LEBANON: ARAB LEAGUE SYG MOUSSA REPORTS NO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000195 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM PINR SY IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: ARAB LEAGUE SYG MOUSSA REPORTS NO BREAKTHROUGH, BUT PROGRESS, IN LATEST ROUND OF TALKS REF: BEIRUT 181 BEIRUT 00000195 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Michele Sison for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b) an d (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa, just minutes before departing Beirut, told the Ambassador that, although he was unable to report a breakthrough in the ongoing political impasse, he was not disappointed in his visit. There had been very open and serious discussions, he said, which revealed several points: the opposition was divided, Aoun was adamantly opposed to electing Sleiman, and Berri claimed he was ready to break ranks to hold the election if the majority agreed to a 10/10/10 cabinet. Sleiman nevertheless remained the only candidate on the table. Moussa plans to return to Beirut February 23-24. End summary. ¶2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by DCM and Pol/Econ Chief, met with Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa on February 8, immediately prior to his departure from Lebanon. Hesham Youssef, Moussa's Chief of Cabinet, and Talal el-Amine, another aide, also attended the meeting. ¶3. (C) Moussa jumped right in, stating, "This situation will continue for some time." There had been no breakthrough, he reported, but he was more positive after this visit. "There are so many question marks," he remarked, but they emanate from "serious discussions." His meetings succeeded in "shaking things up," pushing all sides into different corners. A DIVIDED OPPOSITION -------------- ¶4. (C) Moussa noted that his meetings were very revealing for several reasons. First, the opposition was clearly divided, he said, later adding that it was worth pursuing the different shades of gray between their positions. ¶5. (C) Second, Aoun has his own policy and ambitions (Moussa described it as an "almighty mission" to become president) and is not ready to play the concessions game to allow Sleiman to be elected. Aoun is a "fine man," Moussa said, but we must try to help him "move into the mainstream." Moussa added that Aoun is only party who speaks for himself, without reporting to an "outside uncle." I respect that, he admitted, even if I disagree with his position. He and Hizballah need each other, he added, for the mutual support of their respective constituencies. ¶6. (C) Finally, Moussa continued, Berri claimed he was ready to open parliament on February 11 as scheduled on his own, even if Aoun and Hizballah refused to go along, if the majority accepted a 10/10/10 cabinet division. Berri reportedly told him that Aoun did not represent Amal when he demanded concessions on cabinet formation and other issues. The question is, Moussa said, whether Berri would really act without the blessing of Hizballah and Damascus. There is a lot of confusion, Moussa noted. ¶7. (C) Moussa said the majority was more unified, but based on a minimal level of agreement. Hariri, though reportedly toying with the idea of 10/10/10, was reluctant to accept what did not appear to be a solid proposal and, according to Moussa, remained pessimistic about reaching a solution. Moussa, noting that the Arab League initiative proposal on cabinet formation remained from 13/7/10 to 10/10/10, said no new formulas (i.e., Berri's idea of a "king minister," reftel) would be entertained, since they would only bring things back to square one. ¶8. (C) (Note: The night before, speaking by phone with the DCM following the February 8 "quartet" meeting between Moussa, Aoun, Hariri, and himself, Phalange leader Amine Gemayel had called the meeting "three hours for nothing." He said it was clear that the opposition, especially Aoun, did not want an election to take place. It is not really about a blocking third or 10-10-10 division of seats in the cabinet, he said. The opposition, especially Aoun, wants influence in the government by controlling key cabinet seats and agreeing BEIRUT 00000195 002.2 OF 002 on the names of who would fill key positions. Consistent with what Moussa told the Ambassador, Gemayal claimed that Aoun and Berri are clearly not on the same page. End note.) SLEIMAN STILL THE CONSENSUS CANDIDATE -------------- ¶9. (C) Moussa confirmed to the Ambassador that Sleiman's position was now stronger than before. Ten days ago other names were still circulating, he said, and they still are. But there will be no serious attempt to change him as the consensus candidate, he stated, admitting, however, that Aoun would present the most serious challenge. ¶10. (C) Referring to Hariri's tough comments during his visit, in which he accused the opposition of doing the bidding of Iran and Syria, Moussa said neither side wanted an escalation of violence in the streets. The majority said if you shoot, we'll shoot, Moussa said, and both sides know the other is serious and the public will not tolerate more violence. THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM -------------- ¶11. (C) Many believe solution is outside, Moussa commented, adding, "I don't disagree." Solving the crisis in Lebanon would help ease tensions regionally, especially between Saudi Arabia and Syria, and vice-versa. Regarding the March Arab League Summit in Damascus, Moussa reported that he had told the Syrians that an empty seat for Lebanon was not acceptable. Moussa believed there was "something" behind Qatar's recent decision to leave UNIFIL, though he did not elaborate. Asked whether the Special Tribunal factored into any of the discussions, Moussa waved his hands in the air, said it was present, but no one talked about it. NEXT STEPS -------------- ¶12. (C) Moussa's recommendation was that the U.S. remain quiet on the Arab League initiative publicly, but continue meeting with all the players in the background. Commenting that he was "not disappointed" with his visit, he said there was still a lot of work to do and now was the time to "hammer strongly." The Arab League did not plan to meet again before Damascus, but Arab leaders would have the opportunity to discuss Lebanon at an upcoming EU-Arab meeting. He himself planned to return to Beirut February 23-24, just prior to the next parliamentary session on February 26. (Note: Berri officially postponed the February 11 session a few hours after Moussa's departure. End note.) "We'll see..." Moussa concluded. COMMENT -------------- ¶13. (C) In our discussions with March 14 throughout Moussa's visit, we urged them to maintain a united front and not give the opposition the opportunity to pin the blame for any perceived failure of the talks on the majority. March 14 appeared to hold firm, Saad's reported flirtations with 10/10/10 aside. ¶14. (C) It is easy to understand why this formula appeals to Berri; it helps him out of a prickly situation. As Speaker, he is caught between a rock and a hard place trying to demonstrate he is doing his utmost to get parliament open to hold the election, without evoking the wrath of his allies. ¶15. (C) For Saad the only attraction of 10/10/10 is if it would lead to the immediate election of Sleiman. But, as Saad is fully aware, this would require Berri and his Amal MPs to break from their Hizballah and Aoun allies, since Hizballah is unlikely to drop its demand for a blocking minority and Aoun, as Moussa accurately divined, has no intention of electing anyone but himself. Would Berri really risk alienating Damascus? Our guess is no, and our prediction is that, barring an unexpected breakthrough, there will be no election before the Damascus Arab League Summit. End comment. SISON