LEBANON: DEJECTED PATRIARCH REVEALS UNHAPPINESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000048 SIPDIS SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT) DEPARTMENT FOR NEA FRONT OFFICE AND NEA/ELA; NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2028 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM LE SY SUBJECT: LEBANON: DEJECTED PATRIARCH REVEALS UNHAPPINESS ABOUT AOUN BEIRUT 00000048 001.5 OF 003 Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) During the Ambassador's 1/11 farewell call in Bkirke, Maronite Patriarch Sfeir was uncharacteristically open about his distaste for Michel Aoun, describing Aoun's behavior and statements as shameful and harmful. He gave lukewarm endorsement of Michel Sleiman's candidacy as president, while emphasizing that a constitutional amendment was a necessary precondition to Sleiman's election. Sfeir was vague on how much power the Siniora cabinet should exercise during the presidential vacuum. Asked what the international community can do to support Lebanon, Sfeir -- unusually -- advocated an acceleration of the Special Tribunal, stating that only the tribunal might thwart Syria's plans to reassert total control over Lebanon. End summary. AOUN IS A PROBLEM -------------- ¶2. (C) On 1/11, the Ambassador paid a farewell call on Maronite Patriarch Sfeir. After the exchange of the expected farewell pleasantries of varying sincerity, Sfeir complained that MP Michel Aoun (who only the previous day had publicly described Sfeir as "a citizen like any other") was making it harder, not easier, to fill Lebanon's presidential vacuum. In a "how-dare-he" tone of voice, Sfeir -- usually reticent on such matters -- said that he found Aoun's behavior inexplicable for someone claiming to act in Lebanese and Christian interests. Aoun is so blinded by ambition that he fails to recognize that he is weakening the Christian role in Lebanon and the presidency he claims to defend, Sfeir complained. "It is a shame" that Aoun has come to symbolize the political power of the Maronites to so many people. Hizballah is nothing but an Iranian and Syrian tool, and Aoun has allowed himself to be used by them. LUKEWARM SUPPORT FOR SLEIMAN -------------- ¶3. (C) The Ambassador asked Sfeir his views of LAF Commander Michel Sleiman, given that Sfeir has often said that he did not believe it wise to have another military man as president. Saying (albeit with no visible enthusiasm) that "they say" Sleiman "is a "good man," Sfeir chided the Ambassador that, in fact, he had said as early as August, from his summer residence in Diman, that, if the only way to save Lebanon and save the presidency was through a military man,then that was fine. Sfeir expressed pessimism, however, that Sleiman would be elected any time soon for "they (presumably March 8 leaders, not the ame "they" who see Sleiman as a good man) are asing too much" as the price to elect him. The Amassador asked Sfeir what his perception was of Sleiman's ties to Syria. "They say" that the Syrians no longer trust him, Sleiman said, shrugging. "et us hope" that he can be elected soon, and that, once elected, "he can manage." CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT ESSENTIAL -------------- ¶4. (C) Noting the Arab League communique and Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa's current diplomacy in Beirut, SIPDIS the Ambassador asked Sfeir's view of the constitutional requirements for Sleiman to be elected. Sfeir insisted that a constitutional amendment, via the cabinet, is essential. He expressed impatience with the March 8 view that the cabinet can be bypassed for electoral expediency. The constitution is clear that the commander cannot become president unless he resigned two years before taking office. Thus, Nabih Berri and Syria are "playing games" in trying to reject a formal constitutional amendment. If the constitution can be ignored now, who will prevent it from being ignored again, and again? And what will happen to the Christians in such a situation, Sfeir asked. UNCLEAR ON HOW FAR THE CABINET SHOULD GO IN GOVERNING ALONE -------------- ¶5. (C) The Ambassador noted the debate within March 14 and BEIRUT 00000048 002.5 OF 003 the GOL about how aggressive the Siniora cabinet should be in governing, now that presidential powers have shifted par interim to the cabinet. With Lahoud's vetoes now gone, what guidance would the