LEBANON: BERRI SAYS CABINET MUST BE 10-10-10

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000026 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2018 TAGS: PARM PGOV PREL PTER FR LE SY SUBJECT: LEBANON: BERRI SAYS CABINET MUST BE 10-10-10 REF: BEIRUT 00016 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a January 7 meeting with the Ambassador, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri said he agreed with the 1/5 Arab League Foreign Ministers' communique. But Berri's interpretation of the communique was sharply at odds with that of March 14: whereas March 14 sees the communique as largely supporting the majority's views, the Speaker interpreted it as calling for an equal distribution of cabinet seats amongst the majority, opposition, and the president. Berri also used constitutional acrobatics to claim that the communique allows the election of Lebanese Armed Forces Commander Michel Sleiman without a constitutional amendment -- something he said he was prepared to do once the majority would agree to the 10-10-10 split. Berri, however, rejected a recent call by opposition leader Michel Aoun that the Taif Accords be amended to increase the president's power, and said he expected March 8 to launch demonstrations in the coming days, but did not expect direct action to be taken against the U.S. Embassy. End Summary. ARAB LEAGUE COMMUNIQUE "HISTORIC" -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by Poloff, met with Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and his advisor Ali Hamdan at Berri's office in Ain el-Tineh on January 7. Berri began the meeting by calling the Arab League Foreign Ministers' communique in Cairo on Saturday night 1/5 a "historical" decision. He added that he welcomed the communique, but was "afraid of the way the Lebanese would translate it." (Note: The communique outlines a three-point plan to solve the presidential election impasse which includes: 1) immediate election of Lebanese Armed Forces Commander Michel Sleiman as president, in accordance with the constitution; 2) formation of a national unity government in which no party has a blocking power; and 3) adoption of a new electoral law. Public endorsements of the communique have been made by Majority Leader and head of the Future Movement Saad Hariri, Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, Hizballah MP Hussein Hajj Hassan and Berri. End Note.) Indeed, as the meeting showed, Berri's interpretation of the Arab League's handiwork was sharply at odds with the description of the Arab League negotiations shared with us by Mohamad Chatah, PM Siniora's senior advisor, who was in Cairo as the communique was being drafted. NO AMENDMENT NEEDED TO ELECT SLEIMAN -------------- ¶3. (C) In terms of the immediate election of Lebanese Armed Forces Commander Michel Sleiman, Berri said that the solution was simple: drawing on the Arab League communique's reference to the Lebanese constitution, he would apply Article 74 of the constitution to elect Sleiman, without amending the constitution. According to Berri's interpretation, past legal decisions support his argument that, "exceptional circumstances" could be invoked as reasons for not adhering strictly to constitutional procedures for amending the constitution. (Berri has argued in the past that the presidential vacuum and the risk of a Sunni-Shia conflict all justified this approach.) ¶4. (C) Deploying as is his custom a complicated legal argument to justify the political position he has taken, Berri said Sleiman would have needed a constitutional amendment to become president before former President Emile Lahoud's term ended at midnight on November 23. However, since then, the presidential vacuum, which qualifies as a "exceptional circumstance", allows for the election of Sleiman without a amendment. Therefore, in Berri's view, Article 74 overrides Article 49 of the constitution, which requires civil servants to wait two-years after resigning from their government position before holding public office. (Comment: Some March 14 members have argued that by electing Sleiman without amending the constitution, Sleiman would be under the constant threat of intimidation, because at any moment any parliamentarian could threaten to challenge BEIRUT 00000026 002 OF 003 Sleiman's legitimacy, making Sleiman susceptible to manipulation. End Comment.) ¶5. (C) However, the Ambassador pointed out to Berri, that Article 49 also requires a six-year wait period for former Presidents to be re-elected to office; therefore, if the current political impasse constitutes an "exceptional circumstance" that trumps all other parts of the constitution as Berri says it does, then former President Emile Lahoud could be re-elected to office without a constitutional amendment. Berri attempted to show the difference between the two situations saying that Lahoud's case would require an amendment, but Sleiman's situation would not; however, Berri ultimately avoided addressing the Ambassador's point. 