LEBANON: SHIA NGO HEAD TALKS ABOUT OPERATING IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000625 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/PI, ECA/FO NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/ZARATE OVP FOR HANNAH AND KAREM E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINR EAID OEXC OVIP PROP SY IS, LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: SHIA NGO HEAD TALKS ABOUT OPERATING IN THE SOUTH Classified By: CDA Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) On May 6, the Charge met with Ali al Amine, an independent Shia who heads Shoun Janoubiyeh, an NGO which publishes an independent magazine covering events of interest to the people of Southern Lebanon. Amin said that small arms proliferation continues to be a major problem in south Lebanon. Even though Hizballah has "talked" to him about some of his cooperative efforts with the USG, he continues to preserve the independence of his organization by maintaining that he is "open to dialogue with all sides." When asked how the international community could support the independent Shia movement, al Amine said that the GOL must step in to replace Hizballah as the actual or perceived provider of social services. Finally, he said that many independent Shia are distrustful of March 14 and the West after being "sold out" by March 14 after a deal was struck with the opposition in advance of the 2005 parliamentary elections. End Summary. Small Arms Inflow Equals Trouble -------------- ¶2. (C) Al Amine told us that the current political tensions have produced feelings of insecurity among the residents of Dahiyeh, in Beirut's southern suburb, and Shia villages in the South. In his opinion, no one wants to return to an all-out civil war, but all sides -- not just the opposition -- continue to build stocks of small arms. "Sparks will fly when you mix guns and anxious people during troubled times." The GOL made an effort to collect large weapons and ammunition after the end of the civil war, but proliferation of small arms has continued with no GOL interference since the 1990s, he stated. ¶3. (C) When asked where the small arms come from, Amin said that it is well known the one can purchase weapons in Lebanon's Palestinian refugee camps. He said the bulk of the weapons are smuggled in via sea routes and beach landings, not overland via Syria. He urged the Charge to explore options for maritime security in addition to programs such as the Northern Border Pilot Program. Partnering on USG-Funded Programs -------------- ¶4. (C) Al Amine told us that he was proud to be one of the seven NGO implementers for the MEPI-funded "Citizen Lebanon" project, administered by the National Democratic Institute. It has just launched and is part of a multi-million dollar, three-year program to promote "a sense of citizenship" throughout Lebanon. Al Amine was pleased that the multi-year format allows for long-term work. "It will take time for the ruling sectarian divisions to fade." ¶5. (C) Shoun Janoubiyeh is the "Citizen Lebanon" local partner working in the deep South. The Charge asked if this partnership with the USG had caused him any problems. Al Amine said Hizballah has indeed "talked" to him, but Al Amine responded to them point blank that he is open to working with all sides and said he fully intended to maintain his dialogue with the USG. He said Hizballah, in general, is opposed to all projects and programs by independent Shia groups. However, his NGO has a respected 15 year history of working in the region and he did not seem overly concerned by Hizballah's notice of his work. He said his program is also strengthened by a large number of independent Shia volunteers who are committed to the NGO's mission. USG and March 14 Should Support Independent Shia -------------- --- ¶6. (C) Al Amine admitted that, in many instances, direct funding from the USG can be problematic in the South. He said it would be more prudent to provide additional support to the GOL so that is can step in to provide much-needed social services to the local residents. "People only see Hizballah programs and they wonder why the GOL, which BEIRUT 00000625 002 OF 002 receives so much international financial support, fails to meet their needs." ¶7. (C) Al Amine shared some concrete ideas to support independent Shia youth in South Lebanon by providing them with internet access, youth clubs or entertainment options, and sport fields. (Note: EmbOffs referred him to USAID's local Office of Transition Inititives and AMIDEAST's Transparency and Accountability grants as potential sources of funding. End Note.) He told us that these would be effective counter-radicalization tools and that "Hizballah absolutely hates the pilot programs that have been started by UNIFIL." When asked why, Al Amine explained that Hizballah targets young, unemployed, and uneducated Shia for recruitment. He told us that in Nabatiyeh, Hizballah goes into villages with a list of target individuals, gives them USD 500, a gun and a sense of self-importance before shipping them off to training camps. Hizballah also prays on the Shia community's feelings of insecurity by telling them to look at the plight of the Shia in Iraq and implying that they could be the next victims of Sunni domination in the region. ¶8. (C) Al Amine also said that the independent Shia feel politically marginalized. "March 14, which is strongly supported by the USG, is largely seen as a non-inclusive group which does not stretch out its hand for dialogue. You, the U.S. Government, are criticized by association. There are a few individuals within March 14 who are the exception to the rule, such as Nassib Lahoud -- but the most powerful leaders, including the Prime Minister, continue to ignore us." ¶9. (C) Al Amine then shared his personal assessment of various March 14 leaders: -- Saad Hariri: Al Amine believes Saad is looking for "followers, not partners." For the independent Shia who have no wish to formally join March 14, this approach is a non-starter. -- Amine Gemayel: We were surprised to hear Al Amine tell us that Gemayel had a strong relationship with the independent Shia. His diplomatic approach is well-received, but the Shia also believe that he has become only a marginally influential figure within March 14. -- Walid Jumblatt: The Shia have a hard time accepting Jumblatt's conversion from a pro-Syrian figure into a key March 14 player. -- Samir Geagea: Al Amine called him the most intelligent of the March 14 leaders. However, he believes that GeaGea's prison sentence permanently isolated him from the Shia community. "He's lost touch." ¶10. (C) AID Mission Director asked why the independent Shia aren't more proactive about developing their relationship with March 14 leaders. Al Amine then placed the relationship into historical context. In April 2005, Al Amine's father, a respected Shia cleric in Sidon, organized a conference of approximately 500 Lebanese independent Shia figures. During the conference, the group issued a political declaration which nicely paralleled March 14 democratic ideals and adopted a concrete work plan to move forward. "Hizballah and Amal were furious with us because we were pulling away some of their Shia support base. However, March 14 then made a deal with Hizballah and Amal in advance of the 2005 parliamentary elections that pulled the rug out from underneath the independent Shia. Moderate Shia still feel burned by those events and ironically, that backroom deal by March 14 only helped to make their enemies stronger." Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Al Amine is a credible interlocutor with tremendous experience on the ground. We agree with his belief that efforts to counter Hizballah's control of the south will require long-term effort and long-term support. End Comment. SISON