LEBANON: PM GRATEFUL TO RECEIVE PRESIDENT'S STRONG

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000251 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL UNSC PTER SY IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: PM GRATEFUL TO RECEIVE PRESIDENT'S STRONG LETTER OF SUPPORT REF: BEIRUT 00175 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Under Secretary of Defense Edelman delivered the President's personal letter to Prime Minister Fouad Siniora during their meeting in Beirut on February 12. The Prime Minister was grateful for the letter, saying he was pleased to see such "strong and firm support on many important issues." The Prime Minister reached out directly to KSA officials, who informed him that the Saudi contribution for the Special Tribunal "had likely already happened." The Prime Minister asked for the international community to join together for clear and united statements of support for the March 14th majority and immediate presidential elections. He asked for additional economic support and called recent Israeli actions along the southern border unhelpful. Finally, he acknowledged that the Palestinian refugee camps still present a security challenge. He asked for international donors to support the reconstruction of the Nahr al-Barid camp in order to provide "a new model for camps in Lebanon. End Summary. Grateful for the President's Letter -------------- ¶2. (C) Prime Minister Siniora paused at the opening of his February 11 meeting with Ambassador and USD/P Eric Edelman to carefully read the text of the personal letter from the President that Edelman had just handed to him. The PM acknowledged that the letter was coming at an important time, as March 14th prepares to commemorate the third anniversary of PM Rafik Hariri's assassination on February 14. ¶3. (C) The Prime Minister expressed his gratitude for the letter and said that he had no doubt about the President's personal commitment to Lebanon. However, he was anxious to "move forward with a literal translation of this support on the ground," mentioning the need for continued support for Lebanon's military and the Special Tribunal. PM Reaches Out to KSA Officials for Tribunal Funding Update -------------- ¶4. (C) During his last meeting with the Ambassador (reftel), the Prime Minister said he would follow up personally with the KSA for contributions to the Special Tribunal. When asked by the Ambassador for an update on his efforts, he said that he had personally spoken with Prince Saud al Faisal, the KSA Foreign Minister, about the issue and sent a reminder on February 11. With the U.S. delegation still in the room, he phoned Saudi Prince Bandar for an update. At the conclusion of the conversation, he told us that "The Saudis want to do this, but they want to do it without noise." He did not elaborate on this comment. ¶5. (C) He also took a call from Prince Mukrin bin Abdel al Aziz, Director of Saudi General Intelligence. At the end of this conversation, Siniora told us that he had been told that the Saudi transfer of funds had "most likely already occurred." Siniora asked Prince Mukrin for his assistance in following up on the pledges from both the Kuwait and the UAE. (Note: After this meeting, DCM spoke with Hariri senior advisor, Ghattas Khoury, who said that Saad Hariri planned to personally call Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal and Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Zayed on the evening of February 12 to urge formal and rapid tranfer of their donations into the UN Special Tribunal accounts. End Note.) Lebanese Majority Has Already Compromised Too Much -------------- ¶6. (C) As it had been four months since his last conversation with Ambassador Edelman, PM Siniora provided an overview of recent events "to put things in a Lebanese perspective." He said the majority has already sacrificed and compromised too much. They have shelved the right to use their "50 plus 1" majority to elect a president and they have agreed to support a presidential candidate who comes from outside of their own BEIRUT 00000251 002 OF 003 cadre of March 14th loyalists. The Prime Minister pointed out that March 14th had gone along with the French initiative and said, "We were let down." ¶7. (C) Siniora reiterated that the opposition still insisted on obtaining veto power in the new government and they were holding the presidential election hostage until their demand was met. "We want the blackmail to end," emphasized Siniora. Lebanon Needs Allies to Speak with One Voice -------------- ¶8. (C) In Siniora's opinion, the many "sidebar" consultations with Syria to date have failed to produce meaningful results. "The Syrians are masters at seeing light between the cracks and playing allies against each other. If the Syrians can see any room for negotiation, they will bring a situation to the brink in pursuit of the best possible deal for themselves. We have to stop the blackmail and escalating accusations. Dialogue should not take the form of violence in the streets - nobody wants that." ¶9. (C) Siniora would like the Arabs, Europeans, Russians and Americans to deliver one coordinated message to the Syrians, which he admitted is difficult to do. He emphasized the potential for Russia to play a positive role, stating that they had perhaps the greatest ability to influence internal decision-making in both