10-10-10 DIVISION OF CABINET SEATS A MUST -------------- ¶6. (C) Berri claimed that the Arab League communique interpreted a national unity government as a 10-10-10 cabinet split, distributing seats equally amongst March 14, March 8, and Sleiman. Berri argued this would be the only allocation of seats that would block all parties from having a blocking minority, as called for in the communique. However, March 14 sources are saying that the discussions in Cairo focused on 15 ministers for March 14, 10 ministers for March 8, and 5 ministers for Michel Sleiman. That formulation would deny the March 14 majority an overwhelming two-thirds majority and denying the opposition a blocking/toppling minority. ¶7. (C) Berri said if March 14 was given 14 or 15 seats and Sleiman had five or six, the two partie could unite and would have a two-third majorityto override a March 8 veto. However, Berri argue, if March 8 ever wanted to join with Sleiman topass a decision, their combined 15 or 16 votes wold not be enough to stop a March 14 veto; thus, Mach 14 would have a blocking minority under this nterpretation which contradicts the Arab League ommunique, according to Berri. He noted his peronal indifference to the allocation of seats, butsaid his March 8 partners would not accept anythng less than 11 seats, a blocking third, if the 0-10-10 distribution is not adopted. ¶8. (C) Beri believed a 10-10-10 allocation was important because it would give the president a swing vote which would be important in order to give stability to the government. He also said that it would improve the Christians political position in the country. Hamden added that by giving Sleiman 10 seats he would be "Emperor" and proclaimed the "savior" Christians think he is. AOUN CALLS FOR AMENDING TAIF -------------- ¶9. (C) Berri mentioned that Aoun advisor (and son-in-law) Gebran Bassil, recently called for a meeting of all Lebanese parties to come together and agree on amending the constitution to specify that the president have such representation in the cabinet, thus changing the Taif Accord. Berri said he refused to agree with this proposal. Berri joked that even if the opposition had 29 seats and March 14 had 1 seat, Aoun would still refuse to agree on Sleiman's election because Aoun still wants to be president. MARCH 8 DEMONSTRATIONS WILL OCCUR -------------- ¶10. (C) The Ambassador asked Berri about Hizballah SYG Hassan Nasrallah's recent speech, in which Nasrallah implied that March 8 would launch demonstrations in the next ten days to force the resignation of the Siniora cabinet (reftel). Berri confirmed, saying "of course there will be trouble in ten days." Berri blamed PM Siniora for the coming trouble, saying Siniora went beyond his agreement to only use his presidential mandate for urgent government matters. Berri claimed Siniora's decision to pass a resolution calling for an amendment to the constitution to allow for Sleiman's election overrode his mandate powers. Berri said that in two separate instances, Siniora gave his guarantee that he would not pass such a resolution, but that the day after making these guarantees; Siniora presented the resolution to the parliament. ¶11. (C) The Ambassador inquired about specific demonstrations BEIRUT 00000026 003 OF 003 against the U.S. Embassy by opposition supporters. Berri said "no way." Berri said that this rumor stems from the belief that President Bush is going to make a surprise visit to Lebanon during his Middle East trip this week. Berri promised to do everything in his power to stop any demonstrations by March 8 supporters against the Embassy. COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) Berri's comments seem to suggest the worst about the aftermath of the Arab League meeting: that Syria went along with the Arab consensus regarding the Lebanon communique, while Syria's allies in Lebanon intentionally developed an interpretation that is intended to thwart a solution -- but with the Lebanese, not the Syrians, blamed for the impasse. Mohamad Chatah, who was in Cairo for the deliberations, insists that the Arab League foreign ministers were explicit in their discussions that there would be a majority-minority split in the cabinet, with the negotiating history of the communique thus at odds with Berri's insistence on a three-way equal split. Chatah's description, of course, favors the March 14 interpretation of the communique. ¶13. (C) Unfortunately, the actual language of the communique can be read in a way that supports Berri's less-than-innocent interpretation. If the language means that March 8 cannot have blocking or toppling power, why should March 14 be permitted such power? Neither political bloc is mentioned explicitly in the document. Moreover, we can see Berri's interpretation being used against March 14, when March 14 argues for something along the lines of a 15-10-5 split: oh, Berri (and Aoun) will say, now the majority wants to take away powers that the Arab foreign ministers wanted to give to the (Christian) president? We left the Berri meeting concerned that, unless Amr Moussa and the Arab foreign ministers who attended the Cairo meetings give strong, public interpretations of the communique that are clearly in favor of March 14, we are no closer than we were to a solution to Lebanon's political crisis. FELTMAN