanon will not become a real state without
developing a similar system. Save us from this mess!"


20. (C) He said that without a real democracy, Lebanon will
continue as it is today. He told us he compared Lebanese and
American governments for his undergraduate thesis, and
believes that there should be a similar system in Lebanon
where the religious communities make up the Senate, and the
Parliament is then freed for open, national elections.
"Today," he said, "all religions have established a state
within a state. It is just more obvious with the Shia
community!"

HOPING FOR POSITIVE
RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.
--------------


21. (C) Telling the Charge that his family is well-liked by
the Christians (implying that the Jumblatts are less so),
Arslan said he hopes for the "best possible relationship with
the USG." He said he is dismayed when he believes the USG is
"closer to others." He told the Charge, "There are a lot of
lies in Lebanese politics, and these lies cause most of our
disasters. Sometimes, the truth doesn't reach you. I want
to be a guardian of truth for the United States."
SISON