LEBANON: AS BACKUP, KLEYATE AIRPORT REQUIRES US

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000686 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO:KHARRINGTON, MPOPAL, NEA/ELA, EB A/S SULLIVAN, EB/TRA, ALSO FOR A/S SILVERBERG AND PDAS WARLICK NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO DEPT PASS TO DOD/PSP USDPEDELMAN, DAS KIMMITT, MDALTON E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2018 TAGS: EAIR EFIN PTER PINR MASS ASEC UNSC SA IR LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: AS BACKUP, KLEYATE AIRPORT REQUIRES US SUPPORT TO GO OPERATIONAL REF: A. BEIRUT 499 ¶B. BEIRUT 533 ¶C. BEIRUT 670 Classified By: CDA Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Summary: USG support will be required to make the northern Kleyate Airport viable for commercial flights. Request DOS and DOD/OSD feedback on possibility of either Paris III funds or Section 1206 or Section 1210 of the 2006 National Defence Authorization Act funding. With the Beirut International Airport (BIA) barricaded by Hizballah, serious consideration should be given to providing both monetary and technical assistance, in order to secure an alternative to BIA. Director General of Civil Aviation has full specifications for the upgrades, prepared after the July 2006 war, and based on serious safety and security issues. Chairman of Middle East Airlines (MEA) Hout believes that airport security is compromised by opening up operations through competitive bidding. Recent problems, including access to jet fuel, highlight vulnerabilities of BIA. End summary. USE OF KLEYATE SHOULD BE EXAMINED -------------- ¶2. (C) With Beirut International Airport (BIA) currently under siege by Hizballah, immediate consideration must be given to equipping the other Lebanese airport, Rene Mouawad, otherwise known as Kleyate. This airport, in the northern part of the country, has been used previously for commercial flights, but now is a military airport for a country with no military aircraft other than helicopters. It is currently operational during daylight hours, and with the right wind conditions. (Ref. A) While Kleyate would need navigation, security and ground handling equipment, BIA is far from secure at any time. Additionally BIA is vulnerable to immediate takeover by Hizballah, as demonstrated both 05/07/08 and previously on 01/23/07, when the airport was effectively closed by Hizballah, through the use of road barricades. Currently, we understand that Hizballah is in the process of installing permanent gates to allow them to open and close the airport roads at will. BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT VULNERABLE -------------- ¶3. (C) BIA is vulnerable from several perspectives, some of which are immutable. The location, in the southern suburbs of Beirut, is in the backyard of Hizballah. Positioned on the sea front, there is limited access by road, which is easily blocked. Delivery of fuel is done by truck, and on 05/13 Hizballah temporarily blocked access to the fuel tank farm, in an apparent attempt to demonstrate that the airport, which continues to have airplanes landing and taking off, is ultimately unable to insure continuous operations. Employees are required to reach the airport through questionable neighborhoods. The airport support operations are currently under the control of the GOL-owned MEA, but efforts to open the operations to outside companies, according to MEA Chairman Mohammed Hout, will allow private companies to control critical parts of the operation. (Ref. C) INCIDENTS AT BIA -------------- ¶4. (C) Over the last ew months, there have been specific incidents of breaches of security at the airport, including the mock targeting of planes with lasers and the discovery of a camera pointed at the runway, and apparently installed by Hizballah. The discovery of this camera, and the decision by the cabinet of the GOL to remove it and the Brigadier General in charge of airport security, was a leading cause of the current civil disturbances. According to the Director General of Civil Aviation Hamdi Chouk, other serious vulnerabilities include the lack of safety equipment, such as fire trucks destroyed in the July 2006 war, and ground communications. Currently airport staff communicate through personal cell phones, BEIRUT 00000686 002 OF 002 LIMITATIONS OF KLEYATE AIRPORT -------------- ¶5. (C) Kleyate is not a perfect substitute. The location is vulnerable to wind direction, with unfavorable winds permitting approaches only through Syrian air space. This happens 50 percent of the time for large planes (bigger than a Gulfstream V) and 30 percent of the time for smaller aircraft, but during landing only. Taking off is not a problem. Currently the perimeter defenses are old and inadequate. However the runway is in good condition, having been fully repaired after the damages incurred during the July 2006 war, and is of an adequate length (10,000 feet) for large commercial aircraft. The buildings are in use by the Lebanese Armed Forces, and are in a good state of repair. (Ref. B) REQUIRED UPGRADES -------------- ¶6. (C) Upgrades will be required to use Kleyate for commercial flights, and at night. All upgrades proposed are for minimum requirements for safety and security. Full specifications are available from the GOL. The basic requirements are as follows: ¶A. Airport navigation Equipment ¶1. An airport movable tower control system - fully equipped. ¶2. Instrument Landing System (ILS), Distance Measuring Equipment (DME), and VHF Onmidirectional Radio (VOR) equipment. ¶3. Area control radar. ¶B. Airport security equipment ¶1. Passenger and baggage inspection machines (x-ray and hand held metal and explosive detectors, six of each.) ¶2. Closed circuit television (CCTV) network. ¶C. Airport ground equipment ¶1. Runway and taxi way solar lighting system (200 solar lights.) ¶2. airport electric generator. ¶3. Two fire fighting trucks. Full specifications and cost estimates are being prepared for dissemination through NEA/ELA Lebanon desk. ¶7. (C) Comment: In any discussion of fully outfitting Kleyate for use as a commercial airport, careful consideration must be given to the message; does this give tacit approval to Hizballah to control BIA? Hizballah has previously declared that the opening of Kleyate would be a red line. In addition, Kleyate is vulnerable to other opposing forces, including Syria. However, Lebanon has only two land borders, with Israel and Syria, and as such, egress can never be guaranteed. Currently the GOL cannot control the use of the only viable airport, and therefore USG employees and Lebanese alike are extremely vulnerable to a hostile force. End comment. SISON