LEBANON: WITH WELCH, JUMBLATT AND COMPANY DISCUSS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000548 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, NEA/IPA, PRM/FO, AND PM/FO NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER TREASURY FOR U/S LEVEY DEPT PASS TO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2018 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR KJUS MASS IR AR SY IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: WITH WELCH, JUMBLATT AND COMPANY DISCUSS POLITICAL OPTIONS BEIRUT 00000548 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: CDA Michele J. Sison for reasons section 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) U.S. support for Lebanon, the April 22 Friends of Lebanon ministerial, the Special Tribunal, concerns about renewed regional conflict, the upcoming U.S. presidential election, and March 14's next steps dominated NEA Assistant Secretary David Welch's discussion with key March 14 leaders at an April 17 dinner hosted by Walid Jumblatt. Welch gave assurances that the U.S. would support whichever decision the majority made to resolve the ongoing political impasse, including the election of a president by simple majority vote. It was clear, however, that his interlocutors remain ambivalent on how to proceed, particularly without the input of their still absent majority leader, Saad Hariri. End summary. ¶2. (C) Druze leader Walid Jumblatt hosted a dinner in honor of visiting NEA A/S David Welch on April 17, which included Telecom Minister Marwan Hamadeh, Social Affairs Minister Nayla Mouawad, Information Minister Ghazi Aridi, Nassib Lahoud, Ghattas Khoury (representing Saad Hariri),and March 14 MPs Wael Abu Four, Henri Helou and Faysel Sayegh. Charge, NEA Staff Assistant, DCM, Pol/Econ Chief, and Senior LES Political Advisor also attended on the U.S. side. HOW THE U.S. CAN HELP -------------- ¶3. (C) Jumblatt praised the joint statement by President Bush and the Pope calling for an independent and sovereign Lebanon. Asked by A/S Welch what else the U.S. could do to support Lebanon, Jumblatt asked for U.S. assistance in procuring used fighter jets and Puma helicopters from the U.A.E. He also urged disbursement of Paris III funds without conditions, adding that it was ridiculous to condition the disbursement on economic reforms such as privatization and administrative reforms when the current political situation precluded such changes and while Hizballah is receiving "tons" of money from its backers. He stressed the GOL needed to receive assistance that does not requirement parliamentary approval, a reference to the difficulties faced in dealing with loan assistance versus grant aid.. Hamadeh noted that the IMF had given Lebanon a favorable review, which could persuade countries to give more money. ¶4. (C) Jumblatt and Lahoud both urged U.S. assistance in pushing the Saudis to follow through with their promised USD 1 billion to support Lebanon's Central Bank reserves. Lahoud warned that, in addition to a political and economic crisis, Lebanon also was facing a social crisis due to the rising prices of food and oil. "We need to ensure some social spending by the GOL," he stressed. A/S Welch agreed, urging March 14 to come up with a platform to address social needs. A/S Welch responded that the U.S. was working on a robust package of military assistance, and agreed future financial assistance should not need GOL action. HELPING THE DISPLACED -------------- ¶5. (C) Mouawad stressed that financial support for persons displaced during Lebanon's 15-year civil war also was needed to close this important chapter of Lebanon's history. This issue was especially urgent for Christians displaced from the Chouf Mountain area (Jumblatt's home turf),in order to strip MichQ Aoun of his Christian support. The Christian vote is up for grabs in 2009, Lahoud warned, while Hamadeh added that March 14 was beginning to win against the Aoun camp and aiding the displaced would help. ¶6. (C) Mouawad, noting that Iran and Qatar had sponsored entire villages in the south, and that Iranian money was now infiltrating the north as well, said the Saudis should provide USD 200 to 300 million to help accelerate the process of reconstructing the Christian villages in the Chouf. Both she and Jumblatt agreed that reconstruction of the Nahr al-Barid Palestinian refugee camp should be carried out in parallel. ¶7. (C) Jumblatt also stressed the importance of developing Tripoli, in north Lebanon, to prevent the expansion of Sunni extremism in that region. Hizballah is spending a lot of money in these Sunni areas, Mouawad noted, but praised Saad Hariri for securing strong Sunni support for the Lebanese Armed Forces during the Nahar al-Barid fighting. CONCERNS ABOUT SPECIAL TRIBUNAL -------------- ¶8. (C) Jumblatt expressed serious concern that the Special Tribunal was not progressing quickly enough, as well as concern about Hizballah and Syria's campaign to release the four generals arrested in 2005 in connection with the Hariri assassination. He strongly criticized Prosecutor General Said Mirza's "incompetence," calling him a weak person unfit for his job. Moreover, he said, the Lebanese judges are weak and do not have the "guts" for confrontation. If one or two of the generals are released, he warned, it will affect the credibility of the tribunal. Jumblatt also was concerned that the Russians might play an unhelpful role in the Security Council. Responding to Hamadeh's comment that the Canadian Ambassador had reassured him about the excellent credentials of UNIIIC Commissioner Bellemare, Jumblatt reacted negatively, saying, "this is what they told us about Brammertz." ¶9. (C) A/S Welch, noting that he would see Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Kuwait, reported on his meeting the week before with Bellemare and noted that the U.S. was in the process of institutionalizing its relationship with UNIIIC to provide better and faster assistance. Furthermore, the U.S. had doubled its contribution to ensure the Tribunal's financial requirements were met, and Congress fully supports the Tribunal as well, he noted. While Bellemare did not discuss in Washington the content of his investigation -- which A/S Welch deemed