LEBANON: HARIRI URGES STRONGER U.S. PRESSURE ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000215 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM PHUM PINR SY IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: HARIRI URGES STRONGER U.S. PRESSURE ON SYRIA BEIRUT 00000215 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Increased pressure on Syria was the dominant theme of the Ambassador's first meeting with majority leader Saad Hariri. The opposition, supported by Syria and Iran, was pursuing a long-term strategy to gradually take over the country, he claimed. Bilateral and international assistance was important, but not enough, to counter Syrian and Iranian influence. Meanwhile, although March 14 was still giving the Arab League initiative a chance, it was at the same time escalating its rhetoric to rally public support and pressure the opposition. End summary. ¶2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by DCM and Pol/Econ Chief, paid an introductory call on majority leader Saad Hariri at his office in Qoreitem on February 11. Saad's advisors Ghattas Khoury and (cousin) Nader Hariri, and Saad's notetaker, also attended the meeting. Saad had recently returned from Tripoli (his first trip to the north since the end of the Nahr al-Barid fighting in September),where, welcomed by thousands of local supporters, he had announced a donation of $52 million for the purchase of land for schools and delivered a strong speech against the opposition. His next stop would the Biqa' valley, he said, following the February 14 rally in Beirut commemorating the third anniversary of his father's assassination. STRONGER PRESSURE ON SYRIA -------------- ¶3. (C) Saad stressed the need for stronger U.S. actions against Syria to stop it from playing a destabilizing role in Lebanon, a theme he returned to over and over again during his hour-long meeting with the Ambassador. Syria is counting on the passage of time, he said. It is prepared for a long marathon with sustained pressure on the March 14 majority. Syrian President Bashar al-Asad himself admitted a few months ago that he was waiting for a new U.S. administration, Saad pointed out, adding, "Look what happened in France when Sarkozy came to power." ¶4. (C) The Ambassador stressed that there was bipartisan support in Congress for an independent and democratic Lebanon, with no daylight between the Democrats and Republicans. She said that, regardless of who wins the U.S. presidential election, there will be little change in U.S. policy toward Syria and Lebanon. ¶5. (C) The core problem, Hariri countered, is that the U.S. still has no Syria policy, other than to condemn. But condemning the Asad regime only strengthens it; like a child who is constantly reprimanded, eventually he stops listening. Carrots are useless, he argued, recalling Secretary Powell's overtures to Damascus, and the U.S. has no stick. If the U.S. really wants an independent and democratic Lebanon, it must get tougher on Syria. ¶6. (C) Syria and Iran plan ahead, Saad continued. Hizballah began 25 years ago as a small group and today has become one of the strongest. The next year and a half is their window of opportunity; they'll assassinate a few more leaders, take over parliament, and then the U.S. will wake up and realize it has another Hamas situation on its hands. If the opposition wins, he warned, one day soon you will see an Iranian base in Lebanon. ¶7. (C) March 14 was also strong, but unable to fight back, Saad said. Whereas the opposition had all options available, including money and weapons, the majority does not carry arms and does not want civil war. March 14 was trying to weather the approaching storm of continuing assassinations and political instability, but it needed to give its supporters hope and tell them to stay calm. What can I do against 20,000 missiles, car bombs, and arms left, right and center? he asked. BEIRUT 00000215 002.2 OF 003 ¶8. (C) If you want the Syrians to play ball, you have to put a gun to their head, he insisted, adding that economic sanctions could help. They won't stop unless the regime feels threatened. Iran also would be ten times weaker in Iraq, the Palestinian territories, and Lebanon if the U.S. went after Syria. If you can't, Saad said, then tell us and we'll go and talk to the Iranians ourselves, just like the Egyptians and everyone else does. INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE IMPORTANT BUT NOT ENOUGH -------------- ¶9. (C) The Ambassador, noting the February 12 visit of Under Secretary for Defense Edelman and the February 27-29 visit of SIPDIS PRM PDAS Samuel Witten, said the U.S. will continue to provide strong, tangible bilateral support to Lebanese institutions such as LAF and Internal Security Forces (ISF). Saad, acknowledging the critical role that U.S. assistance had played in Nahr al-Barid, stressed the need for transport helicopters to help the LAF move faster; if had been the U.S. army fighting terrorists, they would have had Apache helicopters at their disposal. You have them, he said, you just need to make a policy decision to provide them. If Lebanon had had a Marshall Plan for the LAF following the 2006 war, we would not be in the situation