LEBANON: INDEPENDENT SHIA FIGURES PROMOTE WAYS TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000608 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM SY LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: INDEPENDENT SHIA FIGURES PROMOTE WAYS TO COUNTER HIZBALLAH -- VIEWS FROM TYRE AND BAALBEK REF: A. BEIRUT 523 ¶B. BEIRUT 601 ¶C. BEIRUT 579 Classified By: CDA Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Sayyed Ali al-Amin, Shia mufti of Tyre, remains highly critical of Hizballah, listing examples of its widespread control over state institutions and the media. He said the best way to counter Hizballah is through empowering moderate Shia clerics and through the provision of basic services, adding that the U.S. must publicize its assistance. He expressed his hesitancy for parliamentary elections, saying that until Lebanese state institutions are strengthened, elections would be pointless. He suggested that the United Nations monitor the March 2008 parliamentary elections, but was highly critical of UNIFIL. ¶2. (C) In a separate meeting, Duraid Yaghi, an independent Shia lawyer from Baalbek in the Bekaa Valley, proposed a multi-faceted approach to countering Hizballah influence, including investing in civil society initiatives and focusing on empowering moderate Shia sheikhs. He also dismissed any value to working with former Hizballah SYG Subhi Tufayli, who is based in the Baalbek area. End summary. USING RELIGIOUS FIGURES TO COUNTER HIZBALLAH -------------- ¶3. (C) The Charge visited Sayyed Ali al-Amin, the Shia mufti of Tyre and the Jebel Aamel district, on May 4 during his weekend visit to Beirut. Amin's son, Sayyed Hassan al-Amin, and Senior LES Political Advisor and PolOff also attended the meeting. Amin, who noted that he has been speaking out since 1987 against Hizballah's weapons and its intentions to build a state within a state, stressed that the moderate Shia voices, or the "silent majority," need to be heard. However, these moderate voices cannot make a difference alone and need more political tools to confront Hizballah, he said. ¶4. (C) He argued that Hizballah cannot be defeated by civilians, but rather, the Shia clergy can play a large role because the Lebanese situation is directly influenced by religious leaders. Today, he continued, the Higher Islamic Shia Council is controlled by Hizballah, as are Lebanon's educational and media institutions, particularly in the south. He lamented that Hizballah uses the resources provided by the government, yet works counter to the state. He added that he does not intend to eliminate Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri's Amal movement or Hizballah, but rather to fold them into the Lebanese state. ¶5. (C) Amin criticized the French for empowering Hizballah, citing in particular France's inclusion of Hizballah in its Celle Saint-Cloud inter-Lebanese meeting in July 2007. The French should have invited independent Shia, he remarked. UN-MONITORED ELECTIONS -------------- ¶6. (C) "The one who fears Hizballah cannot make a change in public opinion," Amin stated. He continued, "I cannot benefit from someone who is afraid." He said he hopes the youth will raise their voice against Hizballah and elect new representatives to the government. He caveated that he opposes lowering the voting eligibility age because he sees youth as more extreme. While he advocates a new electoral law based on proportional representation, Amin stated firmly, "You can have the best electoral law but if the state is weak, it makes no difference." ¶7. (C) He said parliamentary elections should not be held until Lebanon is a strong state and has control over its weapons, finances, and media. Amin noted that Hizballah controls the polling places in the areas in which it dominates. He proposed that when parliamentary elections do occur, the United Nations monitor and supervise them. STATE- AND INSTITUTION-BUILDING -------------- BEIRUT 00000608 002 OF 003 ¶8. (C) The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and other state institutions must be strengthened, Amin argued. Amin said he is concerned about the consequences of the January 27 Beirut riots after which the LAF "lost credibility," in his view, despite what he deemed an appropriate response to the violence. He wondered whether Shia officers in the future would uphold their military duties after having seen officers detained after the January 27 incident. ¶9. (C) Amin warned that Hizballah controls the government to a greater extent than expected, pointing to the ministry of health, in particular. Despite the resignation of Hizballah and Amal ministers from the cabinet, he said they remain influential. (Note: "Resigned" Shia Minister Mohammed Khalifeh heads the Ministry of Health. End note.) Amin added that even the Ministry of Social Affairs was known to provide "billions" of Lebanese pounds to NGOs that ultimately are controlled by Hizballah. He said that he had made this allegation to Social Affairs Minister Nayla Mouawad, who responded by asking Amin to form his own NGO to which she could disburse funds. He has done so, he said. AN IDLE UNIFIL, GOL -------------- ¶10. (C) "UNIFIL troops are now merely tourists in Lebanon," Amin said. He reported that he spoke to a Belgian UNIFIL contingent four months ago about the visible fiber optic network (Ref A) Hizballah has been constructing throughout the country. The Belgian response was reportedly that they had not seen anything. Amin said that the UN is beholden to Hizballah, adding that even UNIFIL Commander Claudio Graziano's interpreter is from Hizballah. Citing further