correct so as not to politicize the Tribunal -- A/S Welch found him "convincing and serious." Extending UNIIIC's mandate was useful because it would prolong Chapter 7 authority, which would "cause Bashar to choke." UNIIIC was conducting a complex investigation and needed time to run its course. FRIENDS OF LEBANON -------------- ¶10. (C) Hamadeh said if the GOL was invited to attend the 4/22 meeting on Lebanon in Kuwait it would help further the legitimacy of the GOL. The French, he claimed, are attempting to find ways to get back on the local scene, arguing that their role should be confined to keeping the Arab League initiative focused on the presidency first, followed by cabinet formation and the electoral law. Hamadeh told this to FM Kouchner and Presidential Advisor Levitte during his recent trip to Paris. Berri's efforts to focus on the electoral law were an attempt to dislocate March 14, Hamadeh said. The Europeans, he contended, will play a greater role after July 1 when France takes over the EU presidency. ¶11. (C) Jumblatt praised Saudi King Abdullah, noting his trong support for March 14, but added that effortsshould be made with Kuwait and the U.A.E., whose level of representation at the Arab League summit in Damascus was "not good," to bring them in line with Saudi Arabian solidarity on Lebanon. Jumblatt recognized "it is a long process but we are determined." However, he deplored that French President Chirac is no longer in power, hinting that the current French administration does not support March 14 as much as the previous administration. SEEKING U.S. APPROVAL FOR SIMPLE MAJORITY ELECTION -------------- ¶12. (C) A/S Welch, noting that the Arab League summit in Damascus was a failure, said the U.S. shared March 14's concerns, adding that it supported the Arab League initiative, beginning with the election of a president.Mouawad asked whether the U.S. would support a preident elected by simple majority. A/S Welch replied that the U.S. would support whatever the majority decided to do, but that it did not appear that March 14 was united on this issue. However, March 14 was the democratic majority, and if it opted to proceed with a simple majority election, the U.S. would be "at the forefront of international support." ¶13. (C) A/S Welch commended March 14 for its efforts to unify and crystallize its program, remarking that what he saw now was a more confident coalition. Aoun was "tanking" and March 14 should help him "tank," he said. Furthermore, now that Lebanon had regained its rightful role vis-a-vis Syria, March 14 should take advantage of the support of the international community to assert its own initiatives. "Don't let others take the initiative," he stressed, adding that the principle of "elect a president now" was a good one. "Don't relinquish the principle that the majority rules." ¶14. (C) Both Jumblatt and Hamadeh stressed that it was necessary to have the Patriarch and consensus candidate Lebanese Armed Forces Commander Michel Sleiman (the presumed president-elect) on board. Hamadeh noted that March 14 had been helped by Michel Murr's recent defection from the Aoun camp. Mouawad, however, again stressed that going forward with the presidential election would require strong support for Lebanon's currency and a "massive" international recognition of the newly elected president. (Note: Despite A/S Welch's assurances that the U.S. would support March 14 should it decide to proceed with a simple majority election, we heard after the dinner that Mouawad and several others were still not satisfied. End note.) ¶15. (C) Lebanon is the "cutting edge of democracy" in the Middle East, A/S Welch said, and the U.S. believes in March 14's cause. But it is easier for the U.S. to support you if you develop a message and platform that earns the people's support; by turning the tables on the opposition in terms of who takes the initiative, you will develop a credible political track. "We move, you move," Jumblatt paraphrased. CONCERNS ABOUT U.S. ELECTION -------------- ¶16. (C) Lahoud commented that both the Democratic and Republican parties should have the same position on Lebanon: supporting Lebanon's democracy, sovereignty and independence. The pro-Syrian opposition was banking on a change in U.S. policy or its commitment to Lebanon, he said. A/S Welch responded that U.S. support for Lebanon was bipartisan, and that its policy would not change with the U.S. presidential election, citing democratic criticism of former President Carter's meetings with Hamas and Syrian officials. Iran, Iraq, the Palestinian question and Lebanon are the top U.S. foreign policy priorities, he said, and this is unlikely to change. He dismissed suggestions that the U.S. would negotiate a Syrian track with Israel that would compromise Lebanon. The U.S. is by far the greatest defender of security and freedom in the Middle East, he reminded his hosts. CONCERNS ABOUT REGIONAL WAR -------------- ¶17. (C) Responding to concerns about a new conflict with Israel, especially in anticipation of Hizballah retaliation for the February 12 assassination of Imad Mugniyeh, A/S Welch said he did not believe the Israelis intended to start something in Lebanon, although they probably would respond if provoked. Israeli overflights were intended to ensure that Hizballah did not attempt something, he said. Jumblatt suggested that the German border project along the northern Syrian border could be expanded, if it were functioning, but unfortunately the various security forces were not coordinating well. Khoury noted that smugglers were able to enter Lebanon via normal routes, paying off border officials to bring their goods in. ¶18. (C) Mouawad lamented the fact that the Europeans were being "held hostage" by their UNIFIL presence in south Lebanon, and that UNIFIL was ineffective in preventing Hizballah from carrying on its activities. We are facing a state within a state, Lahoud agreed. WAITING FOR SAAD -------------- ¶19. Jumblatt and others were critical of Saad Hariri's long absence, blaming him for March 14's lack of progress on developing unified positions, especially on whether to proceed with the presidential election. ¶20. (U) A/S Welch has not had the opportunity to clear this cable. SISON