LEBANON: SAAD HARIRI: LOW EXPECTATIONS FOR DOHA,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000704 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA USUN FOR WOLFF/PHEE/KUMAR NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO DOD FOR OSD EDELMAN/LONG/KIMMITT/DALTON E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2018 TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM PINR KJUS MASS IR AR SY IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: SAAD HARIRI: LOW EXPECTATIONS FOR DOHA, IRAN HAS TAKEN OVER LEBANON REF: A. BEIRUT 698 ¶B. BEIRUT 697 ¶C. BEIRUT 688 BEIRUT 00000704 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: CDA Michele J. Sison for reasons section 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Future Movement leader Saad Hariri confirmed the death of top Hizballah military leader General Abu al-Fadl in a May 15 meeting with the Charge. Political leaders were preparing to meet in Doha on May 16 to relaunch the National Dialogue, though both enthusiasm and expectations for the talks, viewed as yet another opposition stalling tactic, are low. In Saad's view, Iran already had taken over Lebanon. The events of the past week have reopened deep wounds in Lebanon that would be difficult to heal. Bolstering the Lebanese army was the only way to confront Hizballah. The majority, meanwhile, was now negotiating from a position of weakness, while Hizballah had gained newfound strength. End summary. DESPITE RESERVATIONS, POLITICAL LEADERS HEAD TO DOHA -------------- ¶2. (C) Charge Sison, accompanied by A/DCM and DATT, met with Future Movement leader Saad Hariri at his home in Qoreitem at 1830 on May 15, just as the Arab League delegation was beginning its pressconference announcing that Lebanese political leders would meet in Doha on May 16 to relaunch the National Dialogue. Hariri advisors Ghattas Khoury and Nader Hariri, Boutros Harb, and Hariri notetaker also attended the meeting. The Charge, who had met with Walid Jumblatt earlier in the day (Ref A),noted that the Druze leader did not plan to attend the National Dialogue in Doha, citing the need to visit villages in the Chouf affected by recent fighting. Saad assured her that Walid would be convinced to come, which Walid himself later confirmed to the Charge by phone. ¶3. (C) The Charge also noted that Aoun (Ref B) had expressed dissatisfaction with Doha "formula" of 14 top political leaders, which Saad ascribed to Aoun's dislike of MP Michel Murr (father of Defense Minister Elias Murr),representing the Greek Orthodox Christians. Hariri did not react to the Charge's comment that Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun hoped to secure either the Ministry of Finance or Interior for his party, other than to say, "I won't discuss ministries." Asked about recent renewed talk of a 10-10-10 cabinet, Nader quipped, "We won't give Aoun the pleasure." Aoun wants to stop the Dialogue by increasing his own demands, Saad said, when what he really wants is to be president. Some of us have doubts regarding Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander General Michel Sleiman, Saad admitted, shooting a look at Boutros and eliciting laughs from both men (Note: Harb, one of March 14's two preferred candidates for president, had himself hoped to become the consensus candidate by reaching out to Speaker Nabih Berri. End note.). ¶4. (C) Saad said Arab League delegation head Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassin did not expect the talks to last more than three days. Harb, however, added that the 1989 Taif negotiations -- also expected to last a mere three days -- expanded into 24. DEEP WOUNDS REOPENED -------------- ¶5. (C) Saad did not appear optimistic that Doha would produce a solution to the on going political crisis, repeating a grim "we'll see" several times throughout the meeting. "The wounds are very deep," he said, and the events of the last week had reopened many of them to the extent that they might not be healed easily. The army had managed to "put sense into the people" and prevented a near-massacre of Sunnis near BEIRUT 00000704 002.2 OF 003 Tripoli, but for how long? ¶6. (C) Hizballah, however, had suffered more casualties than were being reported, Saad said, claiming they had lost 45-50 supporters, including Hizballah General Abu al-Fadl, whom Saad described as an "Intervention Regiment Commander." (Note: We believe al-Fadl was one of the top Hizballah military leaders. End note.) Al-Fadl's death was the catalyst for Hizballah's attack in the Chouf, he claimed, prompting Walid Jumblatt's counterattack. Although the violence had since calmed down, "there will be a next round," he warned, "but I am not going to become a militia." ¶7. (C) Hizballah had tried to remove any mention of its arms from the agenda, but failed, he said, attributing its acceptance of the National Dialogue to its