we are in now, but the problem is there is always hesitation. ¶10. (C) Saad agreed that an announcement that enough funds had been donated to start the Special Tribunal would give people more hope, but they also needed to see more on the ground. Strong international alliances are important, he said, but they can't help us tip the balance of power in our favor while two countries are paying "hundreds of millions" of dollars to Hizballah. ¶11. (C) Recalling that last fall there had been a consensus at one point on Robert Ghanem, only to have the opposition pull out, Saad said the only real candidate for Syria and Iran is a presidential void, he explained. This strengthens their allies in Lebanon, weakens March 14, and contributes to the Christian diaspora. The opposition knows the government can not do anything economically for the people, and that we are heading toward an economic meltdown. PM Siniora had been successful in securing financial support from the Saudis, he claimed, but this is only a bandaid, when what we need is an operation. Outside donations will not solve the problem, he said, only an election will. But there is no real pressure on those preventing the election. 10/10/10 CABINET IS RED LINE FOR THE MAJORITY -------------- ¶12. (C) Saad called his meetings with visiting Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa "enlightening." A 10/10/10 SIPDIS cabinet formation was not acceptable to March 14, he said, because it has the majority and therefore the minority should not be given equal status. However, he admitted that this formulation could open the doors for Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Michel Sleiman to be elected president. (Note: In a February 12 meeting with Pol/Econ Chief, an advisor to Samir Geagea said Lebanese Forces would not rule out a 10/10/10 cabinet if it would lead to Sleiman's election; however, the opposition also would insist on other conditions such as agreement on the new army commander and G-2 intelligence director. End note.) ¶13. (C) In Saad's February 8 meeting with Moussa, Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun, and Phalange leader Amine Gemayel, Aoun revealed the opposition's real position, Saad said, or that of Syria and Iran, he added. In addition to 10/10/10 they want prior agreement on the prime minister, key ministries, the government's statement to parliament, etc. March 14 cannot accept this, he stressed, as this would lead to never-ending discussions and no election. ¶14. (C) Recalling that last fall there had been a consensus BEIRUT 00000215 003.2 OF 003 at one point on Robert Ghanem, only to have the opposition pull out, Saad said the only real candidate for Syria and Iran is a presidential void, he explained. This strengthens their allies in Lebanon, weakens March 14, and contributes to the Christian diaspora. The opposition knows the government can not do anything economically for the people, and that we are heading toward an economic meltdown. PM Siniora had been successful in securing financial support from the Saudis, he claimed, but this is only a bandaid, when what we need is an operation. Outside donations will not solve the problem, he said, only an election will. But there is no real pressure on those preventing the election. ¶15. (C) Saad said, although he would still give the Arab League initiative a chance, he had decided to escalate his attacks against the opposition to ensure that March 14 was being heard. Admitting it was a risky policy, he said he would keep pushing until the Iranians, who fear a Sunni-Shia conflict, understand where the game is leading and allow the election to take place. ¶16. (C) Saad warned that the opposition would try to "stir things up" during the February 14 rally, but they would be reluctant to go too far. They know people are armed and will defend themselves, he said, and that, as the civil war demonstrated, there will be no winners. ¶17. (C) Saad noted that, in addition to several incidents that occurred the previous day between Hariri and Berri supporters, the Hariri-owned Oger Liban construction company's headquarters was shot with over 300 bullets. He decided not to publicize the attack because it would have made people "go crazy," he said, given the current tensions in the country. COMMENT -------------- ¶18. (C) Saad reverted to his usual themes in his first meeting with the Ambassador: tough actions against Syria as the key to resolving Lebanon's political crisis, warnings that Lebanon will become the next Gaza and a forward base for Iran if the opposition wins the 2009 legislative elections, and the need for more sophisticated U.S. military aid to increase LAF capabilities. While we applaud March 14's efforts to go back on the offensive with its public messages, we are somewhat concerned with the strikingly violent tone used recently by Saad and Druse leader Walid Jumblatt, upon which opposition leaders already have seized to criticize the majority as seeking confrontation. Nevertheless, the tough talk seems to be having the desired effect of rallying March 14 supporters; though many Lebanese admit they fear violence in the coming days, just as many tell us they expect a massive turnout February 14. SISON