LEBANON: HARIRI URGES STRONGER U.S. PRESSURE ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000215

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM PHUM PINR SY IS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: HARIRI URGES STRONGER U.S. PRESSURE ON
SYRIA

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Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b)
and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Increased pressure on Syria was the dominant theme of
the Ambassador's first meeting with majority leader Saad
Hariri. The opposition, supported by Syria and Iran, was
pursuing a long-term strategy to gradually take over the
country, he claimed. Bilateral and international assistance
was important, but not enough, to counter Syrian and Iranian
influence. Meanwhile, although March 14 was still giving the
Arab League initiative a chance, it was at the same time
escalating its rhetoric to rally public support and pressure
the opposition. End summary.


2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by DCM and Pol/Econ Chief,
paid an introductory call on majority leader Saad Hariri at
his office in Qoreitem on February 11. Saad's advisors
Ghattas Khoury and (cousin) Nader Hariri, and Saad's
notetaker, also attended the meeting. Saad had recently
returned from Tripoli (his first trip to the north since the
end of the Nahr al-Barid fighting in September),where,
welcomed by thousands of local supporters, he had announced a
donation of $52 million for the purchase of land for schools
and delivered a strong speech against the opposition. His
next stop would the Biqa' valley, he said, following the
February 14 rally in Beirut commemorating the third
anniversary of his father's assassination.

STRONGER PRESSURE ON SYRIA
--------------


3. (C) Saad stressed the need for stronger U.S. actions
against Syria to stop it from playing a destabilizing role in
Lebanon, a theme he returned to over and over again during
his hour-long meeting with the Ambassador. Syria is counting
on the passage of time, he said. It is prepared for a long
marathon with sustained pressure on the March 14 majority.
Syrian President Bashar al-Asad himself admitted a few months
ago that he was waiting for a new U.S. administration, Saad
pointed out, adding, "Look what happened in France when
Sarkozy came to power."


4. (C) The Ambassador stressed that there was bipartisan
support in Congress for an independent and democratic
Lebanon, with no daylight between the Democrats and
Republicans. She said that, regardless of who wins the U.S.
presidential election, there will be little change in U.S.
policy toward Syria and Lebanon.


5. (C) The core problem, Hariri countered, is that the U.S.
still has no Syria policy, other than to condemn. But
condemning the Asad regime only strengthens it; like a child
who is constantly reprimanded, eventually he stops listening.
Carrots are useless, he argued, recalling Secretary Powell's
overtures to Damascus, and the U.S. has no stick. If the
U.S. really wants an independent and democratic Lebanon, it
must get tougher on Syria.


6. (C) Syria and Iran plan ahead, Saad continued. Hizballah
began 25 years ago as a small group and today has become one
of the strongest. The next year and a half is their window
of opportunity; they'll assassinate a few more leaders, take
over parliament, and then the U.S. will wake up and realize
it has another Hamas situation on its hands. If the
opposition wins, he warned, one day soon you will see an
Iranian base in Lebanon.


7. (C) March 14 was also strong, but unable to fight back,
Saad said. Whereas the opposition had all options available,
including money and weapons, the majority does not carry arms
and does not want civil war. March 14 was trying to weather
the approaching storm of continuing assassinations and
political instability, but it needed to give its supporters
hope and tell them to stay calm. What can I do against
20,000 missiles, car bombs, and arms left, right and center?
he asked.

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8. (C) If you want the Syrians to play ball, you have to put
a gun to their head, he insisted, adding that economic
sanctions could help. They won't stop unless the regime
feels threatened. Iran also would be ten times weaker in
Iraq, the Palestinian territories, and Lebanon if the U.S.
went after Syria. If you can't, Saad said, then tell us and
we'll go and talk to the Iranians ourselves, just like the
Egyptians and everyone else does.

INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE
IMPORTANT BUT NOT ENOUGH
--------------


9. (C) The Ambassador, noting the February 12 visit of Under
Secretary for Defense Edelman and the February 27-29 visit of

SIPDIS
PRM PDAS Samuel Witten, said the U.S. will continue to
provide strong, tangible bilateral support to Lebanese
institutions such as LAF and Internal Security Forces (ISF).
Saad, acknowledging the critical role that U.S. assistance
had played in Nahr al-Barid, stressed the need for transport
helicopters to help the LAF move faster; if had been the U.S.
army fighting terrorists, they would have had Apache
helicopters at their disposal. You have them, he said, you
just need to make a policy decision to provide them. If
Lebanon had had a Marshall Plan for the LAF following the
2006 war, we would not be in the situation we are in now, but
the problem is there is always hesitation.


