Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|
08BEIRUT688 | 2008-05-14 21:46:00 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Beirut |
VZCZCXRO4584 OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV DE RUEHLB #0688/01 1352146 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 142146Z MAY 08 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1874 INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY 1204 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2288 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2592 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY |
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000688 |
1. (C) In a 14 May meeting, Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander LTG Sleiman told visiting Acting CENTCOM Commander LTG Dempsey that Lebanon is in a "civil war" that requires a political solution. Sleiman outlined for General Dempsey the difficulties of the current tactical situation on the ground. Sleiman does not believe he had enough troops deployed in Beirut during the recent crisis, but he never expected Hizballah to do what it did in Beirut. Sleiman sees the need for the continued military-to-military cooperation between the U.S. military and the Lebanese Army, with a special focus on training. End Summary. 2. (C) Charge, Acting Central Commander Lieutenant General Dempsey, Central Commander J5 Policy and Planning Director Major General Allardice, POLAD Ensher, LTC Paddock, Colonel Townsend, and Colonel Zajac met with LAF Commander Lieutenant General Michel Sleiman at his office in Yarze on May 14. Sleiman warmly welcomed LTG Dempsey into his office that overlooks downtown Beirut. A LITTLE BIT OF HISTORY THAT FRAMES THE CURRENT ARMY CHALLENGES -------------------------- 3. (C) Sleiman opened the meeting by thanking the USG for its support, saying, "I know you support us, the Lebanese Army, and the government." Sleiman then gave a tactical history of the development of the "resistance" against Israel in Lebanon that began with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in the 1960's, a very brief description of the seventeen different religious communities in Lebanon, and concluded with statements about the difficulties with his Israeli and Syrian neighbors. "We always had 'the resistance' that began with the Palestinians. Now it has been transferred to other groups," said Sleiman. 4. (C) LTG Dempsey acknowledged that Sleiman has many challenges, but that these challenges also provide many opportunities for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). The CENTCOM Commander asked the Lebanese Army Commander what his strategy was for the employment of the LAF. Sleiman responded by enumerating the LAF's five priorities: 1) Defending the borders with Israel and Syria; 2) Controlling the Palestinian Refugee Camps; 3) Combating terrorism; 4) Preventing smuggling by sea or land; and 5) Preserving unity in the Army to support the Internal Security Forces (ISF). I HAVE ENOUGH TROOPS FOR MY MISSIONS IF THE POLITICIANS WILL DO THEIR JOBS -------------------------- 5. (C) Sleiman told us that these missions were currently being fulfilled by 50,000 troops, of which 40,000 are regular army, professional soldiers and 10,000 are conscripts who are on a Lebanese version of "stop loss" where they cannot leave the Army. Sleiman said he hoped to convert these 10,000 troops into regular army troops in the near future with the right incentive and retention packages. Even if these troops stay, Sleiman does not believe he has enough troops to adequately protect Lebanese citizens in the current environment. Due to the current fighting in various locations in Lebanon, Sleiman only has 3,000 troops in Beirut at this time. 6. (C) Sleiman told LTG Dempsey that he has enough troops to execute his assigned missions if the politicians could do their jobs and keep the political peace. Sleiman told us that he knew 50,000 was a large number of soldiers for a country of Lebanon's size, but that it was appropriate given the nature of the missions and the trust placed in the Army by the Lebanese citizenry. OUR COUNTRY NEEDS A POLITICAL STRATEGY, NOT A MILITARY ONE BEIRUT 00000688 002.2 OF 004 -------------------------- 7. (C) In almost statesman-like language, Sleiman told us that Lebanon needs a political strategy, not a military strategy, to deal with its problems. Sleiman told us that this political strategy should focus on two elements: 1) the weapons (both arms and ideology) in the Palestinian Camps; and 2) the weapons of the "resistance." Acknowledging that these two items require a strong army, Sleiman believes they need an equally strong political solution. 