LEBANON: DEFMIN MURR ON TRANSFORMING THE LAF TO SUPPORT CT OPERATIONS, UNSCR 1701, CAMPS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIRUT 000459



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TAGS: MASS, MCAP, PTER, PARM, PINR, KPAL, SY, IS, LE

SUBJECT: LEBANON: DEFMIN MURR ON TRANSFORMING THE LAF TO

SUPPORT CT OPERATIONS, UNSCR 1701, CAMPS



BEIRUT 00000459 001.9 OF 005





Classified By: Charge D'Affaires a.i. Michele J. Sison

for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).



SUMMARY

--------------



1. (S) In April 1 meetings with ASD Vickers and SOCCENT

Commander Mulholland, MinDef Murr outlined his vision for

transformation of the Lebanese Army to a more Special

Operations-capable force equipped with a Close Air SUPPORT

capability such as attack helicopters. In a new development,

Murr explained how he saw UNCSR 1701 as a tool that could be

applied to the Palestinian refugee camps to help address the

problem of terrorism, especially in the Ain Al Hilweh camp.

LAF Commander Michel Sleiman told us how he plans to create a

Lebanese Special Operations Command and how he wants to

assign commanders to this unit after Presidential elections.

LAF G-2 Intelligence Chief Khoury thanked the delegation for

the training assistance that the Military Liaison Element

(MLE) provided to the G-2 Strike Force during Nahr Al Bared

conflict. Both Murr and Khoury stressed the importance of the

U-2 IMAGERY that has been provided to SUPPORT counter

terrorism operations in the Lebanon. End Summary.



2. (S) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations,

Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities

(SOLICIC) Michael Vickers, SOCCENT Commanding General Major

General Michael Mulholland, Charge Sison, Defense Attache and

ODC Chief met with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of

Defense Elias Murr, Lebanese Army Commander General Michel

Sleiman and Lebanese Army G-2 Brigadier General Georges

Khoury. The atmosphere of all the meetings was welcoming and

appreciative of USG support. General Sleiman hosted the

delegation for a lunch at the Yarze Officers Club (septel),

an honor that he reserves for his most important guests.



NAHR AL BARED WAS DIFFICULT FOR US

WE KNOW THAT WE MUST TRANSFORM THE ARMY

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3. (S) Murr opened the meeting by recalling the difficulties

that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) had faced during the

Nahr Al Bared (NAB) campaign in the summer of 2007. The LAF

lost a total of 176 service members as a result of the

fighting. (Note. At the end of NAB, the LAF had 168 KIA.

Since that time, and additional six soldiers have died of

their wounds. The two Red Cross workers who were killed at

NAB are now counted in LAF casualties. End Note.) Murr

explained that the LAF had a hard time because of the narrow

streets in the camp and the lack of equipment and ammunition

for the LAF. Murr also noted that the LAF force structure and

training did not meet national requirements.



4. (S) Murr said that the LAF had learned many lessons from

NAB. At the strategic level, Murr said it was apparent that

the army needed to shift its training and equipping focus to

support more counter-terrorism operations. Murr was firm when

he said, "we don't need this heavy army that was trained and

equipped by the U.S. in 1983. Things have changed since 9/11

and we need to rely more on special forces and fewer heavy

brigades. We need light and medium weapons and attack

helicopters to back up the grond troops." Murr surmises

that he needs 10-15,000 Special Forces troops organized in

10-15 Special Forces regiments supported by 20-25,000

conventional troops. He thinks that the army's current end

strength of 60,000 is too large for the missions assigned.



THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS: FULL OF TERRORISTS

NO RESPITE FROM TERROR FOR AT LEAST 10 YEARS

--------------



5. (S) The primary purpose of this transformed army would be

to address terrorist threats inside Lebanon. Murr told us

that Syria is still assisting the terrorists that are present

in all thirteen of the Palestinian camps. According to Murr,

other Arab nations are using the camps in Lebanon as a

dumping ground for their "dirty people." One of the more

interesting details about NAB was that of the 30 Fatah Al

Islam members that were killed and another 30 that were

captured, none of them were in U.S., European, or Arab



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intelligence services' databases.



6. (S) "If you look at Ain Al Hilweh, we face another Nahr

Al Bared at anytime. We have to be trained and ready."

According to Murr's information, Ain Al Hilweh (AAH) is

becoming another NAB, but much, much worse. If a fight

breaks out in AAH tomorrow, Murr will have to deploy 100% of

his Special Forces (SF) units. This will leave him with no

reserve to address any other issues that may arise. If two

camps erupt simultaneously, the LAF will not be able to

contain either camp. For this reason, Murr wants to move

quickly to transform the LAF to a special forces-centric army.



REBALANCING THE ARMY WILL CAUSE RESISTANCE

HEAVY BRIGADES SHOULD BE PLACED ON THE BORDERS

-------------- -



7. (S) Murr expects resistance from the LAF Brigade

Commanders for any transformation that reduces the number of

brigade commands. (Comment. Brigade command is the gateway to

command of the LAF. A reduction in the number of brigade

commands would force earlier decisions on the future

leadership of the LAF. End Comment.) Murr wants to only

retain the five heavy brigades and place them on the borders.

