LEBANON: GOL NEXT STEPS AFTER DECISION TO BOYCOTT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000436 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, PRM/FO, AND PM/FO NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER TREASURY FOR U/S LEVEY DEPT PASS TO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM PINR PREF MASS SY IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: GOL NEXT STEPS AFTER DECISION TO BOYCOTT ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT BEIRUT 00000436 001.4 OF 003 Classified By: CDA Michele J. Sison for reasons Section 1.4 (b) and (d) . SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) According to his top advisor, PM Siniora is striving to win his government Arab recognition that it represents the country as a whole, rather than only the March 14 faction, and that the ongoing political crisis is a result of Syrian interference rather than internal factional disputes. The Arab League initiative failed because it mutated into a mediation between March 14 and March 8 rather than sticking to its original principles. March 14 itself was feeding the image of a factionalized country by sending its own messages to the Arab League, rather than leaving it to the GOL to play this role. Support for U.N. control of Sheba'a Farms and speedier progress for the Special Tribunal are two ways the U.S. could give strong support to the Siniora government, Senior Advisor Mohamad Chatah emphasized. Although anticipated Hizballah revenge for the assassination of Imad Mougnieh had resulted in well-founded security concerns, the biggest challenge for the Siniora government was to "neutralize" the risk of Israel launching preemptive strike against Hizballah. End summary. SINIORA GOVERNMENT STRIVING TO HOLD ITS OWN IN ARAB WORLD -------------- ¶2. (C) Charge Sison, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, met with Mohamad Chatah, Senior Advisor to PM Fouad Siniora, at his office in the Grand Serail on March 27. Chatah previewed the PM's March 28 address, timed to make the 8 p.m. evening news on the eve of the Arab League Summit in Damascus and advanced copies of which he would send to Arab capitals. The statement would highlight two main points. First, Lebanon chose not to participate in the summit for two related reasons: 1) to reject the state of affairs in Lebanon, i.e.., the presidential vacuum and ongoing political stalemate. The Lebanese President should sit in Lebanon's chair and no one else, Chatah stressed; 2) to express displeasure with Syrian interference in Lebanon that has led to the current crisis. ¶3. (C) Second, Chatah continued, Siniora would stress that the crisis was not the result of a conflict between Lebanese factions, as Syria claimed (in an attempt, Chatah explained, to exonerate itself from accusations of interfering),but really a question of Lebanon's relationship with Syria. Although Siniora would not go so far as to criticize the Arab League directly, Chatah said the major problem with the Arab League initiative was that it had mutated from three basic principles (the presidency, cabinet formation, and electoral law) to a mediation that, by delving too deeply into details, lost touch with the original principles. ¶4. (C) The Arab League should not be playing the role of mediator between Lebanese factions, Chatah argued, especially since Arab League members themselves are divided over Lebanon. Furthermore, by assuming this role, the Arab League was treating the majority and opposition as equal players, to the extent that the GOL representative at Arab League meetings (i.e., Acting FM Tareq Mitri at the March 5-6 Cairo meeting) were treated as a representative of one faction, rather than Lebanon's envoy. PM Siniora, Chatah said, has credibility in the Arab world and it is now time to "cash in." ¶5. (C) Chatah also dismissed Speaker Nabih Berri's proposal to relaunch a National Dialogue as an attempt to bypass parliament. Lebanon already has an institutional framework to discuss political issues, he said, and doesn't need a separate forum for discussion with Berri at the wheel. ¶6. (C) Noting that the March 14 Secretariat planned to hold a press conference within the hour in which in would accuse Syria of being behind the political assassinations in Lebanon, Chatah said such assertions were viewed by Arab League members as partisan, whereas the Siniora government BEIRUT 00000436 002.2 OF 003 was trying to present itself as representing the entire country. He therefore argued that March 14 should not send a memo to the Arab League prior to the summit (as it did before the Cairo meeting via a delegation of four MPs). March 14 should be a political group that supports the GOL, Chatah said, and not the other way around. (Note: March 14 Secretary General Fares Suaid announced during the press SIPDIS conference that March 14 would deliver an accusatory memorandum against Syria to the summit. End note.) ...WHILE AT THE SAME TIME KEEPING LEBANON OUT OF REGIONAL ALLIANCES -------------- ¶7. (C) In response to the Charge's inquiry as to how the U.S. could provide further support to the Siniora government, Chatah said it was best for the U.S. not to be in the forefront for the time being. At the same time, the U.S. should not lose sight of the strategic objective of preventing Lebanon from becoming an Iranian base. The U.S. was in a difficult position, he said, because of the "original and continuing sin" in the region (i.e., support for Israel). Siniora, as March 14's prime minister, could not afford to be seen as part of a U.S.- Saudi alliance against Iran, Syria, or anyone else. Instead, Lebanon should play a non-partisan role in the region, including vis-a-vis Israel, which, Chatah added, was the whole idea behind UNSCR ¶1701. ¶8. (C) Chatah also cited "concrete" actions in the south, i.e., supporting Lebanon's proposal to accept the UN cartographer's geographic definition of Sheba'a Farms and allow the UN to take control of the area as a key means for the U.S. to help the Siniora government. Nearly two years after the 2006 conflict, relinquishing Sheba'a to the UN could not be claimed as a victory by anyone and would have an enormous impact in strengthening the hand of the Siniora government. This could set the stage for a credible process leading to the fulfillment of 1701. Instead, the feeling in Lebanon was that the UN was putting the onus on Lebanon to solve the border issue with Syria, when the truth was the U.S. and Israel were not ready for this step. ¶9. (C) Speedier progress on the Special Tribunal also would help the Siniora government, Chatah said. There was growing frustration in Lebanon about the slow pace of the Tribunal, with some concluding that the pace was being deliberately slowed to allow time for the U.S. to negotiate a "deal" with the Syrians. ...AND AVOIDING A CONFLICT BETWEEN HIZBALLAH AND ISRAEL -------------- ¶10. (C) Chatah agreed that there were "well-founded concerns" regarding the security situation following the assassination of Imad Mougnieh. However, Hizballah now realized its rhetoric had gone too far, leading Nasrallah to deliberately play down the risk of a conflict with Israel in his March 23 speech. Hizballah would not risk undermining its strategic position by attacking Israel, and Iran and Israel also had no interest in starting a conflict. ¶11. (C) Chatah opined that any revenge Hizballah might take for the Mougnieh assassination would be a measured response or "compartmentalized revenge" to avoid invoking a massive Israeli response. Both sides know the rules of the game, he said. The biggest risk was that Israel would try to do what it failed to accomplish in 2006, neutralize Hizballah, and would therefore start a preemptive war. The Siniora government's challenge, therefore, was to neutralize this risk. COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) Chatah did not expand on how the GOL intends to "neutralize" the risk of a preemptive Israeli attack on Hizballah. However, part of the GOL's strategy is to deprive BEIRUT 00000436 003.2 OF 003 Hizballah of its main pretext for its arms -- resistance against Israeli occupation of Sheba'a Farms. Siniora has beaten this drum regularly, especially in meetings with high-level visitors from Washington. While we imagine Hizballah would easily find another excuse to hold on to its arms, an Israeli withdrawal from Sheba'a would give the Siniora government an immediate and significant boost both in Lebanon and throughout the region. ¶13. (C) Meanwhile, members of the March 14 General Secretariat told us early on that one of the Secretariat's SIPDIS goals was to coordinate better with the Siniora government. Clearly, there is still work to be done on this front, given the March 14 Secretariat's decision just an hour after our meeting with Chatah to send a "working paper" directly to the Arab League Summit outlining its complaints about the Syrian regime. End comment. SISON