10. (C) Saad agreed that an announcement that enough funds
had been donated to start the Special Tribunal would give
people more hope, but they also needed to see more on the
ground. Strong international alliances are important, he
said, but they can't help us tip the balance of power in our
favor while two countries are paying "hundreds of millions"
of dollars to Hizballah.


11. (C) Recalling that last fall there had been a consensus
at one point on Robert Ghanem, only to have the opposition
pull out, Saad said the only real candidate for Syria and
Iran is a presidential void, he explained. This strengthens
their allies in Lebanon, weakens March 14, and contributes to
the Christian diaspora. The opposition knows the government
can not do anything economically for the people, and that we
are heading toward an economic meltdown. PM Siniora had been
successful in securing financial support from the Saudis, he
claimed, but this is only a bandaid, when what we need is an
operation. Outside donations will not solve the problem, he
said, only an election will. But there is no real pressure
on those preventing the election.

10/10/10 CABINET IS
RED LINE FOR THE MAJORITY
--------------


12. (C) Saad called his meetings with visiting Arab League
Secretary General Amr Moussa "enlightening." A 10/10/10

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cabinet formation was not acceptable to March 14, he said,
because it has the majority and therefore the minority should
not be given equal status. However, he admitted that this
formulation could open the doors for Lebanese Armed Forces
(LAF) Commander Michel Sleiman to be elected president.
(Note: In a February 12 meeting with Pol/Econ Chief, an
advisor to Samir Geagea said Lebanese Forces would not rule
out a 10/10/10 cabinet if it would lead to Sleiman's
election; however, the opposition also would insist on other
conditions such as agreement on the new army commander and
G-2 intelligence director. End note.)


13. (C) In Saad's February 8 meeting with Moussa, Free
Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun, and Phalange leader
Amine Gemayel, Aoun revealed the opposition's real position,
Saad said, or that of Syria and Iran, he added. In addition
to 10/10/10 they want prior agreement on the prime minister,
key ministries, the government's statement to parliament,
etc. March 14 cannot accept this, he stressed, as this would
lead to never-ending discussions and no election.


14. (C) Recalling that last fall there had been a consensus

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at one point on Robert Ghanem, only to have the opposition
pull out, Saad said the only real candidate for Syria and
Iran is a presidential void, he explained. This strengthens
their allies in Lebanon, weakens March 14, and contributes to
the Christian diaspora. The opposition knows the government
can not do anything economically for the people, and that we
are heading toward an economic meltdown. PM Siniora had been
successful in securing financial support from the Saudis, he
claimed, but this is only a bandaid, when what we need is an
operation. Outside donations will not solve the problem, he
said, only an election will. But there is no real pressure
on those preventing the election.


15. (C) Saad said, although he would still give the Arab
League initiative a chance, he had decided to escalate his
attacks against the opposition to ensure that March 14 was
being heard. Admitting it was a risky policy, he said he
would keep pushing until the Iranians, who fear a Sunni-Shia
conflict, understand where the game is leading and allow the
election to take place.


16. (C) Saad warned that the opposition would try to "stir
things up" during the February 14 rally, but they would be
reluctant to go too far. They know people are armed and will
defend themselves, he said, and that, as the civil war
demonstrated, there will be no winners.


17. (C) Saad noted that, in addition to several incidents
that occurred the previous day between Hariri and Berri
supporters, the Hariri-owned Oger Liban construction
company's headquarters was shot with over 300 bullets. He
decided not to publicize the attack because it would have
made people "go crazy," he said, given the current tensions
in the country.

COMMENT
--------------


18. (C) Saad reverted to his usual themes in his first
meeting with the Ambassador: tough actions against Syria as
the key to resolving Lebanon's political crisis, warnings
that Lebanon will become the next Gaza and a forward base for
Iran if the opposition wins the 2009 legislative elections,
and the need for more sophisticated U.S. military aid to
increase LAF capabilities. While we applaud March 14's
efforts to go back on the offensive with its public messages,
we are somewhat concerned with the strikingly violent tone
used recently by Saad and Druse leader Walid Jumblatt, upon
which opposition leaders already have seized to criticize the
majority as seeking confrontation. Nevertheless, the tough
talk seems to be having the desired effect of rallying March
14 supporters; though many Lebanese admit they fear violence
in the coming days, just as many tell us they expect a
massive turnout February 14.
SISON