Syria and Iran. Siniora was pleased with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Saltanov's statement earlier this week which contained clear language calling for an immediate election in Lebanon. King Abdullah had been in Moscow earlier this week and reported to Siniora that Lebanon had been an agenda item during his meetings at the Kremlin. ¶10. (C) Siniora also confirmed that Lebanon had not yet received an invitation from Syria to the March Arab League Summit in Damascus, although it is clear that there is no way for Syria to get around the issue of Lebanon's participation. The PM doubts that Syria will invite him to participate as head of state, despite the fact that he is currently carrying out executive functions in accordance with the Lebanese constitution. The alternative is that there will be an empty seat behind the Lebanese flag on the table during the meeting. Neither option seems palatable to Arab League member states, Siniora said. GOL Needs Assistance to Face Challenges -------------- ¶11. (S/NF) Siniora said that he would shortly be traveling to Kuwait, London, Paris and Berlin to seek additional political and economic assistance for Lebanon. He also said he had approached the KSA and UAE, but told us in a resigned tone, "I've spoken to them and visited them frequently. These things take time." He wondered aloud if these allies were starting to become ashamed of helping Lebanon. "Well, we are not," Ambassador Edelman emphasized. He told the Prime Minister that he would be discussing with Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Murr a new USG donation of USD 7.4 million in additional military assistance. He would also be providing the first results of some new intelligence sharing and proposing ways to build on existing LAF training programs for future cooperative programs. ¶12. (C) Prime Minister Siniora shared that he had a good working relationship with both the World Bank and the IMF, proudly telling us that the GOL was exceeding expectations despite the current challenges it faces. Siniora, a former Finance Minister, then launched into some statistics. The rising price of oil has hit Lebanon hard and the GOL, which subsidizes electricity production, is losing USD 1.2 billion per year. After Paris III, the GOL also agreed to reduce import taxes and Siniora said that they have to contend with USD 600 million per year on lost fuel excise taxes. He said he has been speaking with two countries to arrange for less expensive oil purchasing agreements. Kuwait has agreed to sell Lebanon oil at the same price it sells to the U.S., which Siniora claims "is not cheap." Siniora also plans to dispatch a delegation to Iraq to negotiate a purchase of crude oil which could be shipped to Lebanon via Turkey. "Syrians Use Sheba'a Farms to Justify the Presence of BEIRUT 00000251 003 OF 003 Hizballah" -------------- ¶13. (C) The Prime Minister also raised one of his frequent talking points -- the need to find a resolution for the Sheba'a Farms issue. He asked the USG to "do something helpful. Don't make us have to deal with the Syrians to find a solution for this. They like having this bleeding wound on the border. They use it to justify the preence of Hizballah." Israelis "Not Helpful" forStability in Lebanon -------------- ¶14. (C) Ambassador Edelman mentioned that he would shortly be meeting with Israeli interlocutors who, in general, respected the work of the Siniora government given the current difficult challenges that it faces. Siniora said Israeli actions continued to exacerbate tensions in southern Lebanon, specifically highlighting the continued illegal overflights, the lack of cooperation in identifying the location of cluster munitions from the 2006 war, and the recent kidnapping of shepherds and shooting death by IDF forces firing into Lebanese territory. He also said that Israeli representatives were "unhelpful" in UN-led border coordination meetings, especially on border demarcation issues. According to Siniora, all of these tiny things combined to put great pressure on the GOL's ability to maintain stability in southern Lebanon. Palestinian Camps Still Sources of Trouble -------------- ¶15. (C) In response to Ambassador Edelman's request for information about the Ayn al Hulwah Palestinian refugee camp, the Prime Minister acknowledged that this and other camps continue to be sources of trouble. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have been able to exert some control in the camps and to make offenders aware of the GOL's determination to maintain order, but the PM said the camps are still, in reality, microstates. ¶16. (C) When asked how the GOL would address this issue, the Prime Minister responded by saying that a new model for camps was needed in Lebanon. He called on international donors to contribute to the rebuilding of the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp. "We must show the people progress and give them a sense of hope for a better future. We paid a terrible price to gain control of that camp. We have to make it mean something." Conclusion -------------- ¶17. (C) The Prime Minister ended that meeting by telling Ambassador Edelman that the current political crisis was "bigger than Lebanon." He said that, if not resolved quickly, the Lebanese model will have profound implications on "societal openess in the rest of the region. SISON