examples, he mentioned that Hizballah provides the UN with lists of people to hire, and also that the UN works through municipalities, which are controlled by Hizballah in its civic action program. "Hizballah knows even what the UNIFIL troops eat!" he exclaimed. ¶11. (C) Amin emphasized that the LAF was also aware of the fiber optic network but stood by as it was built. The fiber optic network, plus the monitoring cameras set up purportedly by Hizballah at Beirut International Airport (Ref B), indicate Hizballah's willingness to establish its own state, Amin submitted. The GOL should apply its laws to the organization, he urged. ¶12. (C) Amin relayed that he pressed Prime Minister Fouad Siniora to hold monthly meetings, even at lower levels if preferred, to discuss Hizballah and Iranian control in Lebanon with independent Shia clergy. While Siniora promised to follow up, no meetings have been held yet. Pulling out a book containing the Lebanese constitution, Amin pointed to Article 44, which states that ten MPs can sign a petition to change the Parliament Speaker. "March 14 should hint they are ready to do this," he proposed. MEDIA SELF-CENSORSHIP -------------- ¶13. (C) Amin provided an example where a police at a checkpoint stopped a cleric for his identification papers in Tyre. The police officer was subsequently beaten by unnamed assailants and the police station broken into. The press was made aware of the incident, yet refrained from reporting on it. Amin advocated support for free press to overcome what he sees as self-censorship based on a fear of Hizballah intimidation. HIZBALLAH TAKING THE CREDIT FOR INTERNATIONAL DONORS -------------- ¶14. (C) Amin asserted that Hizballah frequently takes credit for international and GOL aid. He attributed Hizballah's wide popular support in the south to its provision of services, rather than ideology. He recommended that the U.S. provide its funding more directly to the people through vetted NGOs, adding that people should know the money is coming from the United States. ¶15. Amin reported that he receives people every week asking for services. For example, during the winter, he received many fuel requests for heating homes. They were afraid to speak to him immediately following the war, he noted, but now they are coming in droves. (Note: Amin publicly criticized BEIRUT 00000608 003 OF 003 Hizballah's possession of arms during the July 2006 war. End note.) He invited Embassy officers to visit the social assistance NGO he operates in Tyre. THE VIEW FROM BAALBEK: A MULTI-FACETED STRATEGY NEEDED AGAINST HIZBALLAH -------------- ¶16. (C) On May 2, the Charge and Special Assistant met with Duraid Yaghi, a lawyer from Baalbek in the Bekaa Valley, who traveled to the U.S. as part of a MEPI-funded independent Shia delegation (Ref C). Yaghi, who is also the Vice President of Walid Jumblatt's Progressive Socialist Party, ran unsuccessfully as an MP candidate from Baalbeck in the 2005 parliamentary elections. ¶17. (C) Yaghi told us that the will of the independent Shia in the Bekaa Valley is strong. "We are ready to stand up for ourselves and we are ready to fight for our country." He told us that he had garnered 30,000 votes in his 2005 parliamentary campaign, despite the fact that his financial investment in the campaign was only USD 40,000. By contrast, he said, Hizballah ran a dirty campaign, spent millions of dollars, bussed in illegal immigrants from Syria to vote on election, and gained 50,000 votes. Yaghi thinks his 30,000 "voluntary votes" show that there is a great desire in the Bekaa Valley for change. ¶18. (C) Looking to the future, Yaghi believes that a multi-faceted approach is needed to counter Hizballah influence. Yaghi told us that the investment of small amounts of money in the Bekaa would do wonders. There is a need for community centers that are not controlled by Hizballah, technical training programs for both women and men who need to improve their incomes, and also hashish-replacement programs to help farmers who want to stop growing this crop yet still earn a living. Yaghi thinks these civil society initiatives should also be complemented by efforts in the Shia religious community. He has great faith in the influence of some of the region's younger and moderate sheikhs. He thinks religious schools which teach these moderate religious interpretations of the Koran can have important multiplier effects in the community. ¶19. (C) The Charge praised Yaghi's efforts to bring March 14 and Walid Jumblatt closer, publicly and privately, to the independent Shia in Lebanon. Yaghi admitted that he had helped to arrange some recent well-received meetings but told us that there is much more work to be done withi March 14. "We need our leaders to support us, bu these cash payments they hand out are insulting and millions of dollars often go to the wrong people. A Porsche Cayenne (as a bribe) is not a weapon," he said disdainfully. "We are on the ground, we have roots in the region and long-term relationships. We could help Saad Hariri and March 14 to come up with a more effective approach if they would only listen to us." ¶20. (C) Finally, the Charge asked Yaghi for his opinion of former Hizballah SYG Tufayli, who is also based in the Baalbek area. Yaghi told us that Tufayli does not enjoy the support of the local population in the Bekaa Valley. In Yaghi's opinion, Tufayli is unpredictable and untrustworthy. He reminded the Charge that Tufayli still faces criminal indictments in Lebanon for allegedly killing 18 people in cold blood in 1998. "He is not the answer," Yaghi told us emphatically. SISON