LEBANON: MARCH 14 BRACING ITSELF FOR POST ARAB

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000437 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, PRM/FO, AND PM/FO NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER TREASURY FOR U/S LEVEY DEPT PASS TO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM PINR PREF MASS SY IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: MARCH 14 BRACING ITSELF FOR POST ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT REF: A. BEIRUT 392 ¶B. BEIRUT 436 BEIRUT 00000437 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: CDA Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) The March 14 General Secretariat, still glowing from its successful convention on March 14, is striving to maintain the momentum and gear up for taking tough political decisions in what it views as turbulent times ahead. Although March 14 leaders have not yet reached consensus on whether to expand the current cabinet or proceed with a simple majority election for Michel Sleiman, it appears that they agree that the status quo is not acceptable. Moreover, the Secretariat echoed concerns expressed by other March 14 contacts of more violence following the Arab League summit and upcoming REPORT on the Special Tribunal. End summary. ¶2. (C) March 14 Secretary General Fares Suaid and his wife Zeina, along with Secretariat members MP Samir Franjieh and Phalange advisor Michel Mecattaf, hosted a lunch for Charge Sison, Pol/Econ Chief, and Senior LES Political Advisor on March 26. NEXT STEPS -------------- ¶3. (C) The current situation is leading to the erosion of the Siniora government, and PM Siniora himself is tired, Suaid said. Regardless of the outcome of the Arab League summit, March 14 now needed to take the initiative and paint the opposition as spoilers. Berri's proposal to relaunch a National Dialogue was merely an attempt to stop March 14 from moving forward; the problem was not, as Berri tried to portray it, cabinet formation or the electoral law, but a larger battle over what kind of Lebanon people wanted. The opposition's stalling tactics were aimed at maintaining the status quo while waiting for the U.S. to go into an "electoral trance" and forget about Lebanon. ¶4. (C) The Biel Convention had launched March 14's entry into the international community, and now it was indispensable for the coalition to take decisive political action. Mecattaf said that the Convention had rallied March 14 supporters, and reinforced March 14 as an important date for the "second" independence of Lebanon. The February 14 rally and the March 14 Convention translated into political action, resulting in more than 1,000 requests for participation in the various follow-up workshops, including members of the Syrian opposition. ¶5. (C) March 14 was following up with a statement by one of its MPs sequestered at the Lahoya hotel later that day protesting the ongoing closure of parliament. Suaid himself would hold a March 27 press conference incriminating Syria in the political assassinations in Lebanon and outlining the linkage between progress in the Special Tribunal and the cycles of violence in Lebanon. On March 29, the opening date of the Arab League summit in Damascus, March 14 supporters would gather in Martyrs' Square beneath an enormous picture of all those assassinated and the names of the civilians killed with them, while other supporters in Washington, Paris, Brussels, and other capitals would protest in front of Syrian embassies. The next key date was April 13, the anniversary of the beginning of the 1975-1990 civil war, followed by the April 26 third anniversary of the withdrawal of Syrian troops. March 14 would use these dates to highlight progress in the workshops. ¶6. (C) The opposition was now in reactive mode, as demonstrated by Nasrallah's March 23 speech, which was ideological rather than political in nature, Mecattaf observed. The normally black-clad youth supporters were dressed in multicolored outfits, expressing their rejection of Hizballah's "culture of death." The opposition also now was trying to organize itself (Hizballah, Amal, Aoun, and other opposition leaders such as former PM Omar Karami and Marada leader Suleiman Franjieh),with its own convention and BEIRUT 00000437 002.2 OF 003 common political paper. TO ELECT OR EXPAND? -------------- ¶7. (C) March 14's real challenge is to govern the country, Suaid said. The decision was whether it is better to elect a president or reinforce the cabinet, and March 14 leaders were divided on this issue. Suaid noted that majority leader Saad Hariri's prolonged absence abroad was upsetting other March 14 leaders, especially Druze leader Walid Jumblatt. "When the Saudis asked their citizens to leave, Saad left, too," Suaid joked. (Note: We heard this joke a second time later in the day from another contact and it has now appeared in the press. End note.) ¶8. (C) March 14 Christians preferred to keep the Siniora government and replace the two Christian ministers (assassinated Industry Minister Pierre Gemayel and resigned Environment Minister Yaacoub Sarraf). However, the Patriarch was not yet on board based on fears that this would undermine the Christian presidency by prolonging the vacuum. However, the Patriarch probably would accept a "fait accompli" expansion, all agreed. ¶9. (C) Meanwhile, March 14 would also begin preparations for an election. Suaid said it was time to put Michel Sleiman's feet to the fire to see whether he would accept being elected by a simple majority vote. Mecattaf said Sleiman was moving in this direction, although much convincing still needed to be done. ¶10. (C) March 14 also intends to continue its international diplomacy efforts, especially with European countries that contribute to UNIFIL, and the Arab world. Franjieh noted that Lebanon's relationship with and role in the Arab regional order had become an "idee fixe" among intellectual circles. The U.S. could help by increasing its own pressure on Syria and encouraging the Saudis and Egyptians to do the same. The U.S. also could help by speeding up the Special Tribunal, which Suaid dubbed the "oxygen of this battle." BRACING FOR VIOLENCE POST ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT -------------- ¶11. (C) The Secretariat members viewed Nasrallah's March 23 speech and Berri's call for a new National Dialogue as attempts to calm "panic" in the Shia community, which has been bracing itself for another conflict with Israel. One member noted that the Lebanese postal service, which normally delivered approximately 300 passports a day to residences in southern Lebanon as a whole, now was delivering 300 per day to individual municipalities. Mecattaf noted that Hizballah was upset with March 14's accusation that, because of its allegiance to Iran, it does not belong to the Arab world. Franjieh noted that two days earlier Berri had assured his followers there would be no war, while at the same time warning about a massive Israeli military maneuver on April 6. ¶12. (C) All agreed that the prevailing calm would end following the March 29-20 Arab League summit in Damascus and UNIIIC Commissioner Bellemare's upcoming REPORT to the UN Security Council. They feared assassinations against March 14 leaders, UNIFIL, diplomats, as well as judges who are potential choices for the Special Tribunal. Another possibility was that, now that the Special Tribunal is a fact, Syria would attempt to eliminate potential witnesses, such as Suleiman Franjieh, Interior Minister at the time of Rafiq Hariri's assassination, who reportedly was taking additional security precautions. March 14 needed to be ready to respond to new violence, whether in the form of new actions in the south or assassinations. COMMENT -------------- ¶13. (C) The Patriarch isn't the only one uncomfortable with cabinet expansion. PM Siniora also is wary of the optics of a Sunni-led government prolonging its assumption of BEIRUT 00000437 003.2 OF 003 presidential powers, and probably will be especially reluctant to take any action during the Patriarch's upcoming travel to South Africa and the U.S. PM Siniora also is wary of having Lebanon's domestic dirty laundry aired publicly, as he strives to represent the country as a whole rather than only the March 14 faction (Ref B). While both Siniora and the March 14 coalition that made him prime minister both appear to share this goal, it appears March 14 partisan approach is slightly at odds with Siniora's attempts to remain (at least in the eyes of the Arab world) above petty party politics. End comment. SISON