need to "get out of the streets," which tarnished its image in the Arab world. Another dangerous development was the multiplication of internet sites promoting jihadists, and Hizballah's irresponsible decision to air pictures of mutilations on videos and U-Tube. IRAN HAS TAKEN OVER -------------- ¶8. (C) The agreement to relaunch the National Dialogue did not change the reality that Iran has taken over Lebanon, Saad said. They have demonstrated that, if they don't have a blocking minority, they will use arms to prevent the government from taking actions. Berri himself had threatened at 2200 the previous evening (whilst the cabinet was still in the middle of a five-hour debate on whether to rescind its May 5 decisions to confront Hizballah) that if the government did not, he could not be held responsible for any actions on the ground. As I told you six months ago, Saad said, the Syrians and Iranians will pull a Gaza in Lebanon. HELP LAF FIGHT HIZBALLAH "TERRORISTS" -------------- ¶9. (C) Saad also repeated several times that Lebanon was now the U.S.'s problem. The Charge responded that the purpose of Acting CENTCOM Commander LTG Dempsey's March 14 visit to Beirut had been to show support for the LAF as a state institution and stress to Sleiman that the $331 million in U.S. assistance over the past two years was contingent upon the LAF doing its job (Ref C). Saad agreed that Sleiman's attempt to blame the Internal Security Forces (ISF) was not credible, since the ISF was under his LAF command during emergencies. ¶10. (C) Saad stressed that the LAF's performance over the past week should not affect U.S. assistance; on the contrary, if the LAF had been better equipped, it would have been able to stand up better to the M-16s, Russian missiles and RPGs of the Hizballah "terrorists." We need a Marshall Plan for the army. Unfortunately, equipment was taking "forever and ever" to reach Lebanon; we are still waiting for helicopters and HumVees. The Charge responded that the U.S. would soon send a significant shipment of ammunition, and was working on the questions of uparmored Humvees, night vision goggles, and body armor. AOUN STILL A PROBLEM -------------- ¶11. (C) Hariri did not react to the Charge's comment that Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun hoped to secure either the Ministry of Finance or Interior for his party, other than to say, "I won't discuss ministries." Asked about recent renewed talk of a 10-10-10 cabinet, Nader quipped, "We won't give Aoun the pleasure." Aoun wants to stop the Dialogue by increasing his own demands, Saad said, when what he really wants is to be president. Some of us have doubts regarding Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander General Michel Sleiman, Saad admitted, shooting a look at Boutros and eliciting laughs from both men (Note: Harb, one of March 14's two preferred candidates for president, had himself BEIRUT 00000704 003.2 OF 003 hoped to become the consensus candidate by reaching out to Speaker Nabih Berri. End note.). DISAPPOINTMENT WITH LAF, DISAPPOINTMENT WITH INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY -------------- ¶12. (C) Following the Charge's meeting with Saad, A/DCM spoke privately with Nader Hariri, who expressed dismay at the lack of international response to Hizballah's takeover of downtown Beirut. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak waited five days before returning the majority's telephone call, he said, and the French were not much better. Furthermore, readouts he had received from (unspecified) French-Egyptian discussions also were lacking in substance in terms of what to do about Lebanon. Asked why the government had taken what it knew would be controversial decisions on the eve of a major labor demonstration, making it easy for Hizballah to turn the demonstrations into a political protest, and just when March had been gearing up to force an election on May 13, Nader said that Defense Minister Elias Murr had assured the cabinet that the LAF would defend the government's decision, and that in any case Hizballah would have found another excuse to start trouble. ¶13. (C) Nader, noting that the Bristol Hotel, a mere 300 meters away (and, ironically, home of the 2004 Bristol Gathering that denounced the extension of then President Lahoud) had been taken over by Hizballah, said that the Future Movement had made a difficult but conscience decision not to distribute arms to its followers. He explained that Rafiq Hariri did not have blood on his hands, and his son did not want to see himself transformed into a militia leader either. Nader did not expect the Doha talks to produce much, dismissing them as yet another stalling technique by the opposition until the tide turned more in its favor. The majority, meanwhile, was now negotiating from a position of weakness, while Hizballah had gained newfound strength. SISON