The remaining six brigades, and the five intervention

regiments, would be disbanded and those personnel billets

would be used as billpayers for the new SF Regiments. Citing

a 1991 law that his father sponsored while MinDef, Murr said

that the establishment of new Special Forces units does not

require approval from Parliament or the Cabinet.



WE CAN GET PEOPLE TO SIGN UP

CHRISTIAN NUMBERS IN LAF WOULD INCREASE

--------------



8. (S) In a somewhat odd exchange, Murr explained that he

wanted to increase the number of Christians in the army by

recruiting them for SF units. Citing their reliability,

trustworthiness and eagerness to apply for SF, Murr (a Greek

Orthodox) told us that Christians are ideal for the mission.

Noticing some inquisitive looks from his guests, Murr moved

to explain why he needs to focus on recruiting Christians.

According to Murr, Christians will not enlist to be regular

infantrymen who are deployed in the south and on the borders

as this places them too far away from their families who

predominantly live near Beirut. More importantly, according

to Murr, Lebanese law requires that the Army be 50% Christian

and 50% Muslim. There is much room for the Christian

population in the Army to grow.



9. (S) According to Murr, the LAF staged a mock recruitment

drive during NAB to see how many would answer the call for SF

duty. Over 27,000 applied for duty in Nahr Al Bared. During

a recent recruiting drive, there was a call for 5,000 troops;

50,000 men appeared for review. Of these 50,000, 45,000 were

only interested in SF duty. There were over 8,600 Christians

from Mount Lebanon, a Christian area, who showed up to enlist

in SF. According to Murr, "when you want to fight terrorists,

you are fighting Sunni and Shia; you need Christians in

special forces to do this mission. If you maximize

Christians, you will have the best results."



SHIA NO LONGER A THREAT IN THE ARMY

THEY ARE NOW DOWN TO 25% OF TOTAL FORCE

--------------



10. (S) Murr told us that his recruitment efforts over the

last two years have netted 20,000 new troops for the Army at

the same time that many draftees have been leaving the army.

When this process began, the Shia accounted for 58% of the

enlisted force; now they comprise 25% of the enlisted ranks.

At the same time, Murr has been able to bring the Christians

to 25% and the Sunni/Druze component to 50% of the enlisted

ranks. Murr assesses that the Shia no longer "pose a threat"

to the LAF, even if Nasrallah were to call on them to leave

the army.



11. (S) Regarding the Sunni troops in the Army, Murr

described them as "very loyal." Most of the Sunni troops in

the Army come from the economically depressed region of Akkar



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in northern Lebanon. Every one that joins the Army from the

north usually has an extensive network of family members who

are also in the Army. As for the Shia, Murr said, "they come

to the Army for a salary and to eat. Christians come with a

sense of community service; this is why the elites want to

serve in Special Forces. You won't hear this from the Army,

but it is their reality."



FORMATION OF THE LEBANESE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

-------------- --------------



12. (S) Murr intends to place all of these special forces

under a single command structure that will be known as the

Lebanese Special Operations Command (LSOC). The units that

will comprise this command are the Marine Commando Regiment,

the Ranger Regiment, the Air Assault Regiment and the

Mountain Battalion that is being trained and equipped by the

French. (Comment. Army Commander Sleiman also has this same

formulation in mind for units that will be assigned to the

LSOC. At some point, Murr thinks that this command will need

to absorb the intelligence gathering capability that the LAF

G-2 has in the form of its counter-espionage "Mukafaha"

regiment. The Army Commander does not share this view. End

Comment.)



INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR NEW SPECIAL FORCES UNITS;

POSSIBLE APPLICATION OF UNSCR 1701 IN CAMPS

-------------- --------------



13. (S/REL GBR) Murr stated that continued close intelligence

cooperation between the United States and the LAF was

imperative in the near and long term. The recent IMAGERY that

is being provided to the LAF gives them a capability they did

not have; in fact, "we used to be blind," said Murr. Murr

explained that there are very stringent military laws

governing the protection of this information. In the event

that a soldier was found giving away this information, he

would be tried in a court martial and be subject to capital

punishment if convicted. Murr, himself a lawyer and former

Minister of Interior, carefully scrutinized how this IMAGERY

was used in NAB to ensure that international law was observed

and that no illegal actions were taken by soldiers. Murr

cited the evacuation of the civilians from NAB at multiple

stages of the battle as examples of GoL restraint on the use

of military force. (Comment. We noticed that the LAF was

responsive to its civilian leadership during the NAB conflict

and that its actions conformed to international standards,

the Geneva Conventions and the Law of Land Warfare. End

Comment.) As for the current IMAGERY we are sharing with the

LAF, Murr told us that he continues to apply these same

standards when assessing the lawful use of this imagery. As

for any future counter-terrorism action in the camps, Murr

affirmed that the IMAGERY would only be used for lawful

purposes. Murr said, "we will evacuate all civilians even if

we have to wait three months before we begin operations."



