LEBANON: NEW THINK TANK AIMED AT LINKING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000570 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/ELA NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2018 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR IR SY IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: NEW THINK TANK AIMED AT LINKING INDEPENDENT SHIA REF: A. BEIRUT 515 ¶B. BEIRUT 504 ¶C. BEIRUT 488 BEIRUT 00000570 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: CDA Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Prominent Shia attorney (and Hariri lawyer) Mohamad Matar is establishing a new think tank aimed at linking disparate independent Shia groups in Lebanon and securing more political representation in a system in which Hizballah has a monopoly on the Shia representation. Matar believes Hizballah can no longer claim to be a "resistance" after the 2000 Israeli withdrawal, and instead has become a geopolitical arm of Iran and Syria. However, he does not advocate confrontation with Hizballah, but rather the development of a modern state capable of competing with the group in providing services to its citizens. End summary. ¶2. (C) Pol/Econ Chief and Senior LES Political advisor met with Mohamad Matar, a prominent Shia lawyer with strong ties to the Hariri family, on April 22. (Note: Matar is the Hariri lawyer working with UNIIIC on the assassination of former PM Rafiq Hariri. In what was considered an unprecedented move, he was successful in obtaining the dismissal of Elias Eid, the Lebanese judge investigating the assassination, who was in the process of ordering the release of the four generals detained in connection with the case. End note.) LINKING INDEPENDENT SHIA -------------- ¶3. (C) Matar discussed the new "Chatham House"-styled think tank he is heading aimed at linking all of the various independent Shia in Lebanon. The so-called "Lebanese Analytica Matrix" (LAM) will target independent Shia businessmen, academics, civil society, doctors and others who are disenchanted with Hizballah and Amal's tight grip on the Shia community in Lebanon. Independent Shia associations, NGOs, business cooperatives, etc., are mushrooming in the country but lack a mechanism to link them together. Providing this linkage is LAM's primary goal, Matar said, but "the task will be difficult." ¶4. (C) LAM members include people like Mohammad Hussein Shameseddin (journalist),Ibrahim Shameseddin (the head of the Islamic Cultural Center in Beirut, Ref A),Loukman Slim (independent activist, Ref C),Youssef Khalil (Central Bank Director),Mona Fayed (Lebanese University professor),Yousef Zein (son of the founder of al-Irfan, a former weekly magazine for Shia intellectuals),Ahmad Baydoun (historian), Karim Mroueh (a former communist),Jamil Mroueh (publisher of the Daily Star) and his brother Malek (close to March 14 leader Nassib Lahoud). Matar also said MP Yassine Jaber was linked with the group, though Jaber would prefer that his association be kept quiet to avoid accusations that he is pro-March 14. ¶5. (C) Matar said the group also includes some 180 Shiite religious clerics and has strong relations with the Shiite highest spiritual leader in Iraq, Sayyed Ali Sistani. However, he added, the Shia in Lebanon are extremely divided, which makes the work of LAM difficult but not impossible. Hizballah has succeeded in making them afraid and polarized, while at the same time mobilizing their support through provision of services. ¶6. (C) LAM intends to publish articles and position papers on current political developments, Matar said. It will have a twofold approach: a macro one, highlighting the main objectives of the Shia, which are an independent, sovereign, and secular Lebanon; and a micro one, focusing on grassroots issues and linking various Shia groups. Matar said he personally tends to focus on the macro approach (and currently is writing a paper on the concept of state legitimacy, contrasting the idea of a modern nation-state with that of the pan-Islamic "Uma" or Salafi concept of a BEIRUT 00000570 002.2 OF 003 borderless crusade; whereas he described Loukman Slim's work as more micro-oriented. ¶7. (C) LAM is looking at Shia villages to identify ways to support cottage industries, but needs financial assistance to do this, he continued. However, he stressed that LAM is not interested in receiving direct financial assistance from the U.S.; rather, any U.S. assistance should be funneled through independent NGOs. LAM also is considering the relaunching of al-Irfan ("knowledge"),which started in 1909 and contributed to forging a secular trend within the Shia community before it closed down due to lack of financial resources. LOBBYING FOR GREATER POLITICAL REPRESENTATION -------------- ¶8. (C) Admitting that the ultimate aim of the LAM was political, Matar said its membership includes Shia who believe in a secular system who opposed the 2005 quadripartite agreement between the two main dominant Shia parties, Hizballah and Amal, on the one hand, and Hariri and Jumblatt on the other. (End note: Ibrahim Shamseddine falls into this category, Ref A. End note.) Following the 2005 assassination of former PM Rafiq Hariri, these Shia began lobbying March 14 to adopt an electoral law based on proportional representation to open a window for non-Hizballah and non-Amal to be represented in parliament. Matar disclosed that he has been in a continuous struggle with Saad Hariri and Walid Jumblatt to convince them to accept an electoral law based on proportional representation, and asked for U.S. help in that regard. ¶9. (C) Matar stressed the importance of LAM independence from March 14, because he said that although LAM members are opposed to Hizballah, they are definitely not March 14. He criticized March 14's rhetoric about the Shia "culture of death," which he said was not well received in Shia circles. Shia have split personalities, he explained, stemming from the grandsons of the prophet Mohamad, Hassan (who gave up his claim to the caliphate in return for a life of material happiness) and Hussein (who embarked on a suicide mission to secure the caliphate for himself),torn between wanting to be part of the modern world and becoming suicide bombers. March 14 should focus its attacks against Hizballah and Amal specifically rather than lump all Shia together, Matar said. COUNTERING HIZBALLAH'S DOMINANCE -------------- ¶10. (C) Matar, a staunch opponent of Hizballah, described the party as religious fascists who, like Hitler, represent only a minority but are using democratic vehicles to progressively overtake the country. This, he said, is why it is critical not to give the opposition a blocking third in the cabinet and why it is necessary to elect a president before all else. ¶11. (C) Hizballah lost its emblem as a national liberation party after the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, Matar said, and its subsequent military buildup was not "resistance" but an instrument of Iranian and Syrian geo-political objectives. Matar ruled out a possible war in south Lebanon, claiming neither the Lebanese living there nor Hizballah are ready for another conflict with Israel. ¶12. (C) Clearly criticizing Hizballah, Matar stressed that the Shia in Lebanon should see themselves as Lebanese first and that their outlook should be Arab, not Persian. Noting that much of Hizballah's support came from its ability to fill the gap where the Lebanese state failed, he said the first task of LAM will be to conduct a survey on Hizballah's social network to find ways to compete. He said confronting Hizballah is not the appropriate way to challenge its authority; rather, LAM's approach would be do promote the development of a modernized state capable of providing the services that Hizballah was not providing. ¶13. (C) Matar, a staunch opponent of Hizballah, described the party as religious fascists who, like Hitler, represent only a minority but are using democratic vehicles to progressively overtake the country. This, he said, is why it is critical BEIRUT 00000570 003.2 OF 003 not to give the opposition a blocking third in the cabinet and why it is necessary to elect a president before all else. COMMENT -------------- ¶14. (C) Though clearly tied to the Hariri family, Matar's goal is clearly to promote the political clout of independent Shia (and perhaps winning himself a seat in parliament in the process) rather than advance the interests of March 14 (although the two are by no means incompatible). His views on electoral reform confirm this. We find two aspects of LAM attractive: 1) its efforts to link the disparate independent Shia groupings, something that is sorely lacking in Lebanon; and 2) his emphasis on the legitimacy of the state, painting the debate over political reforms in the win-win context of modernization rather than a zero-sum game between March 14 and Hizballah supporters. End comment. SISON