Patriarch give regarding what kind of decisions the cabinet should take? The Patriarch said that the cabinet should be "neutral." While it would have to do more than a caretaker (or resigned) cabinet would do, it should not take "political" decisions. Political decisions would make it too easy to forget that there is a presidential vacuum, and the ubiquitous "they" (clearly meaning March 8 this time) might react. ¶6. (C) The Ambassador asked whether the Patriarch would advise the Siniora cabinet to replace assassinated Minister Pierre Gemayel or not. Shrugging, the Patriarch said that it would be better to concentrate on electing the president. Yes, the Ambassador said, but it might take a long time thereafter to get a cabinet formed. Wouldn't it be better to strengthen the Christian component of the Siniora cabinet, which may in fact be in power -- either before the presidential elections or, in caretaker status, thereafter -- for a long time? Maybe it would be best to find a "neutral" minister, Sfeir mused. GET THE TRIBUNAL UP AND RUNNING -------------- ¶7. (C) The Ambassador asked the Patriarch where, besides promoting international efforts, he thought international efforts should focus now regarding Lebanon. Sfeir said that it is obvious that Syria wants to control Lebanon again. The Syrians "aren't listening" to the international community and the Lebanese themselves, regarding Lebanese democracy and independence. Thus, the Patriarch suggested accelerating the start of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. That may be the only way to get the Syrians to back down, the Patriarch said. The tribunal is coming together "too slowly." The Ambassador briefed the Patriarch on Lebanon's essential role in getting the tribunal up and running, with the need for the GOL to play a leading fundraising role and to drop special compensatory schemes for judges. The Patriarch responded that he hoped the tribunal would be functional "soon," and he expressed dismay by reports from the Netherlands that the tribunal quarters would not be ready until 2009, "too late to help us." (Note: This indicated a shift in position. In previous meetings, the Patriarch has implied that he thought the tribunal was a rash adventure, likely to harm Lebanon rather than protect it. End note.) COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) Despite some attempts at humor at Michel Aoun's expense, the Patriarch came across as dejected, embittered, confused, and even more indecisive than usual. Ever since being humiliated by the ill-fated French initiative (by which he gave names, none of which are currently under active consideration for the presidency),the Patriarch has increasingly appeared to be a marginal player in the political battle to fill the highest Maronite political office. In addition, to an unfortunate measure, Aoun, who (as his followers' 1989 physical attack on Sfeir demonstrates) has never tolerated Sfeir's separate Maronite identity, has succeeded in belittling and sidelining Bkirke. ¶9. (C) There are persistent rumors that the Vatican is sufficiently unhappy with Sfeir's performance to use his advanced age (88 years old) to force him into retirement once the presidential vacuum is filled. While Papal Nuncio Gatti does not disguise his loathing for Sfeir, we suspect that these rumors of a pending Pontifical pink slip are less based in fact and more rooted in the Aounist-Hizballah attempt to discredit Sfeir. At some point, of course, the basic laws of nature dictate that there will be a term limit to Sfeir's tenure and thus a vacancy at Bkirke. And the candidates for that seat -- drawn from the Maronite bishops -- are nearly as divided between March 14 and March 8 as Lebanon's political class. The selection of a new Patriarch will be shrouded in more mystery than the unseemly presidential sweepstakes, but both the complications and the implications are similar. ¶10. (C) Nonagenarian former minister Fouad Boutros (who is Greek Orthodox and known for his unrelenting pessimism),in a BEIRUT 00000048 003.5 OF 003 1/11 meeting with the Ambassador, shook his head sadly when thinking about the Maronites and their current political and religious leaders: the Maronites deserve "90 percent of the credit" for Lebanon's creation, Boutros claimed. Now they deserve "90 percent of the blame" for allowing Syria and Hizballah "to liquidate Lebanon." FELTMAN