8. (C) Sleiman recounted the early days of the PLO's existence in south Lebanon. In 1970, then Second Lieutenant Sleiman was assigned to the LAF checkpoint in Labounie, a small village in South Lebanon. He recounted that he was the last officer at this checkpoint and took down the LAF colors as the LAF withdrew from the south. It would be 36 years later in 2006 that Lieutenant General Sleiman would raise the LAF colors again at this checkpoint. "This is a long time to not be in an area," said Sleiman. WE CANNOT TELL THE SOUTHERNERS NOT TO SUPPORT HIZBALLAH -------------------------- 9. (C) According to Sleiman, the Shia of south Lebanon told the Palestinians to go back to their camps during the Lebanese Civil War. In exchange, the Shia accepted responsibility for the "resistance" against Israel. After thirty years of representing Lebanese "resistance," the people of the south cannot simply abandon the "resistance," in Sleiman's assessment. Sleiman does not believe that Hizballah represents all of the Shia in Lebanon, since all of the Shia do not agree with their politics or their habits, such as Islamic dress. However, according to Sleiman, there is no Shia in Lebanon who will strike Hizballah because Hizballah protected their homes in the south for the thirty years when the army was not there. During this time, many young Shia men have been sacrificed to protect these lands, so there is a heavy emotional component to their solidarity with Hizballah as well. 10. (C) For these reasons, Sleiman feels that there is only a political solution for the problem of Hizballah's weapons. Sleiman also believes that Hizballah should accept the ways of the rest of the country and allow others to live their lives as they see fit. "They should participate in political life, like parliamentary and presidential elections," said Sleiman. Even so, Sleiman believes the issues of Hizballah and the Palestinians are tied to the wider regional situation. "If I could imagine that in six months the peace process between Israel and Syria was complete, we could really hope for a solution to our process in Lebanon," said Sleiman. With these issues resolved, Sleiman thinks that the independent Shia of Lebanon will be able to speak up and say something different from Hizballah. THIS IS CIVIL WAR ARMY ROLE IN CIVIL WAR -------------------------- 11. (C) Asked what the Army's role was during a civil war, Sleiman became uncomfortable, shifting around in his seat, as he knew this was a very important question. "Yes, I call this a civil war between the Shia, the Sunnis and the Druze," said Sleiman. According to Sleiman, it would be much easier for him if he had an army that protected a regime instead of a democracy. Since Lebanon is a democracy, the Army is obliged to "dissuade" people from a civil war. Ultimately, any civil war must solved by on the political level. "If Christians and Muslims don't want to live together, army cannot make them live together," said Sleiman. 12. (C) According to Sleiman, the current situation has been brewing for the last three years saying, "everyday we hear something from the Sunnis and Shia against each other." Meanwhile, the only good things being said in the country are being said about the Army. "But how long can we endure without a political solution?" asked Sleiman. BEIRUT 00000688 003.2 OF 004 13. (C) General Dempsey reminded Sleiman that Hizballah had fired on its own people in the last week, asking him why he did not go against the people who were shooting at the civilians. Sleiman, again uneasy in his chair, demurred. "There is more than one side to this fighting. This is not just Hizballah. There are Druze and Christians to consider too," said Sleiman. Asked if he would take action against Hizballah when elected President, Sleiman said, "The Army will continue to support, and control the situation, but not 100 percent control, because we will have difficulty without a political solution. We can manage the conflict, but not solve it." WHAT THE ARMY IS DOING TODAY -------------------------- 14. (C) Sleiman told Dempsey that the Army is fully committed around the country today. It is on the borders, around the Palestinian camps, separating belligerents in Tripoli and in the Druze areas, and in the Beka'a Valley. (Note: During the meeting, word came in that the LAF was clearing the barricades across the road at the Masnaa border crossing into Syria that had been emplaced by Future Party supporters. End Note.) "The Internal Security Forces do not do anything!" exclaimed