14. (S) Murr told us that the Ain Al Hilweh camp is the

largest conglomeration of different terrorist groups in the

Middle East. Ain Al Hilweh has secular and religious

extremists and also plays host to German and French

terrorists. Since the United Nations will not go into the

camps, Murr feels that the Government of Lebanon is obliged

to continue stoking inter-Palestinian conflicts to keep all

of the various groups on unsure footing. Citing UNSCR 1701

as an authorizing document for taking action inside the

Palestinian camps, Murr plans on sending in his SF units into

capture terrorists in the camps.



ARMY COMMANDER SUPPORTIVE OF LSOC,

WANTS TO WAIT FOR NEW PRESIDENT

--------------



15. (S) During our meeting with the Army Commander, Sleiman

told us that he supports the formation of the LSOC even

though the command consists of only one officer at this time:

Colonel Charbel Feghali. Sleiman's vision of the LSOC is

that the Regiments receive new commanders after there is a

new Lebanese President. This is in part due to the number of

officer promotions that will follow the installation of the

new president. Note. There have been no promotions in the LAF



BEIRUT 00000459 004.2 OF 005





for almost four years now. Former President Lahoud refused to

sign any promotion orders during his last three years in

office. End Note.



16. (S) Sleiman expects that the next Army Commander will

come from the 1975, 1976 or 1977 cohort of officers. He

expects the next set of Brigade Commanders to come from the

1980 cohort. Thus, all of his Special Forces Regimental

Commanders will be from junior cohorts, most likely 1985 or

later. Sleiman wants "young men with energy to be the

commanders of these special units."



17. (S) Sleiman envisions the LSOC being "almost equivalent"

to the army command. When pressed, he said that he wants the

LSOC to be an independent service, like the Lebanese Navy and

Lebanese Air Force, but that it would still be subordinate to

the Army as is the Navy and the Air Force. Sleiman has no

intention of placing the LAF G-2 Strike Force or the Mukafaka

Counter-Espionage Regiment in the LSOC. Sleiman is amenable

to the formation of another Tier One type force for the LSOC

that has similar capabilities as the LAF G-2 Strike Force.



NAHR AL BARED WAS DIFFICULT,

THE OTHER CAMPS ARE STILL A THREAT

--------------



18. (S) Sleiman thanked us for USG assistance during NAB. He

also recounted the number of soldiers lost and the amount of

ammunition expended. Sleiman feels that the soldiers could

have fired less ammunition, but their expenditure rates are

directly tied to the lack of marksmanship training over the

years. (Comment. Most LAF soldiers fire between seven and ten

bullets a year for training. End Comment.) Sleiman said that

he receives significant pressure from various human rights

groups about excessive force. Sleiman told us how the LAF

stopped at multiple stages in the battle and asked the Fatah

Al Islam members to surrender; when they would not surrender,

the LAF went after them.



19. (S) Sleiman says that the LAF learned many lessons in

NAB. The first lesson was that the camps are part of a

"criminal network" that is responsible for bombings

throughout Lebanon. In the case of NAB, the Army was called

in to arrest these criminals. The second lesson was that the

LAF has no idea what is in the other camps and they must be

prepared to pursue the criminals in those camps too. "We need

a solution; we need to be ready to defend ourselves and the

Lebanese citizens from these criminals," said Sleiman. The

Ain Al Hilweh camp is especially problematic for Sleiman as

the people from the neighboring city of Sidon are quite

sympathetic to the residents of Ain Al Hilweh. This is the

opposite of the situation in NAB in the summer of 2007 where

the local population was not supportive of the Palestinians.



LAF G-2 ON INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION

"WE ARE PARTNERS WITH YOU IN WAR ON TERROR"

--------------



20. (S/NF) Khoury opened our meeting with him by thanking ASD

Vickers for the continuous SUPPORT of Lebanese institutions,

both in terms of equipment and intelligence assistance. From

his own vantage point Khoury told us that this intelligence

cooperation has allowed the LAF to be more effective in its

counter-terrorism actions and thus help the state. Khoury

assesses that the LAF is the only force capable of

effectively dealing with terrorism. "With your support," said

Khoury, "we will be the only military force in Lebanon and

there will be no militias," a clear reference to Hizballah.



21. (S) Khoury told us that the terrorist threat inside the

camps is real and expanding. Citing his agency's 57-year

history of collecting intelligence files on the camps, Khoury

feels that his organization is in the best position to

conduct counter-terrorism operations in Lebanon. Even though

the fight in Nahr Al Bared is finished, Khoury assesses that

there is still a large number of groups coming through Syria

to Lebanon that are sympathetic to terrorism; these groups

are living in the Palestinian camps. Khoury sees a strategic

relationship that stretches from Pakistan to Morocco that

ties these groups together. Khoury thinks that Al Qaeda is



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looking to SUPPORT operations out of the Palestinian Camps.

Khoury is ready to receive any training and equipment that

the USG is able to provide so that he can, "fight terrorism

for the benefit of the world."

SISON