Sleiman. "The Army does it all!" 15. (C) Sleiman explained the Army's strategy of trying to interpose itself between belligerents when a disturbance erupts. At the same time, the commanders on the ground have to act as negotiators between the two sides. LTG Dempsey remarked that this is not unlike what his troops have to do on a routine basis in Iraq. Sleiman also told us that the Army is fully engaged today dealing with problems at the Beddawi and Ain Al Hilweh refugee camps, the Yanta and Qussaya PFLP-GC Camps on the Syrian border, and general security of the entire country to include anti-smuggling operations. Meanwhile, the ISF is not doing anything except writing parking tickets according to Sleiman. "If I had its 24,000 men, I could do much more of my work," said Sleiman. I SHOULD HAVE HAD MORE TROOPS IN BEIRUT WE NEVER IMAGINED HIZBULLAH WOULD DO THIS -------------------------- 16. (C) Sleiman told us that he was now responsible for securing everything in Beirut, to include the Ministry of Interior and the headquarters for the ISF. "We needed 10,000 troops to control the situation in Beirut," said Sleiman. At this time, Sleiman told us he only has 3,000 soldiers in Beirut, with his crack special forces troops guarding the seat of government and senior political figures. Somewhat admitting his tactical mistake, Sleiman said, "We also did not think Hizballah would do what they did to us in Beirut." 17. (C) General Sleiman gave a complete tactical briefing to Charge and General Dempsey of his commander's map. The kaleidoscope of factions, religions and politics were represented graphically on a large scale map that showed all of the streets in Beirut. Sleiman outlined how his troops entered the city, how they cordoned off areas, and how the belligerents were able to fire at each other, from the tops of buildings, over the heads of LAF troops. General Dempsey remarked that UAVs would be a useful tool to see this type of activity so the commander could focus his efforts quickly on the source of firing. "Yes, I know," said Sleiman. 18. (C) Continuing to heap scorn on the ISF, Sleiman again said, "The ISF did nothing. They could not fight for one hour to protect their people." Sleiman told us that the ISF is commanded by a Sunni, and has many Sunni officers, and the Miister of Interior is a Sunni. To add insult to inury, the ISF's own headquarters were in the areathey were supposed to protect with 4,000 men. Instead, according to Sleiman, they did nothing. Acknowledging that civilians should not be required to resist an attack, Sleiman was surprised that the Sunnis did nothing to resist Hizballah. Sleiman remarked that the Druze had resisted fiercely in the Chouf, as had the Sunnis of Tripoli, and some Sunnis in the BEIRUT 00000688 004.2 OF 004 Tariq Al-Jadide area of Beirut. However, in the most densely populated Sunni areas of west Beirut, Hariri's people did nothing in Sleiman's estimation. 19. (C) In the end, Sleiman told us that he does not necessarily blame the ISF for its actions, as it is a multi-confessional organization with its own limitations as well. "My main concern," said Sleiman, "was that the conflict would spread to the Christian areas because Muslim-Christian fighting would have been horrible to stop." WE NEED TO CONTINUE ASSISTANCE WITH A FOCUS ON GOOD TRAINING -------------------------- 20. (C) Turning from the immediate tactical problems on the ground, Sleiman told General Dempsey that the LAF relied on the U.S. for its continued assistance and training. Asked what he needed right now, Sleiman responded that the current program was sufficient saying, "There is only so much you can assimilate at one time. We must make our plan to assimilate the equipment and training at the right speed." When asked about helicopters, Sleiman agreed that additional aviation assets would be helpful, especially in this type of situation. According to Sleiman, what was even more important to him was the recruitment of quality soldiers ("This is my problem, not yours to deal with," he said), and providing them with good training. Sleiman told us that his force has been continually deployed for three years now with little or no training for most units except for his elite special forces units. "When there is not civil war, we can do any mission. We have a will to fight, to be united, but with civil war it is not easy," said Sleiman. In closing, he said the Army was, to the extent possible, limiting violence and protecting the populace until a political solution was reached. 21. (U) LTG Dempsey departed Beirut before clearing this message. SISON |